

CENTENNIAL ESSAYS
A COLLEGE FESTSCHRIFT



1891 • Centennial • 1991

Published by Saint Joseph's College

Rensselaer, Indiana 47978

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FOREWORD

Saint Joseph's College began classes on September 2, 1891. Among activities proposed to celebrate the centennial was one by Dr. John Nichols, Vice President for Academic Affairs, calling for a book of essays to be written by members of the faculty. It was to be a kind of institutional *Festschrift* representing a portion of the academic phase of the celebration.

In announcing the project to the faculty, Dr. Nichols stated that the book would embrace the whence and whither of higher education, of Catholic liberal arts education, and of Saint Joseph's College. The book addresses these issues, but others as well.

Though the book is published by Saint Joseph's College, it is not a statement of official positions by the College on the issues addressed. Each author speaks for himself.

The Editorial Board, appointed by Dr. Nichols, is grateful to him and other members of the faculty and administration for the opportunity of presenting these essays to the reading public. We are also grateful to Lilly Endowment, Inc. for partially funding the project.

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
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INTRODUCTION

Editorial Note: This is part of the Commencement Address that the Most Reverend William L. Higi, bishop of the diocese of Lafayette in Indiana, gave on May 5, 1991. This is not the entire address, but the portion relevant to this publication, especially the discussion on the nature of Catholic Higher Education. We are grateful to Bishop Higi for allowing us to use this material.

During your Centennial year, it is my hope that one of the things celebrated will be the dedication of the priests and brothers of the Society of the Precious Blood to the educational apostolate of this college. Last October, I was privileged to attend the jubilee festivities for six members of this Society, who had collectively served the college for 320 years! Looking back over the history of Saint Joseph's College, the priests and brothers and sisters of the Precious Blood would certainly have given tens of thousands of years of service to the work of this institution. Indeed this is something to be celebrated, particularly during this Centennial.

This is a special day for me because, years ago, my father attended Saint Joseph's College. References to this institution were common place in the home in which I was raised. As Chancellor of this Diocese under Bishop Gallagher and Bishop Fulcher, I had frequent dealings with the priests and the faculty of Saint Joseph's. And now, as Bishop of the Diocese of Lafayette, I assert, as I have on other public occasions, that Saint Joseph's College is a genuine treasure for the Local Church. This college takes a leadership role in forming adult catechists for the Diocese; it conducts a first-rate program in liturgical music; it gathered business leaders from North Central Indiana to discuss the economic pastoral with me; it furnishes fine people to serve on Diocesan and state committees and task forces; and it is, in sum, a source of cultural, intellectual, and spiritual leaven for the Local Church. I have found myself wondering fairly frequently--and this is a self-criticism and not a criticism of the college--how can this Local Church make more and better use of the resources which exist at this fine institution?

Now that I have myself in this historical frame of mind, I'd like to tell you how fascinated I was to see, in reading some of the Centennial publications from Saint Joseph's, how much the college has been a microcosm of the Catholic Church. So many major

changes in the Church at large have also happened here in dramatic fashion:

- the expanded role for lay leadership on the faculty, in the administration and on the Board of Trustees;
- the radical changes in the role of women at the college;
- the rise of an ecumenical spirit;
- people of many faiths collaborating in a common mission on the basis of shared values;
- the intense dialogue between christian faith and the world of science and culture initiated at the Second Vatican Council and so well incorporated into your Core Curriculum.

I congratulate you on the magnificent manner in which you have accomplished these developments within your academic community!

Since the Father Curran case in Washington, much has been written and discussed about the distinctive nature of a Catholic college or university. Saint Joseph's College is *the* Catholic institution of higher learning that I know more intimately than any other. On the basis of this knowledge, let me offer some personal contribution to the discussion of the nature of a Catholic college. I propose to do so in terms of three propositions.

First of all, an historical point: "The Catholic Faith is Catholic!" Both theologically and historically the Catholic faith is characterized by an openness to the full range of human culture. The Fathers of the early church turned to Greek philosophy to help them understand and explain the faith of the New Testament. They also learned much from the Roman genius at political organization when they erected the institutional church. The monasteries of the Eastern and Western Churches preserved the culture of the West after the fall of Rome, leading to a renaissance of Western civilization under Charlemagne and culminating in the splendid intellectual vitality of the medieval universities. Both the monks and the university professors saw an intimate connection between love of learning and the desire for God. And those are the roots of contemporary Catholic colleges, as Pope John Paul recognized in the opening sentence of his recent document on Catholic universities: "Born from the heart of the church, a Catholic university is located in that line of tradition which may be traced back to the very origin of the university as institution."

Pope Leo XIII, whose encyclical *Rerum Novarum* is celebrating its Centennial along with Saint Joseph's College, is another example of this openness to truth wherever it may be found. In that encyclical, Pope Leo tried to use the truth that he saw in both capitalism and Marxism to counteract the defects which flow from an extreme application of both.

In Twentieth Century America, Catholic colleges have kept alive this spirit of openness and breadth of learning by maintaining strong traditions of solid *general education* while other institutions of higher learning adopted a model of specialized research. The Humanities, the Arts and Sciences--philosophy, history, literature, languages, the "new" social and natural sciences--constituted a good half of the educational requirements at Catholic colleges cross the board.

In the first paragraph of the Vatican II document on "The Church in the Modern World" there is a contemporary endorsement of the dictum given to us by the Latin poet Terence: "Nothing Human is Foreign to Me." The Council asserts: "Nothing that is genuinely human fails to find an echo in the hearts of the followers of Christ." This openness or "catholicity" of outlook which this institution practices today is the fruit of an almost two thousand year tradition, uniting faith and reason in a search for truth that is as broad and open as the range of human intellect itself.

My second point is a contemporary one: What distinctive academic culture, granted this tradition, should one expect to find in a Catholic college? The Catholic faith, of course, should be vitally present and active in the ideals and values of the institution. But beyond that, fidelity to this tradition should show up in the comprehensiveness of the curriculum: the openness to the full range of ways of knowing about the world, people, and God should mean, as Newman said, that students will "live among practitioners of all disciplines." And, as believers committed to the non-contradiction between faith and reason, the Catholic college should be an institution in which faculty and students work at drawing together into an organic vision of reality (both in theory and in practice) the insights derived from the many disciplines.

In the pursuit of this organic vision of reality, there are two radical values which are taken as basic facts of human existence in our tradition: the dignity of the human person and global human solidarity. The contemporary response to the question put in the

Parable of the Good Samaritan--"who is my neighbor?"--is that every man, woman, and child on the face of this earth is my neighbor, and each and every one of them possesses the fullness of the dignity of being human. The demands of an humanist ethic joined with a theology of men and women created in the image of God are far more pressing than the demands of a secular humanist ethic by itself.

My final point deals with the acid test of Catholicity. In former days, we used to have to worry about whether or not a child's vaccination "took." I would suggest that the way one can determine if an education at Saint Joseph's College "took" would be whether or not graduates see a necessary connection between knowledge and action, between values and commitment, between faith and action. "Did it take or not?"

I implore you graduates...

- to integrate theory with practice;
- to vivify your business and professional lives with the values to which Saint Joseph's College has exposed you;
- to see your college education, as the college does, as more than merely academic, as more than just preparation for a career, as more than growth for your individual purposes;
- to stand up for progress in respecting the human dignity of all persons.

In short, I am asking you to live the values of christian humanism, not just know them. As you leave Saint Joseph's College, be the person your parents, your professors, your friends, and you yourselves (in your more reflective moments) see in you!

A TIME REMEMBERED

Ralph M. Cappuccilli

DEDICATION

After forty-six years of my life spent here at Saint Joseph's College, in grateful reminiscence, I wish to dedicate the personal reflections herein contained to the following: Father Paul Speckbaugh, C.PP.S., and all the Priests, Nuns, and Brothers of the Society of the Precious Blood whose lives of service have long been an inspiration to me and a constant reminder that "the best is yet to come." As Al Jolson would say midway through his performance: "You ain't seen nuthin' yet."

Come raise your voices
Strong in youthful joy
And make the heavens ring,
As thus our crimson ensign
now unfurls
And flies on airy wing

These lyrics from the Saint Joseph's College Banner Song were written by Father Paul Speckbaugh, one of the first and most beloved priest-professors I had as college teacher, counselor, and advisor. He was a brilliant teacher; and I was fortunate to have him during my undergraduate days (1944-1947). Gifted, talented, and wise, he was an inspiration to all who came under his tutelage, for he was, at once, both the symbol and the embodiment of the Saint Joseph's College spirit and a scholar of first rank. Learning, achievement, dedication, spiritual growth, and success were values he inculcated in me. His commitment was the college's commitment: the turning of young Catholic students into competent, successful, professional Catholic men, who, as Father Paul would often say, as he spun the chain that held the crucifix and beaded his shoulders in an ever-widening arc, "You must learn

to think, boys, think, boys; the world needs Christian men of logical, analytical minds and high ethical standards." This was his motto and the motto which has been that of Saint Joseph's College.

In Father Paul's time, the college was all male, and it remained so until some twenty years ago, when the College decided to admit women on a permanent basis and adopted residential co-education. This brought physical and other changes to the College atmosphere and curriculum; however, it served to enhance what had been a commitment to excellence in Catholic higher education from the College's inception.

My early days as a student at Saint Joseph's College were filled with the thrill of knowledge inculcated in me by men of grace and wisdom. How can I ever forget Fathers W. Pax, H. Lucks, A. Zanolar, A. Wuest, J. Kenkel, J. Sheeran, E. Kaiser, E. Maziarz, J. Baechle, M. and B. Dreiling, S. Ley, S. Hartman, I. Rapp, C. Robbins, R. and G. Esser, A. and L. Heiman, J. Hiller, R. Gross, and so many others who were, and are, models of what learning should be? All contributed to my growth by their scholarship and their exemplary lives as priests and men.

Throughout my first years at Saint Joseph's, its curriculum was diversified and selective and included some sixteen major fields in which one could concentrate. They were spread out through the humanities, social sciences, and physical sciences. The general education program was distributional and uniformly required of all students. Everyone, regardless of major, had to take the same general education program for his first two years. This included twelve hours of science, twelve hours of a foreign language, fifteen hours of philosophy and theology, and individual courses in economics, history, English, speech, and humanities. Most students satisfied their general education requirement during their first two years; concentration in their major field was accomplished during the last two years.

I chose to major in English in order to become a teacher at the secondary level. My experience in the area was not only thorough, but fulfilling and rewarding. Taking courses in composition, grammar, and world literature (ancient to modern), I pursued a comprehensive program of study. I knew I was preparing to compete anywhere with anyone with my education! A major task, which each student had to overcome, was writing a final thesis. The thesis was in one's major field. Each of us chose an advisor who directed his

study in the project and provided him with guidance and direction to its completion. My advisor was Father Raphael Gross, an eminent scholar and now deceased president of the College, who provided me with insights and motivation that have remained with me. Indeed, I was no exception in having so gifted an advisor. Such direction and guidance were common for all students, for other faculty exemplified to other students the same commitment I experienced from Father Gross.

Academic pursuits were complemented by co-curricular activities, that were many and varied. We had, and still have, a professional fine arts series from concerts and plays to prominent and nationally famous artists. Nostalgically, I remember the Von Trapp Family singers, Vivian della Chiesa, the Russian Cossack Chorus singers and dancers, the Catholic University Players, Harold Clurman (theater critic) and William Buckley, one of our commencement speakers who had just published his first book, *God and Man at Yale*. There was no lack of cultural complement to our educational growth, both in and out of the classroom.

Sports also played a significant role in our campus life. Father Edward Roof (still alive) was the athletic director, and he ran an active athletic program which included football, baseball, basketball, tennis, and golf. The program is much more diversified now. We did not have a strong intramural program such as presently exists; nevertheless, we did participate in inter-hall competition, and all of us were encouraged to keep ourselves physically fit.

An experience which I vividly recall was the presence of the Chicago Bears on campus. They chose Saint Joseph's College as their training camp. Coincidentally, this choice was made the same year I enrolled at Saint Joseph's College, 1944. They were to use the College's facilities for thirty years. During those early years the Bears' presence was an additional attraction that provided those of us who remained at the College throughout the summer the opportunity to watch professional athletes drill and scrimmage in our very own backyard. Later, as a professor at the College, I frequently brought my children with me to witness this extraordinary activity. What a tremendous impact this had upon the Rensselaer community! It served to develop strong feelings of mutual support between the town and the College.

I remember when I enrolled in the second semester of 1944, at a time the Second World War was nearing its end. The total enroll-

ment had dropped to thirty-seven students. At war's end, under the G.I. Bill, the gradual influx of returning G.I.'s rapidly increased our enrollment. In 1947 the enrollment was 601, in 1954 it was 665, and in 1959 it was 1089. What a change this had brought! Prior to the war's end in 1945, I took classes with so few students enrolled in them that I virtually could say that I had the benefit of private tutoring. All of this started to change when the G.I.'s started to return in 1945, 1946, and 1947. Many G.I.'s who had undergone the devastation and horror of war and had delayed their education needed very little external incentive, upon returning to College, to pursue their studies with diligence and determination. Thereby, the atmosphere and environment on campus for learning and knowledge were further heightened for all of us. The education of the G.I.'s having been interrupted, they returned to school with remarkably renewed fervor. When one went to the library, one could always find it filled with former G.I.'s preoccupied with "making up" for lost time. They were models of scholarship, and their example "rubbed off" on all of us.

Of course, the influx of G.I.'s necessitated an expansion of the College's physical plant to house the students. New residence halls--Noll, Bennett, Halas, and Gallagher--were constructed, followed by Schwietermann for housing of Priests, Brothers, and guests and Justin (for women) when the College adopted residential co-education.

These were complemented by a new student center (Halleck Student Center), named in honor of Charles Halleck, a Rensselaer lawyer and U.S. Congressman who served as house minority whip and leader of the U.S. Congress for a number of years. In Halleck's honor former President Dwight D. Eisenhower was present for the dedication of the building in 1962. This building replaced Raleigh Hall, which itself had been a replacement for the old "J Cafe," located in the basement of Gaspar Hall. Since that time, as the need has arisen, Saint Joseph's College has kept abreast of physical needs by adding to and refurbishing its physical facilities.

Another of the experiences I recall as outstanding was the sense of community that pervaded our campus life. This, coupled with and engendered by a high spirit and an intense morale, contributed to a profound sense of loyalty and Christian consciousness that was, and is, the Saint Joseph's College hallmark. Our education was continually reinforced by this sense of

community. It was given impetus by daily Mass. The chapel had eight to ten side altars where individual Priests would say Mass at different intervals from 6:30 A.M. to 8:30 A.M. Many of the students assisted as servers. Our classes all began and ended with prayer.

Priests edified everyone of us who witnessed such daily sacrifice. Moreover, from 1942 to 1950, there were some forty to sixty seminarians who, by their fervent dedication to all things, both spiritual and academic, also inspired us. Furthermore, there were Brothers and Nuns who went about their duties uncompromisingly in keeping up the College's physical plant and ministering to student needs. They were totally devoted to their tasks and displayed a remarkable enthusiasm that brought forth our admiration and affection.

Another of the most prominent influences during my undergraduate days at Saint Joseph's College was the speech professor whose speech course we all had to take. He was Father Ildephonse Rapp. An avid rhetorician, he was consumed with the ambition to make everyone another Demosthenes or Cicero. As a speaker, he was a human dynamo. Memory was one of his fortes. His recitations from many literary classics were spellbinding and kept all his students in rapt attention throughout his many exciting classes. Physically fit, totally devoted, and gifted with a voice the Attic orators might envy, he engendered my admiration even more when I discovered a most unbelievable eccentricity. Annually, Father Rapp climbed the water tower, 170 feet high, located in the center of campus. As a part of his birthday celebration, he scaled that steel-girded monster to its very top. He persisted in this activity until he attained the age of seventy-five, when he was finally ordered by his religious superior to desist from inviting personal tragedy by indulging in such a foolhardy escapade at his age. Knowing he was going to be forbidden this activity, Father Rapp climbed the tower a few days before his superior's official notification was to be mandated.

Other memories come vividly to me now: autumn football on Saturday afternoons followed by hamburgers and milk shakes at Lunghi's Restaurant in Rensselaer, "J Cafe" chatter with many friends and classmates, long "root hoggin'" walks to town on sunny Sunday afternoons and a camaraderie that has perdured. Yes, how can I ever forget "root hoggin'"? It was the equivalent of a hog's rooting in a pen which we duplicated with broken tree limbs and

branches used to overturn cans and debris in our path as we leisurely strolled to Rensselaer. It seems like only yesterday that among these pastimes everyone on campus squeezed in time to listen to the Metropolitan Opera on radio, sponsored every Saturday afternoon by Texaco. And the proms held every year with big name bands capped my eventful undergraduate years.

Lest I forget, not all was angelic! I lived in Seifert Hall, where our rector was Father Joseph "Pappy" Sheeran, an infinitely patient and beloved priest with an indomitable will who meted out justice with equanimity to all. When our mischief went "out of bounds," as it frequently did, we willingly accepted his reprimands as "shoats" (his favorite nickname for us), and we meekly resolved that henceforth proper conduct would permanently be observed and maintained. One instance comes readily to mind. I can't recall who began one of our biggest Saturday afternoon water fights, but it was one of the grandest water fights ever: first floor of Seifert Hall versus second floor of Seifert Hall. I resided on the second floor, where the advantage lay because of its strategic position. We posted a guard on the second floor stairway landing who served as a lookout and signaled us whenever a first floor student went strolling down the hall. As he did so, four or five of us, upon our lookout's warning, would, with buckets "snatched" from the hall storage closet and then filled with water, empty the contents on the unsuspecting passersby. The students on the first floor retaliated by attacking us *en masse* until all students, hallways, rooms, walls, ceilings, etc. were drenched. No one suspected that "Pappy" was around, but he was! He emerged from his room, surveyed the chaos, did not allow his wrath to overcome him, but with calm resignation meted out the punishment all of us knew would be forthcoming. For myself and others involved, this included the following: cleaning and drying every drop of water throughout the hall; painting the hallways and rooms; remunerating the college for all damages; submitting to an eight o'clock curfew. Failure to comply with any of the above mandates would result in a semester's expulsion. At the time "Pappy's" opprobrium seemed harsh. In retrospect, it was not. Indeed, our respect and admiration for him multiplied.

After receiving degrees, many of us left to pursue (and succeed in) our chosen professional fields for which we had been thoroughly trained. I went to graduate school at the University of

Michigan. After successfully completing my master's degree in speech communications, I returned to my *alma mater* as a teacher in that field. Father Raphael Gross was president, and Father Edward Maziarz was academic dean. They hired me to teach speech and drama. As a novice teacher, I marveled at the support given me by colleagues whom I formerly admired as a student and now admired even more as a peer. Their example was, now with my personal identification with them, more indelibly impressed upon me as a lay member of their teaching community.

As a former student and new teacher at the college for forty-six years of my life, I have been witness to and participant of the commitment I first experienced as a student: the diligence, concern, and prescience of the administration and faculty to build a Catholic Christian college of higher learning. An unswerving dedication to academic excellence and professional training reinforced through moral and ethical values has remained constant and current. New and useful programs have been introduced to keep abreast of, and in the forefront of, other colleges, and even universities, in striving to meet the needs of an advancing world. New major programs adapted to these demands have been introduced, ranging from computer science and telecommunications to nursing and medical technology. Quality in teaching personnel has been sought and achieved. Men and women of exceptional competence and qualification have been scrutinized and engaged by the administration, not only to maintain and enhance our curriculum, but to sustain the college's pursuit of excellence in quality of campus life.

Among the other major changes that have emerged during my tenure, there are several that deserve special comment. One of the most telling and welcome changes was the college's introduction of residential co-education twenty-three years ago. This change was a welcome one. It exemplified foresight and willingness to perceive and acknowledge the female component as an integral part of society. (Moreover, it was a major step in recognizing the viability and essential meaning of Saint Joseph's regard for training, that facet of society that has become a complement to our total educational process.) This brought physical and more flexible changes to the College atmosphere and curriculum; however, it truly served to enhance what was and has been a commitment to excellence in Catholic higher education from the College's inception. Additional staff and courses, both academic and co-curricular, gave still

another dimension to our campus. The atmosphere and environment were enlivened and made more realistic in both the academic and social lives of our students.

With the addition of women, the academic atmosphere became more competitive, and the social inter-relationship of male and female better adapted to the nationwide trend that has become acutely aware of the competence, need, and expertise of professionally trained men and women. Saint Joseph's College has understood this urgency and has responded effectively and cogently.

The area in which I teach, speech and drama, was given a major boost and increased flexibility with the advent of co-education. Prior to the admission of women, my speech classes, although technically sound and academically oriented, lacked in the realistic and heterogeneous dimension students would encounter in the workaday world. Moreover, another exigency that the administration addressed in my area with the introduction of co-education was the need to select and present dramatic plays of diverse and varied dramaturgy that broadened the total spectrum of our theater program. I no longer had to find all male character plays or assign men to women's roles. We did, however, in the mid and late fifties invite women from various Catholic female colleges in the area to perform female roles previously acted by men. For example, Father Lawrence Heiman contacted the drama directors at Saint Xavier's College in Chicago and Saint Mary of the Woods College near Terre Haute, Indiana, and they allowed us to bring in actresses from their schools. Thus, our theater program became more viable and less artificial, and our play selection and adoption became more varied. However, the inconvenience of travel for rehearsal and performance which this procedure involved was staggering. Our rehearsal schedule had to accommodate the girls who would arrive by train (the old Monon line) on Friday afternoons. We would rehearse around the clock, both night and day, until Sunday afternoon, when the girls departed for their respective schools, only to return the following weekend and repeat the process. There were four to six weekends of these inter-school exchanges to prepare a play for final performance. Although this improved our program, it was, at best, only a stopgap measure; for our rehearsals were too long, too concentrated, and too rigorous. Lunch and dinner were brought to us right on the stage.

Furthermore, short naps and breaks, also on the stage, were few and far between. Through this procedure we managed to mount and present such productions of excellent quality as *Othello*, *Emperor Jones*, *On Borrowed Time*, and *You Can't Take It With You*. When Saint Joseph's College became co-educational (1968-1969), we continued the tradition with presentations such as *Tartuffe*, *The Imaginary Invalid*, *The Glass Menagerie*, *Waiting For Godot*, *Dial M For Murder*, *Our Town* and various musicals, among which was *The Man Of La Mancha*.

Indeed, as efficacious as co-education was for my area of speech and drama, it was more so for the College as a whole. All along the College's administration and staff have, with foresight and conviction, regarded its mission to train young men (and now women) in the Catholic Christian tradition as an integral part of a student's total education. One need only witness the staff changes over the forty-two years of my faculty tenure. Where once we had an all male student enrollment and all male faculty, we are now diversified in both student body and staff. Twelve percent full time and twenty-six percent of our teaching staff part-time is comprised of highly qualified, competent, and professional female professors. This transformation has reaffirmed the college's long time tradition of keeping abreast of educational trends and has augmented our co-educational status. At the present time the female ratio of the student body has surpassed that of the male.

Perhaps a still more essential change that has strengthened our curriculum was the introduction of a Core curriculum in general education. It is an innovative program that has drawn the attention of prominent scholars nationwide. Twenty-four years ago a special Core Curriculum Committee was established by the administration and faculty to determine the feasibility of introducing a Core program as a replacement for our then distributional, traditional, cafeteria style, general education program. After serious consideration and study, the faculty, by a majority vote of eighty-five percent, adopted the Core program. Certainly, this was one of the most prudent decisions ever made by the College. We have always had a good general education program, adequate and well rounded for our students; however, the former cafeteria style approach to learning deferred students' extensive involvement in their major and minor areas. They had to wait two years before pursuing fully their major programs, and

frequently students had little or no sense of the inter-relationship of courses. At times, different courses could be substituted for those required in the general education program.

The Core program brought significant and meaningful direction to our overall education program. For example, some of the following salutary benefits emerged:

(1) The students' general education program was made more cohesive, comprehensive, and integrated. The Core program was spread out over four years instead of two as in the former general education program.

(2) Core provided the student with a broader range and scope of knowledge that was no longer distributive.

(3) Core provided a systematic approach to a universal, common body of knowledge for a uniform learning experience.

(4) Core afforded the students an opportunity to begin their major programs in their freshman year and facilitated the pursuit of their major, minor, and electives from the moment they entered Saint Joseph's College.

(5) This program reflected the College's strong commitment to the liberal arts tradition in Catholic higher education in today's ever changing world.

(6) Core provided a Christian, humane approach by engendering values, both ethical and moral, for a life worth living.

(7) Core combatted the tendencies of other higher educational institutions to over-specialize and/or vocationalize learning.

The acclaim that Saint Joseph's College has received for this innovative Core program has been well deserved. The Core program has been recognized in prominent national journals, but even more important and rewarding has been the reaction of former graduates who have undergone this program. Comments ranging from, "It was the best thing that ever happened to me" to "I didn't realize the value of Core until I started working" are gratifying.

My own personal experience as a teacher in Core, as well as in dialogue with other professors involved, has been intriguing and fascinating. From its beginning I have witnessed its growth and development to its present position of stature and influence. Over and over, professors who teach in the Core program are

discovering new dimensions of information and knowledge through participation in it and rediscovering that learning is endlessly, challengingly, and rewardingly dynamic. My teaching and learning in my own special area of communications has been enhanced by my experience in Core. The value of being exacting and precise has positively affected my analytic thinking, my preparation and presentation of lectures, and the various applications and differing aspects of my subject knowledge. Core has been a pedagogical boon to my own growth and improvement. Moreover, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Lilly Endowment, and others have recognized the impact of our Core program and have contributed funds to its continuing growth, perfection, and implementation.

All our departmental areas, where some thirty-eight area majors are available to our students, are growing and improving. Programs, courses, required and elective, have been with care and consideration revised and expanded to meet the exigencies that will be demanded of our students once they leave Saint Joseph's College.

When I came to Saint Joseph's College as an instructor in speech (1948), I was the sole instructor in the area. At that time there were only two courses available to our students: beginning and advanced speech for a total of six academic credits. Immediately, I set about expanding the program into a minor, and eventually, over a period of four to five years, into a major with a total of fourteen courses (forty-two credits). These courses ranged across the whole spectrum of speech in rhetoric, voice science, and drama. Although minimal, the courses were adequate to the needs of the time. Additional instructors were added to our department. For some time we remained constant with our staff and courses; however, as certain educational needs for the future arose, we constantly revised courses and staff to meet them. For twenty years our department enrolled between fifteen and twenty majors. Students were able to graduate with just one area of concentration, general speech. Today, as I record these observations of our own departmental growth, I marvel at the enrollment, diversity of choice, and staff evolution that have occurred. At present, within our department, we have eighty-two majors enrolled. Our students can concentrate in rhetoric, radio, television, or journalism. There are thirty-seven courses from which they can choose. These

comprise a total of one hundred-eighteen credits, thirty-six of which are specified within each area; the eighty-two additional credits are available to the students in order to supplement their programs. As for our staff, it has increased from two in the late fifties to seven today.

Aware of, and even anticipating, changes in the world in which our students will compete, we have commensurately introduced, revised, and strengthened programs in other departments too. The college as a whole is conscientiously committed to achieving the excellence demanded of today's graduates. The infrastructure, so dedicatedly laid down by the early fathers of the C.P.P.S. (Society of the Precious Blood) to the present president, Reverend Charles Banet, Saint Joseph's College has been blessed with leaders of visionary wisdom. For over twenty-five years, Father Charles Banet has been a leader of courage and extraordinary commitment to the college's mission. His determination, so steadfast and persistent, to excel constantly and to improve the college, has been preeminent in his tenure. The College's growth and stature as a Catholic Christian institution of higher learning have pervaded the spirit of all who work and come under his influence. The sturdy foundation laid by those who preceded Father Banet has been made still more durable and sustainable under his leadership.

This foundation, so firmly established by the administration, did not waver even under the duress placed upon it by the devastation of the Administration Building. Many alumni and some professors still teaching at the College today will recall the destruction by fire of the beautiful administration building in February of 1973. That fire, of unknown origin, turned that old and venerable building into a rubble within five hours. The loss of many of us was great: books, lectures, notes, artifacts, and furnishings were consumed. Never to be forgotten was the Spartan courage of many Saint Joseph students who risked their lives in salvaging essential records from the various administration offices. In so doing, they preserved official documents for future reference.

The loss of the Administration Building actually brought a renewed vigor and determination to the College community. After the initial shock, prudent and ingenious action was undertaken by the administration. Constrained to provide new accommodations

temporarily or permanently, they found ways to do so. Every inch of space was utilized to keep the College functioning efficiently.

Courage, ingenuity, determination, and dedication emerged dramatically at the time of the fire; however, these qualities had prevailed throughout the College's history. As I reflect over my student years (1944-1947) and my teaching years (1948-present), my pride in the College's achievements and growth remains undaunted and secure for the future. My assurance is reinforced when I survey the qualities maintained over the years, past and present, while confronting challenges old and new, to improve and enhance Saint Joseph's unwavering dedication to excellence by always keeping abreast of changes when necessary:

(1) the commitment, competency, and expertise of our administration.

(2) coeducation, to provide a viable social and academic climate.

(3) academic leadership and foresight.

(4) Core, which has integrated general knowledge.

(5) moral, ethical, and religious training.

(6) the diversity and currency of academic programs.

(7) maintaining and upgrading the physical plant.

(8) provision for sustaining and supplementing Financial Aid programs.

(9) superior faculty.

Yes, Saint Joseph's College looks to the future unhesitatingly, as well as with great anticipation! Fortified with a long tradition of commitment to excellence as an institution of Catholic higher education, it stands ready to confront and surmount the dynamics of social, political, economic, and technological change. Uncompromisingly, it has maintained its community and collegial spirit. It stands ready to forge ahead still further, not with idyllic proposals, but with realistic action, to meet the vagaries of an ever-changing world. It stands ready to herald the dawn of whatever eventuality lies ahead. The mission of training men and women, grounded in Christian values and dedicated to quality scholarship leading to professional competence and expertise, has never wavered. Many successful alumni are ample testimony to that. Their support, both financially and academically, has been steadfast and loyal. A strong witness to this has been a steady growth in contributions. Moreover, their participation in alumni groups,

clubs, and activities on behalf of the College bodes well for their *ALMA MATER*. Of salient importance is the Board of Trustees of the College. Their efforts on behalf of the College regarding both internal and external resources has been incalculable. Ever concerned for the College's quality, they have shown wisdom that has been our shining talisman.

In addition, the community of Rensselaer has provided undying and inspiring support, and the College community has gratefully received that support and has thrived, to the benefit of both town and college.

Therefore, those of us who stand at the portals of the future--administration, faculty, staff, students, alumni, and community--exclaim Father Speckbaugh's words which so aptly express the past momentum of Saint Joseph's College and the renewed rejuvenation that will carry that momentum into the future.

Come fill the world with stirring melody
 To show our joyous glee--
 We'll fly our standards high
 To grace the gleaming sky--
 A flag for all to see.

A 'COPERNICAN REVOLUTION' IN HIGHER EDUCATION

John P. Nichols

For several years--since about 1977--I've been bothered about the facile connections that people in higher education circles make between narrowness and depth, on the one hand, and between breadth and shallowness, on the other. The major, they say, must pursue narrow specialization to achieve depth, whereas in general education breadth is bought at the price of shallowness of study (the survey course, for example). G. K. Chesterton extrapolated the first member of these correlative gems of wisdom into the definition of the specialist as "one who knows everything about nothing," and J. J. Kockelmans formulated a rejoinder in his definition of the generalist as "someone who knows nothing about everything!" (Can you picture the grant proposal or the college catalog that would synthesize these two statements into "the compleat undergraduate experience"?)

I called the connections narrow/deep and broad/shallow "facile," and I mean it. They are, in fact, wrong. In an otherwise wonderful 1985 monograph, *Integrity in the College Curriculum*, the Association of American Colleges (AAC) nonetheless called the academic major "a study in depth" to distinguish it from the general education portion of the curriculum. One of the things which I want to argue very strongly in this essay is that general education, in terms of its own set of defining goals, is every bit as much a "study in depth" as the major. You simply have to have a big enough idea of general education!

That brings me to a second point of beginning. A keen observer of the whole scene of general education in the 1970s and the 1980s, Jerry Gaff, wrote in *Liberal Education* (74.5, 11): "There is a reform movement, but it hasn't produced significant change in nine out of ten colleges." A front-page headline in *The Chronicle of Higher Education* (Dec. 14, 1988) announced "Sweeping Curricular Change Is Under Way at Stanford." The professors interviewed in the article, however, praised the "classic compromise" as "politically ingenious," in that those who wanted to hold to the old canon could

do so, but others got some space to do what they wanted to do. (Horace anticipated "sweeping changes" like this: "Parturiunt montes nascetur ridiculus mus." "The mountains are in labor; what will issue forth is a ridiculous mouse.") It's time for something radical and comprehensive to occur.

THESIS

I was invited to give a presentation on the Core Curriculum at Saint Joseph's College for a group interested in general education reform at the 1989 National Conference of the AAC. The organizer wanted me to use the title "The Case Against Modest Changes." At first I told her that I'd rather argue the affirmative--"The Case FOR Immodest Changes: Let's Hear It for Immodesty!"--but then I remembered Paul Ricoeur's inspired use in *Le Volontaire et l'involontaire* of the metaphor of "The Copernican Revolution" for the radical metaphysical decentering of the Cogito that was his main project. Click! That was it.

What was at stake in my two introductory points was a reversal of perspective or, in Copernican terms, a recentering of the undergraduate college curriculum. If to be human is to make meaning, then general education is the center of the curriculum as a critical reflection on human experience in its totality. What is secondary, derivative, or "planetary" is the major as a specialization in but one of the many ways that we structure human experience. The goal of general education is to ready students to be full participants in the conversations of the educated members of the human family.

I will first build the case in support of my thesis and then show a living instantiation of this recentered curriculum. The case will be built by harkening to four "major prophets," who I think offer convincing proof that the academic universe is indeed "Copernican," contrary to popular perception.

THE CASE

In the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Politics*, Aristotle makes it abundantly clear that he thinks there is not only a plurality of arts and sciences and purposes but a hierarchy in them as well. Some are subordinate to others as parts to a whole. The master-art or sovereign science in human affairs is Politics, because it seeks the

highest good of the whole polis. Ethics and Politics share the same highest good, virtuous activity, in kind; but Politics is higher in degree because it aims at this good for the whole citizenry and not just for a single individual.

The interesting label that Aristotle applies to Politics is "architectonic." The word is a compound of "archos," meaning chief or leading or primary or principal, and "tekton" which means worker or craftsman. An architect is the chief builder who integrates and harmonizes the individual work of many craftsmen into a meaningful whole. Aristotle uses this metaphor to express the role of Politics vis-a-vis all the sciences which have a role to play in the polis: ethics, psychology, economics, and rhetoric, for example. Thomas Aquinas appeals to the same metaphor but substitutes wisdom in place of Politics: "Sapientia est quasi architectonica respectu omnium virtutum" ("Wisdom is something architectonic in regard to all the virtues." II-II, 66, 5).

I have a different substitution to suggest: just as Politics is the architectonic science for Aristotle and wisdom is the architectonic virtue for Aquinas, so general education is the architectonic portion of the undergraduate curriculum. General education is not ancillary to, not propaedeutic for, nor at the service of, the major. On the contrary, it is general education which has primacy and pre-eminence over the possible and/or available majors. It is the "arch-major" in the university (in the honorific sense of "arch-bishop" and not the pejorative sense of "arch-enemy"). It is general education which makes a whole out of the many parts (the majors, minors, and electives) and furnishes the broader human context within which these parts can remain true to their original or "root" intention.

* * *

Cardinal Newman's *The Idea of a University* is a second obvious source of ideas which can help me build my case. Out of the many stunning discourses in *The Idea*, I would like simply to tie together Newman's positions on the unity of knowledge, the mark of the truly great intellect, and the distinctive trait of education at a university.

Newman's epistemological stance, one would say nowadays, is an objective-realist one:

Summing up... what I have said, I lay it down that all knowledge forms one whole, because its subject matter is one; for the universe in its length and breadth is so intimately knit together, that we cannot separate off portion from portion, and operation from operation, except by a mental abstraction. (Discourse III, #4)

Newman's conviction of the connectedness of everything has its deep reason in the Biblical notion of creation: everything that is owes its very existence to the creative work of the one God.

The crucial point for this essay, however, is the equivalence which Newman sets up between the various sciences or disciplines and "mental abstraction." To abstract is to pay attention to certain facets of things and to ignore other facets. Each discipline, then, in Newman's view, defines itself every bit as much by what it omits/ignores of reality as by what it focuses on. From this he concludes that "the systematic omission of any one science from the catalogue [of the university] prejudices the accuracy and completeness of our knowledge altogether" (Discourse III, #4.). Integration of knowledge is possible because of the oneness of God's creation, but integration is necessary because of the unavoidable abstraction at the root of every discipline.

The "truly great intellect," then, "is one which takes a connected view," possessing "the knowledge, not only of things, but also of their mutual and true relations," knowledge which deserves to be called "philosophical" (Discourse VI, #5). The highest goal to which education can aspire is to develop the ability to synthesize, the power of viewing the many as knit together into one whole. The cultivated intellect, "disciplined to the perfection of its powers," is not partial or fanatic about just one way of viewing reality, but is calm and collected, attuned to the multi-faceted view of reality which the several disciplines furnish, and skilled in seeing the influence of all these partial views on one another and their confluence into the whole.

The very *raison d'être* of the university is to cultivate the minds of students in the way just described. Therefore, all branches of knowledge, all disciplines, must be present in the university; the distinctive trait of the university education is comprehensiveness. If the universe is one, as said above, all of the disciplines "have multiplied bearings one on another." "They complete, correct, balance

each other... There is no science but tells a different tale, when viewed as a portion of a whole, from what it is likely to suggest when taken by itself, without the safeguard, as I may call it, of others" (Discourse V, #1). Newman does not expect students to master every one of the disciplines in order to cultivate this integrative or philosophical habit of mind. What he expects to happen at a university is that students will pursue one or two disciplines in a special manner; but, by "living among" practitioners of the whole circle of disciplines, they will learn how to "complete, correct, and balance" the views of one discipline with those from others and, most importantly, learn how all branches of knowledge are connected.

* * *

There are those who would dismiss Newman's view of university education simply on the basis of its "naive nineteenth-century objectivism." But I have found a remarkable degree of confirmation of Newman's position in the writings about higher education by one of America's foremost contemporary proponents of existential phenomenology, Joseph J. Kockelmans. What I would like to present here, as a third step in building my case for immodesty about general education, is a summary of the view of higher education which Kockelmans presents in *Interdisciplinarity and Higher Education*, as based upon his philosophy of human knowledge contained in *The World in Science and Philosophy*.

Rampant specialization has ruined the undergraduate curriculum. Universities have in a sense become like prisons where inmates with the same record (discipline) are put in the same hermetically sealed cell (department). A form of Marxist alienation--practitioners of one discipline cannot recognize themselves in the products of another discipline--isolates discipline from discipline, to the ruin of academic community. Kockelmans' conviction is that general education is the answer to this problematic situation and that transdisciplinarity is the key to general education. Transdisciplinarity is for him, not a global, but a specific attitude which aims at understanding the contribution which each discipline makes to the human search for meaning. It is the "philosophical" aspect of the practice of any discipline. It is the locus of the debate between Einstein's refusal to accept that "God plays dice with the

cosmos" and Bohr's embrace of radically stochastic processes in nature, or it is the insistence of both Paul Ricoeur and Peter Berger in their different disciplines that human behavior must be seen as a dialectic between determinisms and freedom. Transdisciplinarity thus involves both an endorsement of specialization and a willingness to transcend the limited perspective of one's own discipline. (Where Kockelmans and Newman part company is, so to speak, on the "timing" of the unity or connectedness of human knowledge: for Newman this unity was "given" at creation, whereas for Kockelmans unity is not presupposed but is something to be brought about by human effort. On the nature of human knowledge and the practice of university education, however, Newman and Kockelmans are of one mind.)

It follows, immediately and emphatically, from this commitment to transdisciplinarity that general education is primary and architectonic, whereas the major in undergraduate education is secondary and derived ("planetary"). If I may take a few lines to compare "the world" as seen in three ways--commonsense knowledge, scientific knowledge, and philosophy--by existential phenomenology, I think the architectonic role of general education will be greatly clarified.

As Husserl pointed out, common sense knowledge has as its essential trait that it is uncritical. It is an interpretation of the world which is based on praxis, but it conserves, for one example, proverbs which offer contrary advice: "Haste makes waste" vs. "He who hesitates is lost." Common sense knowledge is also too unarticulated to incorporate the frames of reference of the specialized disciplines. Education, in short, is a movement beyond the world of common sense knowledge.

If I change my attitude, change the way I look at the world, the world changes its characteristics. Phenomenologists took Aristotle's term intentionality to label "a way of looking at the world," a particular way that a knowing subject tends toward (goes out of self toward...) an object known. The "objectivity" of the empirical sciences, for example, is a consequence of the decision of the knowing subject to adopt an objectifying intentionality, one which focuses on those precise facets of the world. Objectivity really is a consequence of the knowing subject's decision. If, contrariwise, I choose to approach Nature with the subjective intentionality of the poet, Nature shows very different aspects of itself to me. What all of

this implies is that the world as seen through the intentionality of any of the special disciplines is abstract, derived, and secondary.

What Newman and Husserl and Kockelmans call "philosophy" is an intentionality which looks for the meaning of the whole of human experience, which looks for the connections among the structures of meaning created in every discipline. It is a critical reflection on the meaning created in these disciplines, a reflection which makes explicit how human experience is structured in each particular discipline and which strives to connect the structures in one discipline with those in another--empirical determinism and transcendent freedom in the explanation of human behavior, for example--and which strives to maintain the vital connection between structures of meaning created in a discipline and their roots in the world of human lived experience (the "Lebenswelt"). Understood in this way, "philosophy" is neither dogmatic (no a priori synthesis is given) nor relativistic (reasons must be given for any transformations in the synthesis of meanings), but is as drenched in historicity as everything else human.

Kockelmans believes that universities should educate students to be "disciplinarians with a transdisciplinary concern" (1979, 158). Their major makes students masters of one intentionality in specific detail, and their general education program cultivates the philosophical or integrative habit of mind. Their major gives them thorough knowledge of how one discipline structures human experience, while their general education program continually reminds them of the partiality of that major's intentionality and the need to complete, correct, and balance that view with the views of other disciplines and with critical philosophical reflection on the meaning of the whole of human experience.

* * *

Believe it or not, there is something extremely practical that can be said about all of this in terms of curriculum design, and that is the valuable contribution of my fourth prophet, Paul H. Hirst. In a remarkable chapter entitled "Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge" in a collection of his essays, *Knowledge and the Curriculum*, this British philosopher of education concretizes our discussion into a specific plan for university education. Hirst is much weaker on the "why" for doing it all--he is content to leave it

axiomatic--so there is a need to keep all of my "major prophets" included in this conversation; Newman and Kockelmans provide what's missing in Hirst, and vice versa.

Hirst is in the same existential phenomenological school as Kockelmans: "To acquire knowledge is to structure and make meaningful in some specific way one's lived experience" (40). A liberal education, as distinct from vocational or specialized education, is comprehensive in that it has as its goal to acquire critical mastery of all the major intentionalities by which we structure and give meaning to human experience.

The distinction of one intentionality from all others is fairly straightforward, and the process involves answering four questions:

1) What are the central concepts which distinguish this intentionality? (e.g., "culture" for anthropology)

2) What is the distinctive logical structure by means of which these concepts form a network of relationships? (e.g., the mathematical structure of Newton's or Maxwell's laws)

3) What are the distinctive statements which are admissible in this intentionality as testable against experience? (e.g., verifiability by sensory observation for the empirical sciences)

4) What are the techniques and skills for exploring experience that this intentionality uses? (e.g., "experience" as contrasted with "experiment")

When Paul Hirst passes all the human ways of knowing that he can think of through this analytic process, he comes up with seven major intentionalities: natural sciences, human sciences, mathematics, history, the arts (including literature), religion, and philosophy. One might argue over the length or the content of his list, but that's not the prime issue right now. What we have here is a specific plan for liberal education at the university: critical mastery of seven (or six or eight) major intentionalities. This would not eliminate specialization in one or the other of these intentionalities (the major), as also stated by Newman and Kockelmans, but it does make some level of mastery of all of them (general education) into the defining trait of a liberal or university education, again as advocated by Newman and Kockelmans. The definition of the exact re-

centering of the undergraduate curriculum in my "Copernican Revolution" is now complete.

How, in God's name, is this kind of general education possible? If one requires encyclopaedic knowledge or the specialist's knowledge of all the minutiae or the technician's knowledge of detailed applications in order to have mastery of an intentionality, then it is not possible of attainment in four years of college--or in a lifetime even. Hirst claims that we can define critical mastery of an intentionality, however, in such a way that a comprehensive liberal education is possible. Three dimensions constitute such mastery of an intentionality:

- 1) sufficient immersion in the concepts, logic, and criteria of the discipline to come to know the distinct way in which this intentionality "works" (e.g., study of paradigmatic cases);

- 2) generalization of the cases over the whole range of the discipline, so one can see what portion of human experience is clarified by this intentionality;

- 3) an outline of the major achievements of the intentionality.

The AAC provided a serendipitous but excellent example of how to do this for the intentionality of the natural sciences in *A New Vitality in General Education* :

A properly constructed general education in science allows students to understand the generality, power, and coherence of nature's fundamental principles. To do so, the courses stress methodology, thought patterns, and the nature of those principles themselves. They also stress two other central elements: factual and descriptive knowledge, and an ability to know and use quantitative concepts. (16)

Develop a similar paragraph for each of the other six intentionalities in Hirst's list (or some other number, if you wish to modify that list), and you have a plan for general education that fulfills his definition of liberal education as comprehensive (and also possible over four years). Define the philosophical intentionality in that list the way that Kockelmans and Newman do, and you have a general education program that cultivates the intellect to its highest level--synthesis--in addition to involving all the disciplines. With all

of that accomplished, the architectonic role (Aristotle) which such a general education program is fit to assume completes the recentering of the undergraduate curriculum on general education rather than on the major. Copernicus has won again!

THE OPPORTUNITY

A Copernican Revolution involves change in the way people perceive things, and thus it is a longer process than a political revolution. The very title of this section, moreover, is a confession that the Copernican Revolution in higher education is not a "fait accompli." That means that the preceding pages were only partly in the indicative mood, only partly descriptive; a lot of what was said was hortatory, in the subjunctive mood.

But the title of this section, with equal force, also asserts that the favorable moment and circumstances for this Copernican Revolution exist. There really is an academic community which is very close to being an academic community. There is a liberal arts college where a significant number of members of the faculty and staff--not all, probably enough, but definitely more than just a few--look upon the college's curriculum with Copernican eyes. The purpose of this essay, on the extraordinary occasion of the Centennial of Saint Joseph's College, is to exhort and to challenge the faculty of the College to seize this moment and make a revolution. Let Year 101 of the history of Saint Joseph's College be post-Copernican!

The Core Curriculum at Saint Joseph's has the mass and the character ("la taille") to measure up to the demands which would be made of a general education program claiming to be the center of gravity of a whole college. The forty-five semester hours of Core are so well designed, so well implemented, and so well articulated as to be much more forceful than their 37.5% share of each undergraduate degree would lead one to expect. Since 1969, when Core began, Saint Joseph's College students have all had a quantitatively and qualitatively significant common academic experience, and--perhaps more importantly--so have about three-fourths of the faculty. What is more, segments of the Core Curriculum are scheduled into every one of the eight semesters of a student's degree program, and each of these segments is taught by an interdisciplinary team of professors from up to seven or eight different academic departments. The unique, in the strong and root sense of that word, and

distinguishing characteristic of the undergraduate experience at Saint Joseph's College, then, is the interaction during all four years between the specialization pursued in a particular major and the broadening of horizons which students gain from the general education Core.

The desired impact of Core on students is very clearly formulated in a set of six exigent goals. First formulated in 1976, they were adopted by the entire faculty in 1979. For some the list of six goals is just that--a list; for others it is a rank ordering--from least to most important; but for all it is a collegial agreement on what general education should accomplish at Saint Joseph's College. Each goal in the following list is accompanied by a paragraph which provides an official or collegial (1987) hermeneutic of that goal.

1) To develop cognitive and communication skills. From Core segment to Core segment, we will expect students to master progressively more challenging exercises in cognitive (analysis, critique, synthesis, reasoning) and communication skills, involving all forms of discourse and all types of skills (speaking-listening, writing-reading).

2) To build a community of seekers after truth. In keeping with the Vatican II basis for the Core Curriculum and the value stance of the College, students will be exposed to and encouraged to develop strong convictions about the corporate nature of human existence and of the unity of the family of mankind, both in intellectual and in effective ways.

3) To expand awareness to the many dimensions of reality. Over the eight semesters of Core, students will be expected to expand their interdisciplinary skills--the ability to make use of materials from outside their field of specialization but in a manner which is faithful to the methodologies of those other fields--and be able to analyze and critique disciplinary readings at the level of a broadly educated generalist. They will be expected to discuss the readings in a way that respects differences in various methodological approaches.

4) To cultivate the integrative habit of mind. Students will be expected to pay almost constant attention to and to learn how to correlate or synthesize (by analogy, dialectic, theme, complementarity, for example) materials from a multiplicity of modes of inquiry.

5) To evoke formulation of, enthusiasm for, and commitment to values. Students will be challenged, over the eight semesters of Core, to develop awareness of personal and communal value commitments (including conflicts and ambiguities), to understand the complex and demanding relationship between choice and consequence, to appreciate the value of liberal arts as a means of confronting current and future issues, and to cultivate practices and attitudes which reflect values consistent with a democratic society.

6) To witness to specific Christian values. Graduates will be expected to formulate a synthesis of their faith by means of the witness of many persons and will be encouraged to bear witness to that faith in their professions and all of their endeavors.

I think that there are at least three statements about the Core Curriculum at Saint Joseph's College to which the faculty would give very nearly unanimous assent. Core, first of all, is the most important academic program at the College. It is the reason for the unusual amount (for a college this size) and the positive tone of all the national recognition for Saint Joseph's College during the past six years. The reputation of the College has been greatly enhanced by public praise from people like William Bennett, Ernest Boyer, David Riesman, Mortimer Adler, and William Perry, and by outstanding support from agencies such as The Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education, The National Endowment for the Humanities, The Council for the Advancement of Private Higher Education, and Lilly Endowment.

The faculty at large also believes that the content of the Core Curriculum is of prime value in our undergraduate curriculum. As an academic part of the Centennial observance, the faculty organized spring session workshops in which professors from sixteen different departments read and discussed some of the great primary texts in the humanities: Plato and other Greeks in 1988, Chaucer and other medieval writers in 1989. The purpose of the workshops was to renew the College's commitment to the liberal arts at the beginning of its second hundred years, but the dialogue which Core and non-Core faculty engaged in over these texts resulted in a stronger and broader faculty consensus on the positive value of the content of Core.

Finally, I think that there is an unusually high level, judging from what I have observed elsewhere as a consultant on general

education, of respect among the faculty for the professional quality of the Core program as implemented. Since each segment of Core is designed and conducted by an interdisciplinary team, professors at Saint Joseph's College hear one another lecture very frequently, I see how my peers work with texts and issues and values--how they practice their disciplines and relate them to other disciplines--and my peers see me as well. Both in planning and operating Core, the College's faculty provides a remarkable instantiation of Newman's dream of the disciplines collaborating to "complete, correct, balance each other."

With all of the preceding material as evidence--quality of the program, strength of faculty support, breadth of involvement--I judge that it is warranted to view Saint Joseph's College as on the threshold of a Copernican Revolution. Still more emphatically, I think that this threshold can be crossed in a single stride.

THE CONSEQUENCES

"Werde was du bist!" said Goethe; become what you are. For the faculty of Saint Joseph's College to cross that Copernican threshold, in my analysis, would involve nothing more than a collegial decision to be and act explicitly, consciously, and deliberately what we are in germ. For this College to declare and to operate in a Copernican fashion, with the undergraduate experience recentered on the Core Curriculum as a common and primary "arch-major" for every student and the major as a secondary project of specialization, is a short step away from where we are now. It is, nonetheless, a revolutionary step into a distinctive academic culture, and I think all kinds of things will fall into new orbits as a consequence of such recentering.

Contrary to what some might fear, first of all, I think each of the traditional academic majors will be enhanced. The major does a poor job of being the center of gravity of the undergraduate curriculum, because no single discipline is up to that demanding task. And, as Newman said, a discipline taken by itself "tells a different tale" compared to what it tells when situated as one of many within the community of all disciplines (the university). The truer tale is the latter of the two.

Those who have a high level of interest in the pre-professional majors, the "useful" majors, have a lot to gain in a Copernican cur-

riculum. When the results of two separate ten-year studies sponsored by AT&T showed that, out of fourteen or fifteen variables investigated, it was an undergraduate major in the liberal arts that alone correlated significantly with higher and earlier levels of success in business, employers and colleges automatically looked into liberal arts majors for future executives. They also advocated minors in business for liberal arts majors and master's degrees in the liberal arts for middle-age executives. What such pre-Copernican myopia missed is the simple, but recentered, strategy adopted at Saint Joseph's College. Let students concentrate in whatever pre-professional field they wish, and that will constitute a regular 36 to 42 semester-hour major. But also put every student through a general education Core which has enough hours, enough substance, and enough integration to constitute a true arch-major in liberal arts, thus offering every graduate the opportunity to acquire the career advantages of a strong background in the liberal arts. What is good-in-itself, say Newman and Aristotle, is also useful (the "bonum honestum" of liberal arts education includes the "bonum utile" of career preparation).

I would like to go even further in claiming that the majors will be enhanced in this new academic universe. None of the majors, though removed from the center of gravity of the curriculum, will be devalued. None will be seen as superfluous, in that no other discipline can reveal the meaning of the sector of human experience which it does; none will be seen as invalid, in that what it tells us is a true and valuable portion of the whole picture; but none will be seen as sufficient, in that every discipline is created via a process of "mental abstraction" (Newman). The presence of a strong Core Curriculum as the center of gravity for the College will counteract the centrifugal tendency--to fly off, literally, on its own tangent--inherent in every discipline. The disciplines will not be isolated from one another but drawn together into collaboration in the interdisciplinary Core. Thus, the practice of each discipline at Saint Joseph's College will be marked by an unusual degree of methodological self-consciousness and by efforts to develop the interdisciplinary skills of both students and faculty.

The preceding paragraph makes a much deeper point than the obvious epistemological one. Starting with Boyer and Levine's *A Quest for Common Learning* (1981) and reaching a climax with Bellah's *Habits of the Heart* (1985), numerous critics of American

higher education have insisted that single-minded emphasis on the major is just another symptom of the cancerous individualism in American society and culture. It is not inaccurate, then, to see a shift in basic values as an extremely important concomitant to the intellectual shift from the major as primary to general education as primary. It is a shift to the common good as a higher value than the individual good. It is creation of academic community. The radical shift in values would show up behaviorally among the faculty in such things as allegiance to the college before one's discipline, seeing the whole "collegium" of the faculty as the primary peer group rather than one's department, and commitment to the growth and development of general education students every bit as much as to that of majors in one's field. "E pluribus unum" would be an appropriate motto for a Core-centered college or university.

Finally, though I have thus far emphasized the status of the disciplines in the Copernican curriculum, the role of primary texts from Western and other civilizations in the Core program makes an additional assertion about what a college education should be: content matters. The indictment in the 1983 report from the National Commission on Excellence in Education is now being applied to colleges: "For the first time in the history of our country, the educational skills of one generation will not surpass, will not equal, will not even approach those of their parents." Journalists have had a field day inventing clever labels for describing the educational condition of the youth of America: "cultural illiteracy," "collective amnesia," "deculturation," and (my favorite) "cultural autolobotomy." To the contrary, the heart and soul of the Core Curriculum consists of the great works of art, literature, and philosophy of America, the West, and the world. Great literature has a universal message, the purpose of which is to instruct us in human values, human aspirations, human tragedy, human ambiguity--the whole experience of life. The content-related goal of Core is to aid students in discovering their cultural roots and heritage (freshman and sophomore years) and then to decenter their viewpoint, to free them from egocentric and ethnocentric illusions, and to open up their horizons to the meaning of "the human" in a global sense (junior and senior years).

The May 14, 1990 issue of *Time* had an intriguing essay by Pico Iyer entitled: "History? Education? Zap! Pow! Cut!" If the world of higher education has been infected with relativism and

individualism, as I have argued, Iyer thinks the world of popular culture celebrates short attention spans, speed in place of depth, and an aesthetic of catchy, rapid-fire images. "The problem with visuals is. . . that they give us no help in telling image from illusion, information from real wisdom"(98). They also do not rescue youth, he says, from what Cicero termed "the tyranny of the present." What is needed is reflection more than images, skill and tact in evaluating data and information; and the human present must be seen as laden with memory of the past and hope for the future. Density or dimension nurtures human life, and so the Core Curriculum is conceived as a single course of study lasting four years or eight semesters, with large amounts of reading and writing required. I am convinced that this center can and will hold together the post-Copernican academic universe.

CONCLUSION

I hope I have persuaded the reader to join me in "a new astronomy." The radical, comprehensive, and blatantly immodest approach to general education that I've advocated sees breadth and depth as conjugate traits of the Core Curriculum. "Nothing human is foreign to me," said Terence; and the Second Vatican Council proclaimed that "Nothing that is genuinely human fails to find an echo in their [the followers of Christ] hearts" (*Gaudium et Spes*, #1). The Core Curriculum is as broad in scope as "the human," and it seeks real depth in its own distinctive goals.

I have two final quotations to present, representing the pre-Copernican and the post-Copernican systems respectively. A professor at Stanford asked, "How could a Chicano student be expected to find his identity in Plato and Aristotle?" He explained that Plato and Aristotle were as much out of touch with this student's real world as 1930s science would be passe for a contemporary scientist. Out of an entirely different universe, the black writer Maya Angelou strongly asserts, "I know that William Shakespeare was a black woman." Shakespeare understood the human condition so thoroughly, that she could recognize her own experience of the world in his characters.

Let's stay with Maya Angelou!

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THE STATUS OF ETHICAL INSTRUCTION IN LIBERAL ARTS EDUCATION: THE SAINT JOSEPH'S COLLEGE EXPERIENCE

Brian K. Simmons

The seal of Saint Joseph's College bears three words inscribed in Latin: *Religio, Moralitas, and Scientia*. In the past 100 years, the College's mission has been to impart an understanding of those three great canons of traditional education, even though during that time there have been phenomenal changes in American society which have challenged higher education as never before. The integration of ethnic groups into the mainstream of society, the rising mobility of women, and the shift from an industrial to a service economy are but a few of these changes.

Perhaps the most perplexing of these changes concerns the moral fiber of society. Commentators have long complained that the nation is in moral decay. They point to corruption in the federal government, immorality in the church, the breakdown of the family, and a host of other instances as support for their premise. Indeed, it is not uncommon to hear the older generation wonder aloud, "What's happening to our society?" These complaints increasingly boil down to a common question: What happened to ethics?

Thrust into the middle of this societal introspection is the institution of higher education. There has been a loud cry from critics for scholars to descend from their ivory towers and help correct the ills facing society. The assumption is that society's ethical shortcomings can be corrected by educating citizens as to what is proper ethical behavior. Such an assumption is warranted given the Western world's strong belief in education as a societal good.

That is where the concern of Saint Joseph's College lies. Like so many others, Saint Joseph's is a liberal arts college dedicated to educating the whole person. As such, it is expected that these insti-

tutions lead the way in the campaign to correct perceived societal shortcomings via education. After all, Saint Joseph's crest proclaims a commitment to moral instruction. Furthermore, the College's Catholic tradition provides an excellent perspective from which to approach ethics instruction. Finally, Saint Joseph's Core curriculum is uniquely suited to fostering moral/ethical development among students.

On the occasion of the College's centennial, it is fruitful to look once again at one of the three pillars of Saint Joseph's mission: moral development. This article discusses the teaching of ethics in the context of a liberal arts higher education and then focuses on how Saint Joseph's has sought to so teach.

An *a priori* concern is that of terminology. The literature concerning ethics instruction most frequently uses three closely related terms: "ethics," "morals," and "values." Individually, each term carries its own connotation. However, in the context of liberal arts instruction the three are nearly synonymous. They refer to the recognition of good versus bad or right versus wrong. Conceptually, one may think of the relationship among the three terms in a linear fashion. One defines one's values, which in turn form the basis of one's morals (broad judgments of right and wrong). Then, one's ethics (case specific judgments of right and wrong) evolve.

It is beneficial to note the role which moral/ethical instruction has played in the traditional liberal arts education. Almost since the inception of higher education, moral instruction has struggled for a place in the curriculum. The Greek tradition of Platonic thought had speculative knowledge as the end of education. Isocrates, on the other hand, saw the need for instruction to enable students to deal with moral realities. In the Roman period, the place of virtue in the curriculum was advocated by Cicero and Quintilian and was exemplified in their conception of the orator who was able to make moral judgments. By the thirteenth century this struggle was continued by those theologians emphasizing the good (the Franciscans) and those emphasizing the true (the Dominicans). Today, the two poles are adjustment and intellectual excellence. The thought is that, while the goal of higher education is intellectual excellence, many students will never ascend to that point. For them the goal is to "adjust" so as to become good citizens.

Still there are many who see a prominent role for ethics instruction in the liberal arts college experience. Howard R. Bowen notes that colleges and universities

must not serve merely as purveyors of lifelong meal tickets, or socializers, or pillars of the establishment. Rather, they must try to change the values of people--not by indoctrination, but by the enlargement of horizons that flow from true liberal education. (1982, 81)

Bernard Rosen and Arthur L. Caplan (1980) indicate that it is ethics instruction which distinguishes many liberal arts programs from their vocational counterparts. And Harvard President Derek Bok states that higher education, as the trainer of future societal leaders, is in a "strategic position to encourage students to think more deeply about ethical issues and strengthen their powers of moral reasoning" (1982, 116). For Bok, ethics instruction serves three purposes: (1) recognizing moral issues in students' lives, (2) fostering an ability to reason carefully about ethical issues, and (3) clarifying students' moral aspirations.

Prior to the secular development of thought arose the Catholic approach to ethics instruction. Francis C. Wade (1963) points out that ethics inherently plays a large role in the Catholic liberal arts curriculum. A Catholic higher education envisions a balance among theology (as manifest in Church teaching), speculative and practical knowledge, and moral instruction. In the strictest sense, Catholic colleges and universities extend those values created from the sense of community with the Church and apply them to specific situations. There has recently been concern expressed over how Catholic universities are teaching values. Courtney Leatherman (1990) explains that "administrators at some Roman Catholic colleges say they must step up their efforts to define and teach the values their institutions espouse" (A16). She goes on to quote Sister Sally M. Furay, Vice-President and Provost at the University of San Diego, as saying:

The communication of values is fundamental to the role of Catholic colleges and universities. We have wonderful public institutions of higher education. If we're going to be exactly like them, who needs us? We have to be alternatives.

Indeed, Catholic colleges and universities have undergone much soul searching of late to determine whether they are truly positioning themselves as "alternatives."

The history of ethics instruction is a colorful one. During the nineteenth century, American colleges and universities placed a great deal of emphasis on the moral development of their students. Douglas Sloan noted that

Throughout most of the nineteenth century, the most important course in the college curriculum was moral philosophy, taught usually by the college president and required of all senior students. The moral philosophy course was regarded as the capstone of the curriculum. It aimed to pull together, to integrate, and to give meaning and purpose to the student's entire college experience and course of study. In doing so it even more importantly sought to equip the graduating seniors with the ethical sensitivity and insight needed if they were to put their newly acquired college education to use in ways that would benefit not only themselves and their own personal advancement, but the larger society as well. (1980, 2)

Such courses were not the only means of instilling an ethical education. Many colleges and universities made it a priority to hire only those faculty deemed to meet the highest of ethical standards. Departments of Philosophy and Religion flourished, and their place in the curriculum was prominent.

This situation, however, did not last. By the 1880s the landscape of American higher education had changed. Disciplines became more specialized. Along with this specialization came the explosion in professional and vocational approaches to higher education. As programs of study became narrower, the courses in moral philosophy came to be regarded as less important. Concurrently, the state of ethics education changed. The field moved toward the study of metaethics (the study of theoretical ethical questions) and away from the study of normative ethics (the study of making moral judgments). This movement led to the further dissipation of the overall importance of ethics in the curriculum.

Events of the past three decades have brought about renewed

calls for ethical instruction in higher education. The Vietnam conflict, Watergate, government corruption, and the perception that society is in moral decay have all contributed to a fresh emphasis on ethics. The further fragmentation and specialization of the college curriculum led to the creation of new courses in applied ethics. Today, most pre-professional programs (e.g. law, medicine) feature courses in ethics tailored to the respective field. Thus, it seems ethics instruction, while not reaching its former place of prominence, has re-established an honored place for itself in higher education. As Rosen and Kaplan note:

We conclude that ethics is now receiving more systematic curricular attention than ten or twenty years ago. On the whole, student enrollments in ethics courses are growing; especially in ethics courses that are not taught in traditional areas of philosophy or religion. (1982, 7)

Despite the renaissance in ethics instruction of late, several troubling issues remain. First, there is the constant concern over indoctrination. Critics of ethics instruction point out that there is a fine line between exposing students to ethical theories and advocating them. While this pedagogical problem is a formidable one, it is not insurmountable. One approach common today is to teach ethics as "values clarification." Indeed, many elementary public school children are brought into contact with programs which merely seek to define the student's existing values. Another approach lies in the method of instruction. Ozar (1979) argues that teachers can be detached in their presentations so as to avoid advocating one philosophy or value over another.

Wade (1963), however, argues that Catholic educators ought not to be concerned about indoctrination given that they are teaching ethics from the Catholic perspective. Such a perspective bases ethics on a community's reverence for tradition as opposed to individualism. The distinguishing aspect of a Catholic education ought to be that it is framed in the context of the Christian as opposed to the secular tradition.

A second issue arising is that of the qualifications of those teaching ethics. Clearly, adequate ethical instruction assumes a minimal level of competence on the part of the instructor. With the increase of ethics courses comes the possibility that some of those

teaching the courses are not sufficiently qualified to do so. While such a concern is legitimate, the potential harms from such a scenario are limited. As most ethics courses are taught at the departmental level (i.e. most courses deal with professional ethics) one might conceivably assume that the instructors are more qualified to address ethical questions in their respective fields. While the overall grounding in ethical theory might be suspect, Callahan (1980) feels that relatively minimal effort (one year's education in another field, something already done during doctoral studies) would be required to give instructors sufficient grounding. This, of course, assumes that the study includes questions of ethics or traditional ethics writings, which many times is not the case. Saint Joseph's is uniquely suited to meet this challenge, given the nature of the Core program. While Core is discussed in greater detail later, it is good to note here that the Core faculty is constantly exposed to much of the material found in introductory courses in general ethical theory. Readings in Aristotle, Mill, Kant, and others are included in the Core curriculum.

Finally, there is the issue of content. One of the sharpest divisions among current ethics teachers is over how much theoretical ethics and practical ethics ought to be included in the course. This includes lengthy discussions about the degree of emphasis on normative ethics, applied ethics, metaethics, etc. As more and more pre-professional ethics courses have been offered, there has been a concurrent decrease in the amount of emphasis given to general ethical theory. This trend alarms many, especially those in philosophy and religion. For example, Archambault (1963) argues that without the broader, general ethical foundation ethics courses are only half successful. He supports his position by noting that general ethics theory gives context and substance to applied ethics courses. However, it should be noted that most applied ethics texts begin with substantial sections detailing the type of material critics say is lacking in these courses. For example, Christians, Rotzoll, and Fackler (1987) begin their text *Media Ethics: Cases and Moral Reasoning* with a lengthy discussion of classical ethical theory and processes of moral reasoning.

Now that we have seen the ideals of ethics in the liberal arts education, it is instructive to peer at its reality. This can best be done through an examination of the methods employed at Saint Joseph's College.

As Wade (1963) notes, the traditional Catholic education is deeply grounded in moral/ethical instruction. John Henry Newman implied such when he wrote that "it is congruous that youths who are prepared in a Catholic University for the general duties of a secular life, or for secular professions, should not leave it without some knowledge of their religion" (1982, 280). Newman's conception of "religion" clearly included the need for ethical/moral instruction as he argues that religion necessitates proper decisions and actions. However, such thinking was not unique to Newman. Catholic universities in Europe had been teaching moral philosophy prior to Newman and its importance in the curriculum was well established.

Saint Joseph's College, like many other Catholic colleges and universities, has approached higher education from this traditional perspective. Thus, the College has necessarily placed great emphasis on ethical instruction, as this passage from the College's Statement of Aims and Purposes illustrates:

Saint Joseph's College is a private Catholic college for men and women. Its primary purpose is the education of college students toward a full life as seen in the Christian perspective...the College provides an environment of scholarship in which faculty and students can work together in the pursuit of truth and knowledge. It strives to foster those ethical and spiritual practices which reinforce that pursuit.

(Saint Joseph's College Catalog, 1989, 7)

What is most instructive, however, is to note the variety of methods which Saint Joseph's uses to teach ethics.

Perhaps the foremost advantage which Saint Joseph's holds over other colleges and universities in ethics instruction is the Core program.¹ Core was established in 1968 "because it was seen to be a better way to achieve the goals and purposes of the institution, a Catholic liberal arts college, than the traditional approach to general education" (*The Core Curriculum at Saint Joseph's College*, 1987, 3). By its nature, Core seeks to expose students to the broad range of liberal studies in an integrated manner. This allows for the discussion of ethics in a wide variety of contexts. In fact, the content and format of the Core segments readily lend themselves to the discussion of ethical matters. This process of recognition of and reflec-

tion about ethical issues is the first step in Bok's (1982) guide to ethics instruction.

Core 1 (The Contemporary World) examines issues such as race and gender and asks students to evaluate their attitudes toward race relations and the treatment of their fellow man. In Core 2 (The Modern World) students learn about the political and economic thoughts of Adam Smith, Jean Jacques Rousseau, and Karl Marx. Their ideas are evaluated not only in light of their contributions to politics and economics, but also in light of their ethical implications. For example, Core discussions frequently center on the morality of the economic theories postulated by Adam Smith.

Core 3 (The Roots of Western Civilization) examines ancient Hebrew, Greek, and Roman philosophy by the reading of the Old Testament and the works of Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero. Each carries clear ethical overtones, and here too an application of these implicit ethical ideas carries over into the discussion segments. The Christian Impact on Western Civilization (Core 4) deals with New Testament sources and the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, Martin Luther and others. These diverse topics are laced with the idea of ethics flowing from both religious and rational sources.

Cores 5 and 6 (Man in the Universe I and II) investigate the scientific aspects of the world in which we live. Students are called upon to make judgments about the impacts of technology and science on society and the environment. It is not uncommon to have students' eyes opened to the "ethics of science" discussed in these two courses.

In Cores 7 and 8 (Intercultural Studies) foreign cultures are probed. Africa, Latin America, and the Far Eastern societies and their problems are studied with an eye toward ethics. Students here are exposed to the concept of cultural imperialism and its ramifications, or to the morality of Apartheid. Each world contains its own ethical issues, and students are encouraged to meet these issues head on.

Finally, Core 9 (Toward a Christian Humanism) and Core 10 (Christianity and the Human Situation) ask students to find their place in the world given their Christian perspective. These capstone courses are the heart of the ethical instruction of the Core curriculum. Students read the bishops' Pastoral Letters which raise the thorniest of ethical questions (e.g. the position of the Church on nuclear weapons). Issues such as world hunger and materialism

are inspected from a Christian standpoint. Clearly, the goal of these courses is "to work with students to help them work out a personal synthesis of what it means to be human and Christian in this world of ours" (*The Core Curriculum at Saint Joseph's College*, 1987, 7).

Not only is the content of Core well suited to ethics instruction, so also is the format. Each Core course meets twice weekly for an hour long lecture period. In addition, there are two to three discussion periods each week where a group of approximately eighteen students meets with a professor to exchange ideas on the lectures and assigned readings. This format is ideal for the teaching of ethics. Meiswinkel argues that "a key aspect of the ethics teaching process may be found in the discussion structure" (1988, 48). This is because ethics instruction succeeds when students have the opportunity to express their opinions and enter into an exchange of views with their classmates. Douglas Sloan (1980) agrees, noting that the vast majority of ethics courses are taught using some form of the discussion format. Students and faculty members have found that the open nature of most Core discussions is an excellent venue for the investigation of ethical questions. The format allows for the free exchange of opinions and ideas on the topic at hand.

Core does not stand alone as the only mechanism by which ethics is taught. Many academic departments offer specific courses in theoretical or applied ethics. For example, the Commerce Department frequently offers Business Ethics which calls for students to isolate areas of ethical conflict in industry. Peter F. Drucker (1984) points out that business schools across the country have placed a renewed emphasis on ethics which is manifest in the explosion in such courses during the past decade. Business Ethics at Saint Joseph's is currently one of the most popular courses offered within the Commerce Department, which is a testimony to its perceived value. This course examines issues such as management's treatment of workers, corporate responsibility, and the obligations of a multinational corporation.

The Communications and Theater Arts Department offers two courses (Journalism Ethics and Issues in Broadcasting) which challenge students to think about ethical matters in the mass media. Topics covered include the ethics of privacy invasion, a free press versus a free trial, and the publication of emotionally charged photos. Upon completing the Issues in Broadcasting course, one student said, "I never really thought about these types of things be-

fore. Media professionals really do have an awesome responsibility!"

Approaching ethical instruction from a more religious bent is the Religion Department's Studies in Morality. Here, the close relationship between ethics and morality is explored and the Catholic heritage of the College is most strongly felt. Students in this course meet ethical dilemmas squarely and attempt to resolve them from a Catholic perspective.

And, of course, the Philosophy Department offers Problems of Acting: Ethics. This course in metaethics serves as the foundation course in any ethical sequence. Although enrollment is normally confined to philosophy or religion majors and minors, its importance was noted by one who recently took the course: "I learned that there is so much more to the choices that we make and that those choices really do have important consequences."

The notion of ethics instruction permeates the curriculum at Saint Joseph's in the content of its academic offerings. The vast majority of courses offered address ethics in some way. For example, the Communication and Theater Arts Department's Persuasion course speaks about the ethical responsibilities of the advocate. The validity of propaganda is discussed. The Commerce Department's Advertising deals with the ethics of the advertising industry, tackling such issues as the advertisement of tobacco products and the questions regarding children's advertising. Also, the Political Science Department's Comparative Government course addresses proper and improper behavior by government officials. Courses in the History Department frequently encounter ethical questions when investigating societies of the past. In sum, there are many courses which do not carry the word "ethics" in their titles yet touch on ethical issues.

Clearly, ethics instruction plays a large role in the traditional Catholic higher education curriculum, and Saint Joseph's College is uniquely suited to continue that tradition. Whether it be through the Core curriculum or courses offered within the academic departments, Saint Joseph's goes to great lengths to instill a sense of ethics in its students. Such instruction is demanded by the traditional liberal arts education, and necessitated by the ever-changing world in which we live.

One of the cornerstones of Saint Joseph's education over the past 100 years has been a grounding in ethics. On the occasion of

the College's centennial, it is appropriate to commend Saint Joseph's for its dedication to ethics instruction and its commitment to the three great canons of higher education: *Religio*, *Moralitas*, and *Scientia*.

SEE NEXT PAGE FOR CITATIONS

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A SHORT HISTORY OF THE WOODROW WILSON SENIOR VISITING FACULTY FELLOWS PROGRAM AT SAINT JOSEPH'S COLLEGE

John B. Egan

They came during ten of the eleven school years from 1975 to 1986.

They came mostly from the Greater New York City and Greater Washington, DC, areas.

They came from places as near as Chicago and as far as London, England.

They came from small colleges and large universities.

They came from the worlds of business and industry, domestic government and foreign service, and the media.

They came from their then present occupations and professions, and out of retirement.

They came alone, and they came as couples.

They came with their education and experience, their wit and wisdom, and shared themselves, generously and efficaciously, a week at a time, with the Saint Joseph's College community.

They were the twenty-one Woodrow Wilson Senior Visiting Faculty Fellows: Philip D. Reed, Jr; Jack W. Lydman; Roland H. Shackford; Ruth E. Bacon; Eugene R. Beem; Bryce Nelson; William H. Taft, IV, and Julia V. Taft; William J. Lawless, Jr.; Richard W. Couper; Baroness (Lady Beatrice Nancy) Seear; Thomas F. Roeser; Padraic Kennedy and Ellen Conroy Kennedy; Constance B. Newman; Dean Boal and Ellen Boal; L. Dean Cassell; Ronald L. Mercer; Joan Beck and Ernest W. Beck.

The Woodrow Wilson Visiting Fellows Program was established in 1973 to increase understanding between colleges and the world of practical affairs. The colleges were primarily private liberal arts colleges. Saint Joseph's College was among the earliest participants. Once enrolled in the program in Fall 1975, the College hosted Fellows once or twice every year between 1975 and 1986 except 1978-79. Fr. Donald Shea, C.PP. S., then Professor of History at

the College, was the campus coordinator for the program in its first year (Reed and Lydman visitations). Dr. John B. Egan, Professor of Music, was campus coordinator thereafter. Hans Rosenhaupt was the President of the Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship Foundation when the program began, and H. Ronald Rouse was Executive Vice President and Director of the Visiting Fellows Program. Rosenhaupt was succeeded by Richard W. Couper in 1981. Judith L. Pinch was the Foundation Program Officer during the years of Saint Joseph's College's participation, and it was with her that the campus coordinators dealt often, directly, and harmoniously. The relationship between the Foundation and the College was and remains warm and wonderful, as do relationships between people "here" and "there."

Philip D. Reed, Jr., the first Visiting Fellow to Rensselaer, came from the "hometown" of the Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship Foundation, Princeton, NJ. His visit extended from November 16, 1975, a Sunday, to the following Friday, November 21. (The visits were officially Monday to Friday affairs, but the Fellows customarily arrived on campus at least a day earlier.) A product of Phillips Academy in Andover, MA, he earned a B.S. degree in Industrial Administration and Engineering from Yale University. Between high school and college, he enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps and served in action at Kawajalein, Saipan, Tinian, and Iwo Jima (in World War II). He was wounded in action at Tinian. Post Yale, he worked for sixteen months in a Wall Street Bond House. Then he spent two years as an engineer in the Bayway refinery of the Esso Standard Oil Company (Exxon). Ever after those first two work experiences he retained a keen interest in the financial community and "Process Industries." Next he joined a small chemical company (M. W. Parsons, Plymouth, MA) as assistant to the president and ran that business for most of ten years. Parsons was sold to S. B. Penick & Co. in 1962, and in 1968, the latter was acquired by CPC International, Reed serving in various administrative positions all those years. In 1975, Reed was a director of S. B. Penick and a consultant to that firm, as well as a director of the Seaboard Surety Company. Penick manufactured synthetic drugs and natural narcotics, antibiotics, insecticides, industrial additives, extracts, and other products for use in foods, medicine, and industry.

Reed was also a governor of Muhlenberg Hospital in Plainfield, NJ, 1960-68. His hobbies were "growing things, making

things, and athletics although this latter lacks in performance." He did not view himself as a political activist, and, although he labeled himself a "liberal Republican," he said such labels "are very hazy and the issues keep blurring party definition." He married an artist, and their three children were in writing and advertising. Among his special interests were multinational corporations, regulatory agencies and their economic impact, and philosophy (philosophization) of science. He had much to say about short-term politics versus long-term planning. Although he eschewed environmental extremism, he endorsed "sound environmentalism" (most specifically, insecticides that were "ecologically sound"); and, already in 1975, he worried about the many vital things people were running out of: energy, food, purchasing power, health care, air, water.

Of his week in Rensselaer, Reed said, "This was my best visit yet and will be very difficult to improve upon." (This sort of thing would be said and written by nearly every Wilson Fellow who visited the college.) He cited the "excellent balance between classroom activities and extra-curricular activities," social exposure to students and faculty, meetings with biology and business clubs, lunches with students, dinners in faculty homes. Reed called Fr. Shea "the best campus coordinator I have encountered yet." As did all other Wilson Fellows, Reed appreciated the beauty and comfort of his guest room in Schwietermann Hall and the hospitality of the Precious Blood Fathers and Brothers there.

Interestingly, at the conclusion of his official report to the Foundation, Reed wrote, "As you are undoubtedly well aware, Mr. Holderman of the Lilly Foundation has developed a sudden but strong affection for Saint Joseph's."

Many of the Wilson Fellows would give special lectures at the College. Many of those lectures would be in and for the Core Program, with which all of the Fellows strongly and positively identified. Reed's lecture was on multinational corporations.

Philip Reed was a unanimously popular Wilson Fellow, an excellent choice to begin the long procession of such Fellows to Rensselaer. His visit was called an academic and psychological "shot in the arm" for the campus, and his was considered "a hard act to follow."

With Fr. Shea's encouragement, Reed offered "several valuable suggestions and observations on curricula, personnel, place-

ment, etc., which . . . will prove very practical." "Picking the brains" of the Wilson Fellows for their views of such matters as curricula, personnel, and placement would be one of the College's greatest gains from the Visiting Fellows Program.

Jack Wilson Lydman, U.S. Diplomat, Former U.S. Ambassador to Malaysia, spent the week of February 29 to March 5, 1976, at the College. Like Reed before him, Lydman was already a veteran Visitor. He reported to Rouse at the Foundation, "Indeed, I felt a deeper and more rewarding involvement, and an equally rewarding response from students and faculty, than at any of my previous engagements." As Reed had also done, Lydman remarked that advance planning at Saint Joseph's College was thorough and served to "maximize opportunities for a meaningful dialogue." Lydman went on to say, "I have not been at a college where there has been anything like the mutual understanding and respect that characterizes faculty student relations at St. Joseph's." He continued:

Students are involved in every echelon of activity--management, curriculum, student government--right up to the Board of Trustees. During my visit, there was a potentially explosive racial incident which caused understandable concern to all. The heat of the matter cooled before I left and I feel certain it will be resolved. I was impressed by the calm, rational responses of many students to this highly emotional issue, by their sophisticated understanding of the positions of all involved, including management. I was also impressed by the way in which the faculty and management shared their problems with the students. The net effect at St. Joseph's was a very healthy community spirit.

"Incidents" of one kind or another would unavoidably and uncontrollably occur during subsequent Wilson Fellows' weeks on campus (or just before those weeks). The College was always "up front" about such things, and such openness never ceased to amaze and impress the Fellows--and to endear the College and its people and programs to the Foundation.

Lydman indicated that the Core Program "provides a resonant sounding board for Visiting Fellows since all manner of career experiences (and esoteria like Chinese and Southeast Asian ceram-

ics) can be fit into it." He was pleased, and maybe a little surprised, to discuss Southeast Asia with many eager and informed faculty and students, in both formal and informal settings.

Lydman did speak at the College, but informally, on Tuesday afternoon, on Oriental ceramics. Just as he reported that "the porcelain session was especially rewarding for the attention and interest it generated--always somewhat surprising to me," so Lydman's hearers were fascinated by a diplomat's knowing and caring so much about Oriental pottery.

Apparently Saint Joseph's College was among the first schools to employ student hosts and hostesses throughout Fellows' visits. That practice incurred the favor of all Fellows sent to Rensselaer, and numerous other schools were inspired or persuaded to "go and do likewise." Lydman wrote colorfully of the arrangement: "Father Shea and his student advisers had set up an almost steel-trap perfect system of escorts-guides."

To conclude his report, Lydman wrote: "I came away from St. Joseph's with a very high regard for the quality of the College and its people and with a renewed sense of faith in the Visiting Fellows Program."

Lydman would later come to be happily reunited (by Roland and Augusta Shackford, Dr. Egan, and Dr. John Nichols) with a later Visiting Fellow to the College, Ruth Bacon: both had served in the U.S. diplomatic corps in the South Pacific. Among the blessings of the Visiting Fellows Program were the many new friendships made and old ones rekindled.

Lydman would "open doors" for several Saint Joseph's College students when they "went to Washington." Other Fellows, too, hosted and assisted College students and faculty at various times and in various ways.

Lydman cared solicitously for his wife during a long and terminal illness. Then he volunteered his services to a hospice in Washington, DC, conducted by Franciscans. Whether in the far corners of the world or his own "backyard," Jack Lydman was always a man of service to others.

"When a visit has been so exhilarating, exciting, and productive, it is hard to know where to start. In terms of accomplishment, so far as the objectives of the Visiting Fellows Program is concerned--at least as I understand these objectives--the visit at St. Joseph's ranks as No. 1 of all the other campuses I have visited,"

wrote Roland Shackford to Messrs. Rosenhaupt and Rouse on November 26, 1976, exactly one week after finishing his week in Rensselaer. His remarks are all the more noteworthy because he was at the time the "dean" of the Woodrow Wilson Visiting Fellows.

When the Foundation called Shackford to ask him to go to Saint Joseph's College, he turned to his wife, Augusta, to share the news with her and find out what she thought of the idea. "Gus," he said, "it's the Woodrow Wilson people and they want me to go out to Saint" Gus didn't even let him finish his statement. "Oh, no, not another one," she complained. The Shackfords had been to two "Saint schools" and had felt virtually imprisoned on both occasions. They had been too well looked after. Guardians were assigned to them to look after their every wish, true, but also, they were sure, to keep them from any unsupervised contact or dialogue with faculty, staff, or students. They were fed well, but as if in a cell. They had not enjoyed this over protectedness, nor had they approved of it. And they--well, Gus, anyway--had concluded that "all those Saint schools must be just alike." (Mrs. Shackford was not actually and officially a Wilson Fellow, but she accompanied Roland on all of his visitations. At Saint Joseph's College she was treated as if she were a Fellow herself.)

Shackford gave four reasons for his glowing remarks about Saint Joseph's College: the coordinator "did an extraordinary job of organizing a program of great variety and value"; he involved a great many students in the planning of the program "and they played major and important roles in carrying it out"; building Shackford's program around the Core Curriculum; the mood and attitude of the College community in general--"enthusiasm about the visit, an openness and candor that I found unusual, and most of all a relationship between faculty and students of mutual respect and friendliness."

Shackford called the Core Program "the most innovative, interesting and fascinating effort in the field of higher education," and added that "it fits like a hand in glove with the objectives of the Visiting Fellows Program."

Shackford particularly lauded "the institutional commitment to Core expressed in the judgment of the whole Saint Joseph's College community that general education is at least as important as the student's major." He endorsed the College's doing what it could, through the Core Program, to offset "the trend toward hyper

specialization or vocationalization in most of American higher education." Shackford also resonated to the personal, the humanistic, and the teleological dimensions of the Core Program.

And Shackford didn't just view Core in the abstract. He attended lectures and discussions of all the Core segments offered the semester of his visit--as would numerous later Fellows. He joined in the conversation. He interviewed students of all levels, and could report a progressive appreciation of Core as a student moved through the program. Freshmen admitted that they didn't like it. Sophomores said they were getting used to it. Juniors said it was all coming together for them. Seniors said Core was the most important thing that happened to them at the college. So Shackford could and did write, believably, "my observation and participation in the program for a week left me with the conviction that it is working."

Egan described the Shackfords as an "inimitably delightful" couple, "consummately gracious," "knowledgeable," "pleasantly and profoundly impressive." He still recalls how amiably Roland responded to (accepted) an invitation by two student hosts to a mid week celebration in Drexel Hall of the college football team's having won their conference championship the preceding Saturday. Shackford, nearly seventy years old at the time, went with senior gridgers, Larry Olewinski and Roy Kuenen, to the Drexel party, even played a little touch football along the way, enjoyed the experience immensely, claimed to be "marvelously rejuvenated" by it.

In all fairness, it must be mentioned that a principal reason for the success of the Shackfords' visitation was their own personality, character, disposition. *They*, too, were open, candid, friendly. *They*, too, were "salt of the earth" folks. *They*, too, were generalists.

Roland Herbert Shackford, native of Maine, took the B.S. degree in electrical engineering at Antioch College in Ohio. As a high schooler he had been office boy and clerk for the New England Telephone and Telegraph Company in Portland, ME. As a collegian he was a factory worker, construction worker, engineering draftsman and installation worker for various firms in Dayton, Toledo, and Detroit. During the Depression years he alternated between unemployment and selling demonstrating pressure cookers in Macy's basement in New York City. Between 1935 and 1952 he was a United Press correspondent in New York, overnight editor in Washington, DC, diplomatic correspondent also in Washington, DC, and General European News Manager in London. From 1952

to 1973, he was with Scripps Howard Newspapers: European Correspondent, London, Paris; Diplomatic correspondent, editorial writer, and Foreign News Analyst, Washington, DC; Asian Correspondent, Hong Kong; Consultant. Perhaps most significantly Shackford was one of the few Western newspaperpersons with access to Red China in the 1960s. He came to be recognized as one of this country's leading Sinologists. From 1964 through 1968, he wrote a twice weekly column, "Report on Red China," for Scripps Howard newspapers. In 1965, he visited Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, India, Nepal, and Pakistan. In 1966, he accompanied President Lyndon Johnson on an Asian tour that included New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, and Korea, including the SEATO summit conference at Manila. (He also accompanied Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy on important missions. Except for Arctica and Antarctica, there was hardly a spot in the world that Roland Shackford didn't visit and "cover.") Shackford was in Korea in 1968, for the seizure of the Pueblo, in Indonesia, with Vice President Humphrey, on a survey tour of Southeast Asia after the TET offensive, on a survey tour of the Philippines, and on a survey tour of the Soviet Union. Two years later he made an extensive African tour with Secretary of State William Rogers. In 1972, he went with President Nixon to China. And in 1972-73, he was with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger for negotiations on the Vietnam cease-fire.

Although he could have been, understandably and pardonably, both a "name-dropper" and a "place-dropper," Shackford was not. He "wore" his wisdom and experience comfortably and quietly. He did realize that his thirty-eight years in journalism had begun when parents of "today's" students were mere children themselves, and he wondered, sometimes aloud, if his vast and rich experiences had been too long ago to still be meaningful. He worried and wondered about students' continuing to find him relevant. The positive response of Saint Joseph's College students should have helped to convince Roland Shackford of his ongoing "relevance" and effectiveness. There were the most positive "vibes" imaginable between him and them.

The Shackfords would remain close friends of the college. Every year when Egan and Nichols went to Washington for gatherings of Association of American Colleges (AAC) and American

Association for Higher Education (AAHE) or other groups, the Shackfords hosted a party in their apartment for their Rensselaer Friends and Washington based Visiting Fellows to Saint Joseph's College. It was at one of these gatherings that Ruth Bacon and Jack Lydman were so blissfully reunited.

Roland Shackford closed his official report on his Rensselaer visit by saying, "Each week that we have spent on this program during the last three years has been memorable in *some* respects--even where goals of the program were not always met. For us each visit has been part of a new education, producing a new attitude toward many things. St. Joseph's was memorable in *all* respects."

Deserving of mention before moving on to the next Fellow is a special friend-in-common of the Shackfords and the Saint Joseph's College community, Dr. Landrum Bolling, onetime president of Earlham College in Richmond, IN, close friend of Fr. Charles Banet, C.P.P.S., and Lilly Foundation administrator. In fact, the Shackfords planned to visit the Bollings on their return trip to Washington (from Rensselaer). While at the college, the Shackfords savored get-togethers with various Earlham College alumni in the area, some of whom had matriculated there with one or more of the Shackfords' three children.

Shackford did deliver a public address at Saint Joseph's College, on Tuesday evening, on "American Foreign Policy: The Role of Henry Kissinger." He also gave a Core lecture on Friday, for Core 7 (China), on "Post Mao China."

Even as he wrote and spoke laudatorily of the College and the ready-made-ness of the Foundation and the College for each other, Shackford insightfully cautioned in a letter to Egan:

I am aware that some of the Fellows are uncomfortable in classes or seminars outside of their own specialty. I think they are usually unduly concerned. Thus, if you want to schedule a future visit, as you did mine, around the Core program it would be well to have Woodrow Wilson seek someone with not only a specialty for some specific part of Core but also a broad background (and more importantly, interest in such an innovative idea).

. . it is a great challenge to the Visiting Fellow--and why shouldn't he or she or he/she be challenged, too, just as the students and faculty are constantly challenged by Core. After all,

education goes on and on, long after leaving college. Sometimes I think it only begins after college.

In brochures advertising the Visiting Fellows Program Ruth E. Bacon is listed as Foreign Service Officer and Former Director of International Women's Year. Bacon, the first woman Wilson Fellow at Saint Joseph's College, had risen in the Foreign Service to the rank of Acting Ambassador (to New Zealand). As she told the story, fumingly and resentfully, the powers-that-be had decreed that the American Ambassador to New Zealand had to be a mountain-climber. Dr. Bacon was a mountain-climber. But those same powers also decreed that mountain-climbing was something unfit for women. So the "full" Ambassadorship eluded her.

When Bacon visited the Rensselaer campus, officers of the senior class and Student Association were, uncharacteristically and even unprecedentedly, almost without exception women. Bacon lost no time reporting to the Foundation how "enlightened" the students were, even as she openly lamented and decried the absence of women from faculty and administration of the college.

Bacon, originally of a Boston Brahmin family, came to Rensselaer from Washington, DC, where she shared an apartment with her talented sister, Dorothy. (That apartment would also be "home" to Dr. Egan on his visits to Washington.)

In her hand-written letter to Egan dated March 17, 1977, soon after her March 6-11 visit to Saint Joseph's College, Bacon wrote:

My visit to St. Joseph's couldn't have been happier for me. . . The programming was excellent and varied, making full use of my time. There was also ample opportunity for talking informally with the students as well as the class discussions. Features which I particularly appreciated were the sending in advance of basic materials and the arrangements for home hospitality (including your own). The evening program for women students, administrators, etc., was a welcome touch. There was imaginative planning throughout.

One aspect of the Core program which pleased me especially was the inclusion of non-Western studies as an integral part of the whole--rather than as an optional extra as is so often the case.

All in all, it was an exceptional visit for me. I learned a great deal and was impressed with the warmth and friendliness of my reception. I feel the College is providing a real service and deserves the continuing support of the Foundation.

In her official report to the Foundation Bacon wrote on April 3, 1977:

St. Joseph's is a delightful and rewarding college to visit. The welcome was warm, the program imaginative, the atmosphere appealing. Dr. John Egan . . . is exceptional for enthusiasm, planning ability and energy.

Bacon described her schedule at the college as "inter-disciplinary, innovative, and full." She had been pleased to discuss such wide ranging topics as the economic consequences of the Industrial Revolution, international aspects of the pollution problem, the Law of the Sea Conference, the future of the World Court, relations between the U.S. and Japan, ethical issues of contemporary journalism, the International Women's Decade, life in the Foreign Service, regionalism in Southeast Asia, Plato and the status of women, impressions of Africa, the economic outlook in the South Pacific, etc.

Bacon also commended a command performance by the college chorus, whose singing she called "beautiful and joyful," and a two piano recital by Dr. and Mrs. Egan in their home in Bacon's honor.

Dr. Bacon, like Roland Shackford before her, was a veteran Visitor. She was observant of setting and facilities, in which regard she wrote, "The College has an attractive setting and some imposing buildings, including an excellent Student Center and adequate dormitories. Compared with other colleges visited, however, the facilities are limited. The Administration Building was destroyed by fire a few years ago. . . To date, no new administration building has emerged, for reasons not clear to me. The library is housed in part of the Science Building. There is a Field House but no modern gymnasium and no pool. The College has made a good start with the Student Center but if it is to maintain its competitive position and even grow in these days, it needs to get on with the updating process."

Bacon noted the centrality of the Core program to the College's approach to education. She also noted the program's three-dimensionality (past, present, and future) and "humanistic emphasis." She praised the format: lectures backed by readings and followed by discussions; large-group sessions alternating with small-group discussions; faculty members learning alongside students, tackling subjects outside their own disciplines. "St. Joseph's has shown commendable ingenuity and educational realism in developing this Program," she said. "It widens horizons for students and at the same time makes the best use of the resources, not unlimited, which are available to the College in facilities and faculty. It stresses responsibilities toward others as well as the need for self-development."

As other Fellows would do after her, Bacon had (and expressed) some misgivings about this Core Program that she praised highly overall:

The Program is not of course problem-free. It is possible that a lightly motivated student might emerge with a little knowledge of many things and an in-depth knowledge of few. The faculty, being human, may not uniformly respond with zeal to learning about disciplines other than their own. Despite these and other possibilities the Program seems to offer a more comprehensive approach to the issues a student is likely to meet as an individual and as a citizen than the system of almost unlimited free election of courses prevalent in many colleges today. The Program is still young and subject to revision and adaptation. Other colleges might usefully consider it in this age of magnified college fees, lavish buildings, and expanding faculty lists.

The working out of the Program must have taken vision, determination and scores of hours of study, discussion, and compromise. It is not the final answer for all colleges but it is an impressive achievement and deserving of encouragement.

Alone among the several Wilson Fellows Ruth Bacon devoted a portion of her official report to "Women at St. Joseph's." After pointing out that a woman (Deb Frantz) was President of Student Government (1976-7), she said: "In my experience it is rare for a woman to hold this post in a co-educational college. Her election

reflects undoubtedly a very able candidate. It also shows maturity in the student body," Bacon went on. "Unhappily the College's Officers have been slower than the students in adjusting to a co-educational status." Then she cited various pertinent statistics. She next wrote:

I mentioned the situation of women in College employment to the College President, Father Banet, explaining that if, at the time women students are planning their future goals, they see only men in positions of major responsibility in their College, their sights will inevitably be narrowed. If Father Banet is concerned, he did not convey his concern to me. Here it is a case in which the students have taken the lead and shown the way to the College Officers.

Now, can one forget the circumstances of the Bacon-Banet encounter? It was late night, and Bacon went to the priests' refectory for a snack, as Fr. Banet had probably invited her to do. (He was always present to Wilson Fellows, doing countless things to make them welcome and comfortable. They all, including Ruth Bacon, remarked on his graciousness and accessibility.) There she did indeed encounter an undershirted President Banet--and she seized the opportunity to shake her finger at him and tell him just what she thought of the dearth of women in high places at the College. She was surely the only Visiting Fellow to "scold" the college president. Both Bacon and Banet have recalled this confrontation good-humoredly.

Even as Wilson Fellows critiqued campus coordinator John Egan, they never failed to speak of Anne-Marie Egan, also a member of the College Music and Core faculties. Bacon wrote:

Anne-Marie Egan, by the way, matches her husband in distinction as a musician, as a faculty member, and as a personality. They are an outstanding example of the sharing of careers and home responsibilities successfully and happily, with a family of seven enterprising and attractive children.

Bacon made a strong impression and had a considerable influence on College and community women. One was encouraged to return to school: she completed law studies at the Valparaiso University

School of Law and then held several jobs, eventually going to work for a law firm in Washington, DC! Bacon did not influence only the women, however. One of the Egan children, Sean, was strongly motivated by Bacon towards being an exchange student and giving his life to Peace Studies and International Studies.

Bacon's "Conclusions" of her official report included a remark on the then next-scheduled Fellow (Eugene Beem): "I understand that the next Visiting Fellow will come from the business area, an excellent choice considering the interest of the students in business related careers. I hope that the Foundation will send another woman Fellow in the not too distant future. Whoever goes will enjoy the visit. You can't miss." (Two later Wilson Fellows would be women, The Baroness Seear and Constance Newman. Julia Taft, Ellen Kennedy, Ellen Boal, and Joan Beck would be Visiting Fellows with their respective husbands.)

Bacon was a lecturer in Core 4 (The Modern World) on the topic, "Economic Implications of the Industrial Revolution for Women and Family." As Bacon began that lecture, Egan, Director of Core 4, was alarmed by the apparent failure of the light at the lectern. He apologized to her at once, and she quickly rejoined, "That's perfectly all right. I don't read." Whereupon she proceeded to speak for the next fifty minutes as freely as any Core lecturer ever spoke. Her lecture style was observed admiringly, almost enviably, by more than one of the professors, several of whom appropriated it successfully. Bacon also lectured in Core 8 (Non-Western Studies), which dealt with Africa and Japan that semester, about both of which she was predictably knowledgeable and articulate.

Bacon, perhaps not so predictably, held forth eloquently and informedly in science and "Science Core" (Core 6) classes. She talked to and with combined Biology (Conservation) and Earth Science (The Economics and Politics of Geology) classes. More than once, in fact, classes were advantageously combined during Bacon's visit to derive the maximum benefit from her visit and give the greatest possible number of students exposure to her. She actually acquired a kind of discipleship during her week on campus.

Surely one of Bacon's most unforgettable experiences at Saint Joseph's College was her Core 2 (Western Civilization) discussion with Fr. Donald Shea, past coordinator of the Wilson Fellows Program at the College, and his students. The subject was Plato's view(s) on woman. That discussion was called "vibrant and stimu-

lating," probably understatedly. Fr. Shea and Dr. Bacon had shared an office in Washington, DC, the prior semester, when both were working for the election of Gerald Ford and Robert Dole. (Fr. Shea was the mid-east regional coordinator of the Ford campaign and was about to leave the campus to take a full time position on the Republican National Committee.)

Egan reported to the Foundation that Bacon had "delighted, challenged, inspired, awed, taught, and edified." He averred that she had opened numerous eyes and minds and hearts in the Saint Joseph's College and Rensselaer communities, even as she pronounced her Wilson week a "marvelous learning experience" for herself.

Unlikely as it would seem, Ruth Bacon would for years after her visit advertise the College as she jogged along the streets of the nation's capital wearing the hooded T-shirt presented her as she was about to return from the College to the capital. (Other Fellows--the Shackfords, Beem, Couper--would similarly advertise the College on the streets of the "Big Apple" and the capital. And they tell of often being stopped in front of the Empire State Building or the White House by people wanting to know about Saint Joseph's College, wanting information that the Fellows were only too ready and willing to give.) Bacon called that T-shirt "a constant reminder of a very happy week."

One last item concerning the Bacon visit: Egan included notes, reviews, responses, *ect.*, from adult and student hosts and hostesses, and from students and professors whose classes Bacon had visited, in his massive-as-usual report to the Foundation and the Fellow(s). Bacon responded:

Other colleges have not provided the memos from students and other hosts--that is a St. Joseph's specialty, I gather, and a good one. I'm glad to have your reports on my talks, for my own notes are what might be called sketchy.

Bacon had been given numerous books by and about Saint Joseph's College and its people, as well as the T shirt, of course. The just cited "response" was written September 12, 1977, well after Bacon's March visit to Rensselaer. The postscript was: "I have such happy memories of my visit--and am still enjoying the books and the T-shirt."

The Wilson Visitation of Eugene R. Beem began in a church. Beem came to a Sunday Evening Lenten Service at Trinity United Methodist Church in Rensselaer, at 5 p.m., March 5, 1978. (The College chorus was in the midst of an uninterrupted annual tradition of Lenten choral concerts at that church.) Not only did Beem come for the singing: he brought the message, on the subject of "The Social Conscience of Business and Industry."

Well before Beem's arrival there was no little interest in him on campus and in town. Psychology Professor Lawrence B. Lennon wrote to John Egan on February 9:

What a neat blend of humanism and economics! I was very impressed with his "A Framework for Thinking about the Social Responsibility of S & H." He would be a great candidate for my personality theories class since I am looking for someone to tie together Maslow and the real world.

Egan had obviously circulated among the faculty the *vita* of Dr. Beem and a paper by Beem of the aforesaid title.

On the same day, History Professor William L. Downard also wrote Egan, requesting that Beem visit his class(es):

I spend quite a lot of time on the American Economic system as it has affected the general populace, and how it affects them today. Also, I focus on the idea of freedom versus restraints in our system and the costs/benefits of the two. Thus I'd really be happy to have Dr. Beem meet with my class.

As a News Release from Charles J. Schuttrow, Director of the News Bureau of Saint Joseph's College, dated March 3, 1978, said, Dr. Eugene Beem would bring to the College "a background in both business and higher education that ideally suits the purpose of the Woodrow Wilson Program."

All of the Wilson Fellows--and Beem was no exception--were interviewed by Schuttrow. Subsequently, several articles would appear in the local press, but also in the newspapers of the major cities in Indiana, based on those interviews. The Fellows were also guests on St. Joe Forum, a weekly radio program hosted by Schuttrow at 5:35 p.m. on Sunday evenings over Rensselaer radio station WJCK,

97.7 FM. The March 17 edition of the *Rensselaer Republican* contained this notice:

Liberty and justice are two major foundations of the American way of life, yet there exists today a tension between them, often created where efforts to attain one of the foundations limits the other. Dr.. Eugene Beem . . . will address that issue when he visits the "St. Joe Forum" . . . Sunday (March 19).

Wherever he went, on campus or off, in Rensselaer or neighboring community, businessman-educator Beem asked (and suggested possible answers to) a trio of vital questions: What is Life all about? What is the "Good Society"? How do we get there?

When he visited the College, Beem's official position was Vice President--Economics for the Sperry and Hutchinson Company of New York City. He was also in charge of Corporate Development for S & H, which most people knew for green stamps, but which had become a huge and diversified entity by the time of Beem's trip to Rensselaer.

Before he joined S & H, in February, 1958, Beem was an educator for fourteen years. His B.A. degree was earned at Ohio's Wooster College in 1942. He received the Ph.D. degree from the University of Pennsylvania in 1951. Beem was Instructor of Economics from 1946 to 1950 at the prestigious Wharton School of Commerce at the University of Pennsylvania. He chaired the Department of Economics at Kalamazoo College from 1950 to 1954. For the following four years he was Assistant Professor of Business Administration at the University of California.

Beem contributed articles on marketing and economics to the *Harvard Business Review*, *The Journal of Marketing*, *The Journal of Retailing*, *Management Review*, *Journal of Farm Economics*, and *Journal of Business*.

He had been a member of the Boards of Trustees of the College of Wooster and Pikeville College, and was an Adjunct Professor of Business Administration at Pace University at the time of his visit to Saint Joseph's College. He was also an elder in the Presbyterian Church.

Like Reed and Shackford, Beem was the father of three children.

Beem's specific responsibilities with S & H in 1976 (presumably the same two years later) were forecasting and monitoring changes in the general economy and in society which created opportunities or threats for S & H businesses. His department also worked with company managers to help evolve business strategies for meeting change.

In addition to speaking at the Methodist Church, Beem spoke to area industrialists, businessmen, and financiers on Monday evening in the elegant multi-purpose community room of the Edward J. Funk Hybrid Seed Corn Company in Kentland, IN, whose young president was Saint Joseph's College alumnus Donald Funk. In his Kentland talk, Beem frequently cited his "guru" of sorts, Peter Drucker, who just happened to be Funk's "guru," too. Funk had actually spent time at Drucker's home, basking in the mere presence of that eminent philosopher of business and "picking his brain."

Beem attended numerous Core lectures and discussions and, not surprisingly, classes in Economics and Business Administration. But he also attended, and contributed to, classes in Religion ("Right and Wrong" and "Prayer"), History ("American Economic History"), and Sociology ("Social Problems").

Beem said often that he believed it was the purpose of educational institutions to "create an atmosphere and environment in which students and faculty will grow toward whole persons." And he identified five stages or dimensions of this personal growth to wholeness: "Faith provides the ground and direction of all growth. Love gives content to faith. Self-awareness and self-acceptance enable balanced growth. Courage overcomes the risk in each type of growth."

Of a liberal education Beem had this to say: "Liberal studies contribute to each person a new dimension and the deepening of ultimate concern. Independent study is the capstone for training in clear thinking and effective communication and motivates a person toward courageous and creative self-affirmation."

All of which was to say that Eugene Beem found Saint Joseph's College and its departmental offerings and its interdisciplinary general education program much to his liking.

To the Foundation Beem wrote on March 23, 1978:

Each one of these Woodrow Wilson experiences gets even better than the last. I cannot imagine how any week could be more stimulating and enjoyable than my week at St. Joseph's. . . . The earlier experience with Woodrow Wilson Fellows had been so positive that there was very broad faculty interest in involving me. As a result, I had a full schedule. . . . More than half of the classroom sessions were in non-business and economic areas, which I appreciated very much. . . . One reason that the full schedule was possible is that I was invited to a number of classes just to participate like any other student.

Beem was exceptionally appreciative of his student hosts and hostesses, and of his evening dinner hosts. He made special mention of Keith Robinson's hosting him to luncheon on the final day of his visitation, noting that "One of his guests I especially appreciated visiting with was the owner of a large furniture store in Rensselaer who does business with four S & H furnishing companies." (Keith Robinson, onetime Trustee of the College, is deceased, as is Willis Wright, the furniture store owner, and also a longtime and generous friend of the College.) Beem observed that "The warmth and friendliness in this community are really something! I have rarely experienced anything like it. At each of these extra-curricular affairs there was a chance for me to share some thoughts with the whole group." Beem added, "This unusual community involvement was possible because of John Egan's unique stature. He and his wife, Anne-Marie, seem to be involved with everything, to know everyone, and to be loved by everyone. They have been at St. Joe's about 17 years, and they are, in a way, a school and community catalyst for bringing out in others the love and warmth which is potentially present within all of us."

Beem said, "Many small schools talk about close faculty-student relations, and a caring environment. This school not only talks about it but really delivers! I do not know of another small school where this genuine community spirit exists so markedly as at St. Joe's."

Beem continued, "Moreover, the faculty is unusually alive and cohesive. I get the feeling that a major reason is the College's required Core Program in liberal arts. While I am certainly not widely versed on what other liberal arts schools are doing, I am convinced that this interdisciplinary approach to liberal arts is right for St.

Joseph's. . . . The essence of Core is that faculty and students learn together. The lectures I heard were superb and the small group discussions were lively. I wanted to stay at St. Joseph's for the rest of the semester to complete the courses!"

Beem had this to say of President Banet: "The President of St. Joseph's . . . is a warm genuine person with the great gift of being able to laugh at himself. He has provided strong leadership for the school. (I marvel at his ability to get a faculty, trained in specialized disciplines, to accept the Core Program, and then to embrace it with gusto.)"

Beem called his living facilities in Schwietermann Hall "superlative," and liked to tell that Charlie (Fr. Banet) called that guest room "the St. Joe Hilton suite."

To his friend, Fr. Banet, Beem wrote on March 16, 1978:

. . . I do not know of another school where I have sensed so warm and loving an environment.

Your Core program is the most exciting approach I am aware of to liberal arts education. I value highly the privilege of sitting in on the Core classes which met last week. I have already dusted off Plato from my library and have purchased copies of some of William Blake's poems. I marvel that you have been able to involve such a high percentage of your faculty in this inter-disciplinary approach.

The College is fortunate to have your strong leadership and I like your completely natural, honest and human approach to management. Moreover, you have a great sense of humor, which may be the most valuable resource that any of us could possess.

Not long after his visit to Saint Joseph's College, Beem retired from S & H and relocated in Berea, OH, home of Baldwin Wallace College, where he accepted a newly created chair in Corporate and Management Ethics. Of his and Mary Jane's move to Berea, Beem would write, "We are delighted to be back permanently in a smallish liberal arts community."

Newspaperman who wanted to be university president: such was Bryce Nelson, Washington correspondent for Los Angeles *Times*, who came to the College the week of October 28, 1979, and was at that very time interested in (and a candidate for) the presi-

dency of the University of Idaho. As a journalist Nelson covered a variety of topics: energy and environment, presidential primaries and campaigns, politics in general, crime, court trials, agriculture, forests, medicine, science, prisons, Indiana, and a host of business, urban, and racial topics. He had been Chief of Midwest Bureau for Los Angeles *Times* in Chicago from 1973 to 1977, and for the preceding four years had been a reporter for that newspaper in Chicago. From 1966 to 1969 Nelson a reporter for *Science* magazine in Washington, DC: he was also acting editor of that publication. In 1965-6 he had been a reporter on the national staff of Washington *Post*, covering Congress. He was the winner of the Albert Deutsch Award for distinguished Journalism in 1970 for exposure of HEW black-listing which forced the HEW Secretary to major reform of HEW security procedures. (HEW is, of course, the former Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, later divided into the Department of Education and the Department of Health and Human Services.)

In other *Times* articles Nelson precipitated Justice Department investigation resulting in unprecedented mass indictment of Indiana prison guards for massacre of black inmates at Pendleton in 1969; focused the first attention on the possibility of deaths and birth defects caused by use of herbicides in the Vietnam War (The Pentagon was required to stop using these herbicides.); stimulated the first HEW national order advising abolition of mobile chest x-ray units in 1972; and spotlighted the need to preserve the farm shelterbelt trees of the Great Plains which led to a 1975 GAO report confirming findings and to Federal action.

At various times from 1957 to 1965 Nelson was a U.S. Senate aide. He was Foreign Affairs assistant to Senator Frank Church from 1963 to 1965 and writer of foreign and defense policy speeches for Senator Hubert Humphrey during the 1964 Vice Presidential campaign.

Nelson had studied history and literature of Western America at the University of Utah in 1956, then received the A.B. with honors from Harvard College in 1959, where he studied on a Franklin D. Roosevelt Scholarship and served for a year as president of the *Harvard Crimson*, the school's daily newspaper. Then Nelson took a Bachelor of Philosophy degree in Politics from the University of Oxford after three years of graduate study (1959 to 1962) on a Rhodes Scholarship.

Nelson was married to a high school teacher and child therapist, Martha, and they were parents of one daughter.

Nelson had made no previous Woodrow Wilson visitations and was a last-minute replacement at Saint Joseph's College for Rene McPherson, then CEO of Dana International, who was thrice slated to come to the College and never could or did make the trip. Nelson had been recommended as a Fellow, and specifically for Saint Joseph's College, by Roland Shackford. Nelson especially enjoyed the company of seventeen-term Congressman from Rensselaer, Charles Halleck, and Willis Wright, Rensselaer businessman mentioned earlier, whose sister was Halleck's longtime personal secretary, at the opening dinner in his honor. Another guest, local patent attorney Jack Nesbitt, struck up a friendship with Nelson based on many common interests, including duck-hunting and art contests associated therewith.

Memorable were Nelson's long breakfasts. He was a very early riser and was daily in the refectory when it opened at 6:45 a.m., there to stay for several successive sets of breakfast companions. His official breakfast host, as he was for all the Fellows, was Fr. Rudolph P. Bierberg, C.P.P.S., whose hospitality, erudition, and stimulating, wide-ranging conversation were cherished by all.

Nelson's formal addresses were to the Business Club and general public, respectively: the former entitled "Men, Money, and Politics," with emphasis on personal, pecuniary, and political affairs in Washington, DC (given on the fiftieth anniversary of the Bank Crash of 1929); the latter concerning Three Mile Island, given the very day of the release of the Kemeny Report on that mishap. (Nelson, in contact with his Washington office, had a "scoop" on the release of the Kemeny report.)

More than any other Fellow, Nelson was interested in the quality and curriculum of student life, what the students do when they're not in classrooms, lecture halls, laboratories, and library.

Not only did Nelson, at least theoretically, meet all the college students (by attending all levels of Core lectures), but he met "all" the children in Rensselaer: he was at the universally popular home of Dr. Kenneth Ahler on Halloween Night. Yearly, the whole town of Rensselaer comes to the Ahlers' door that night.

In Core 9 (Christian Humanism) the week of Nelson's visit, students were reading *Eucharist and the Hunger of the World* by Georgetown University theologian Monika Hellwig. Two of the

students in Dr. Egan's class, who were also two of Nelson's campus hosts, Anne-Cecile Egan and Mark Hoying (now Fr. Mark Hoying, C.PP.S.), without telling teacher, classmates, or Fellow, had fasted from Monday to the time of their Thursday discussion-leading with Nelson present. It was the two students' way of "getting into a Core book experientially," of living out their learning: and Nelson was much moved by all of this. Hoying worked at the College pig farm. He had taken Nelson to that pig farm already on Monday morning --something that wasn't done for any other Fellow.

Very special music was provided at the farewell dinner for Nelson, by student flautist and Nelson hostess Krisztina Bardos, and by a vocal quartet including Ms. Bardos, Anne-Cecile Egan, Mark Doss, and Weldon Egan, who also played guitar. (Mark Doss would go on to operatic fame. He is now with the Lyric Opera Company of Chicago and singing in all the major opera houses of the world.)

Nelson went away with a different impression of the Core Program than that which other Fellows had formed: the experiential, lived-out dimension took hold of him, rather than the organization, content, administration, or some other aspect.

Nelson made extensive use of Core XI as a site for mutually fulfilling conversations with individuals or with small groups of faculty and/or students.

Nelson regretted that he hadn't brought his wife, Martha, "with her greater knowledge, psychology, teaching, and German."

Back in 1962-3 Bryce Nelson had been a political science professor at the University of Pittsburg. Through many subsequent years as a newspaperman, he "left his heart" in academe. Not surprisingly, he became Dean of the School of Journalism at the University of Southern California in 1984.

The first couple to come to Saint Joseph's College--both husband and wife being Wilson Fellows--were William Howard Taft IV and Julia V. Taft from Washington, DC. Theirs was the only Wilson visitation that nearly required midwifery or obstetrics: Mrs. Taft was eight months pregnant and was sure she was going to "have that baby right in the middle of a class or discussion." She actually thought she was having labor pains all during the week at Saint Joseph's College, until she realized (at week's end) that she had been squeezing her always imposing frame, momentarily swollen with child and winter-suited and overcoated besides, into skimpy student

desks. So, the Tafts, she especially, could have reported that their Rensselaer visit was "painful"--but they did not.

The great grandson and namesake of the only man ever to serve as both President of the United States and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, William H. Taft IV was a DC lawyer and former general counsel for the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). Julia was director of the U.S. Refugee Resettlement Project. And this dynamic duo came to Saint Joseph's College the week of March 23-28, 1980.

The other fifteen Fellows were equally interesting and made similar contributions to the campus. Their remarks concerning the College, the Core Program, the faculty and students, the town of Rensselaer, their accommodations and hosts, and their activities and experiences were also similar.

For those who would like to read a full report on the eleven-year history of the Woodrow Wilson Fellows Program at Saint Joseph's College, a copy will be found in the College library or can be obtained for a modest fee from the College bookstore or from Dr. Egan.

FACULTY/STUDENT INTERACTIONS: TEACHING AND ADVISING IN THE 1990s

Charles Kerlin

Institutions of higher learning, like any of society's institutions, will never have enough personable, dynamic, and magnetic staff or bright, highly motivated, self-confident clients, no matter how diligently they attempt to recruit them. Such persons are in relatively short supply.
(Wilson, *et al.*)

"YOU CAN BE ANYTHING YOU WANT TO BE"

When I was a college student at Purdue University in the early 1960s, I felt the usual indecision about career choices and what students call "the rest of your life." When my uncertainty worsened, I'd seek out a classroom professor in my "major of the week" and ask advice. Inevitably, my pipe-smoking, tweedy mentor would say, "Mr. Kerlin, you can be anything you want to be." In those innocent days before Vietnam and Watergate, this advice was just what the doctor ordered--a bracing bit of Midwestern, Protestant, optimism that was all right with me. And as I tried a few majors and began to narrow in on my interests, I loved the freedom of it all! Being anything I wanted to be meant I could take my time to actually enjoy college--experiment, be independent, have fun, learn to smoke a pipe myself! Anything I wanted to be was out there "in the real world" with my reservation on it!

That's the way it was for most of us, wasn't it, in those days before assassinations and riots, inflation and recessions, the Ayatollah and terrorism? But I'm just coming to discover that it is not that way for students today who, if anything, ask the "What am I going to do with the rest of my life?" question more often than I did.

When I was asked that question as a younger teacher, I used to imitate my professors and assume their same tweedy look, put my lips around an imaginary pipe, and say in response, "Anything you

want to be." I wanted my students then, as I do today, to feel the same sense of unlimited opportunity I had felt. I've always wanted them to experiment and be independent as I sometimes was. I've wanted them to enjoy college and pursue it as fervently as they will pursue their careers. But I'm discovering that many of them aren't doing any of these things, and I think it's time we reconsider the kind of advice we give them and the measures we take in and out of the classroom to motivate them while they are under our guidance.

It is the purpose of this paper to examine the literature on faculty/student interaction and discuss ways to improve it to the benefit of both groups. I do so specifically in light of the changing student population which we will have to serve in the 1990s--a population whose diversity will present particularly strong challenges for all of us in higher education. Let's begin by looking at some of the characteristics of that new student group.

TODAY'S COLLEGE STUDENTS

Arthur Levine says that "we can expect the most varied student body in the history of higher education" in the 1990s (15). There will be a majority of women over men (as there is today). There will be more older students enrolled as the number of people in the traditional age group grows smaller. The college population of minorities will grow dramatically because they have higher birthrates than whites and colleges will recruit them as a way of maintaining their enrollments. Levine says that these new recruits will provide "a tidal wave of growth" as we reach out and try to recruit this population (16). However, because college costs will continue to grow, the number of middle-class students might possibly decline, depending on national and state policies towards financial aid.

Nearly half of today's college students go to school part-time. In the 1990s this population of part-timers will grow and many "will be asking for nontraditional scheduling: nights, early mornings, weekends, intensive, off-campus, at home, self-study" (16).

Other forms of competition are now emerging to tempt the traditional eighteen year old freshman to delay or, indeed, forgo college. Corporations and the military will vigorously recruit young people since their proportion of the general population is

declining fast and they will continue (as they do today) to train these young people outside the walls of our academic institutions.

In the 1990s many entering college will be academically underprepared, that is, they will have had "erratic academic performance in high school and as college freshmen, unimpressive standardized test scores" (Moore and Carpenter 96). In the more speculative dimensions they will have "depressed motivation; poor abstract and conceptual skills; low self-esteem; poor self-concept; unclear goals; and they will be culturally deficient, verbally passive, and educationally disadvantaged" (Moore and Carpenter 96).

These characteristics may suggest minorities, but many of these new college students will come from other categories entirely: older women, veterans, workers whose jobs have changed or been eliminated, and many others who for different reasons did not choose to enter college immediately after high school.

Cross (1981) identified new kinds of students entering higher education in her studies undertaken in the seventies and eighties. These students were not underachievers in high school, and they did not have low scores on standardized tests; they were neither culturally or educationally disadvantaged, but they often had high dropout rates and they were badly motivated. (Cross in Moore, Jr.)

What about our most recent freshmen? According to Astin, Korn, and Berz, in *The American Freshman: National Norms For Fall 1989* (a study which included freshman data from Saint Joseph's College), there is growing student activism among American college students. Increasing numbers say that it is a very important goal for them to "influence social values" (an all-time high of 41.1 percent, up from 36.0 percent in 1987 and 31.1 in 1982). Over 23 percent want to "participate in community action programs," and 35.3 percent want to "help promote racial understanding," up from 27.2 percent in 1986. Many are concerned with the environment and legalized abortion. In 1989, 64.7 favor legalized abortion, up from 57 percent in 1988 (4-5).

Politically, students today have a range of concerns which swing from left to right in interesting ways. A new question on handgun control shows 78.2 percent favoring governmental efforts for greater control. On the other hand, they still strongly support the death penalty, drug testing, and other issues which relate to crime and law enforcement (5-7).

"One area in which anxiety remains high, however, is the job market. And it is very high. Work is their primary focus" (17, 19). As a result during the 1980s students have been choosing vocational majors, with business as the most common concentration. In 1985 Levine reported that enrollments in business had more than doubled in the last decade, while humanities majors had fallen by more than a third. Perhaps most interesting for Saint Joseph's College is that women also most frequently choose business (20). Astin, Korn, and Berz note some decline in this trend in their 1989 report. They report that, from a record high of 24.6 percent in 1987, the percent of freshmen aspiring to business careers declined to 23.6 percent in 1988 and 21.8 percent in 1989. A similar pattern appears in the actual numbers who choose business as a major: down to 24.5 percent in 1989 after reaching its all-time high of 27.3 percent in 1987 (5).

Also of special interest to Saint Joseph's College are the growing number of our students who are enrolled in the nursing program. I have not been able to find demographic studies of nursing students analogous to *The American Freshman*, but my own experience with them suggests that their vocational interests are as strong and often more narrow than our other students. They also are coming to us with a wide range of academic preparation. Needless to say, we must be very careful in the way we serve these students and pay particular attention to their impact on our curriculum.

In the 1989 report, other career area concentrations also declined. The computer field and data processing were down. Interest in natural sciences continued to decline (down to 5.9 percent) and the arts and humanities also declined down to 8.7 percent. A modest decline in those interested in a teaching career took place, but psychology continued its steady increase (4.2 percent, up 2.1 percent since 1982). Interest in postgraduate degrees reached another record high in 1989: to 59.6 percent, up from 48.8 in 1980 (6).

High school grades were up, with only 17.7 percent with C+ averages or below (6). In contrast, entering freshmen were lower in reporting cultural activities--visiting an art museum, doing extra reading for courses, being guests in a teacher's home, etc. By contrast "the percent who report earning a varsity letter in sports reached an all-time high" (48.3 percent, compared to 30.6 percent in 1970) (6).

This quick survey reveals, I think, that today's students represent a number of special challenges resulting from their incredible diversity. It seems clear that these challenges will not diminish in the 1990s, since the diversity which generates them will continue. Some of these challenges are revealed by the statistics which characterize them. First of all, we are challenged by our students' vocationalism and individualism which often make them appear narcissistic and materialistic. We must prepare them for a difficult job market which we know frightens them, but we must as well "enlarge upon their dreams," to quote a telling phrase used by Arthur Levine. He continues. "Their dreams are too narrow and too personal. They ask for both too much and too little" (21). They need to recognize, then, that education today is more than job preparation. The time, involvement and cost make such a recognition vital and it is also vital to the survival of colleges like St. Joseph's College which stress the importance of educating students for a lifetime and not just for a vocation.

STUDENT DEVELOPMENT

How might we best go about meeting the needs of our students in the 1990s? Let's begin by looking at some theories of how students learn.

Development theories are of at least two types: those which argue for a series of hierarchical stages (for example, Perry, 1970 and Kohlberg, 1971) or those which are less hierarchical but more multidimensional (for example, Chickering, 1969). Both hierarchical and multidimensional theories have come under criticism recently by women and minorities. Since our student population in the 1990s will contain large numbers of both groups, I will note their criticisms here. Upcraft summarizes this recent criticism of these scales "for not fully accounting for the development of minority students, women, and returning adults" (40). His summary will not be given here, but citations for each are included in the bibliography. These developmental theories are criticized by feminists for mistakenly basing their concepts of human development on male development. The issues tend to cluster around the values of connectedness and autonomy. Kohlberg is criticized by Gilligan for portraying women as deficient in moral development, since his third stage (which stresses helping and pleasing others) is not an

end in itself but only a step to "higher stages where relationships are subordinated to rules (stage four) and rules to universal principles of justice (stages five and six)" (18). Other male-oriented development models (Perry's, for instance) favor separateness and independence over connectedness and interdependence.

Minority critics argue that developmental theories are not appropriate for minorities unless they stress the importance of minority culture inside and separate from white, majority culture (Upcraft 48-9). Those who wish to understand the development of adult learners point out quite rightly that conventional theories stress late adolescent development, and their generalizations are simply inappropriate for adult learners.

A theory which avoids these pitfalls and others discussed in the literature is Astin's theory of involvement. This theory is not only an important addition to the development theory literature, it is also most useful in illustrating the major concern of this paper which is to discuss how various kinds of faculty/student interactions influence the development and growth of today's students. Astin states his theory succinctly and argues that its simplicity is one of its virtues. *"Students learn by becoming involved"* (1985, 133). Astin believes that his theory is comprised of five basic postulates:

1. Involvement refers to the investment of physical and psychological energy in various "objects." The objects may be highly generalized (the student experience) or highly specific (preparing for a chemistry exam.)

2. Regardless of its object, involvement occurs along a continuum. Different students manifest different degrees of involvement in a given object, and the same student manifests different degrees of involvement in different objects at different times.

3. Involvement has both quantitative and qualitative features. The extent of a student's involvement in, say, academic work can be measured quantitatively (how many hours the student spends studying) and qualitatively (does the student review and comprehend reading assignments, or does the student simply stare at the textbook and daydream?).

4. The amount of student learning and personal development associated with any educational program is directly proportional to the quality and quantity of student involvement in that program.

5. The effectiveness of any educational policy or practice is directly related to the capacity of that policy or practice to increase student involvement. (1985, 135-6)

Noteworthy about this theory is its stress on behavior. There are various ways for our diverse student population "to manifest different degrees of involvement" (52), and there are both quantitative and qualitative ways of measuring it; but the effectiveness of *any* educational practice is measured by that practice's capacity to increase involvement. Astin makes clear in a number of places that he is describing a system which ideally involves both students and faculty. For instance: "the involvement concept applies equally to students and to faculty...the theory of involvement is a useful tool that can be used both by researchers, to guide their investigation of student and faculty development, and by college administrators and faculty as they attempt to design more effective learning environments" (1985, 134). Astin lists and describes specific forms of involvement which have the most impact on students. They are:

- Effect of Place of Residence
- Effect of Honors Program Involvement
- Effect of Academic Involvement
- Effect of Student-Faculty Involvement
- Effect of Athletic Involvement
- Effect of Involvement in Student Government

All of these forms of involvement are discussed at great length by Astin and, indeed, all of these forms of involvement are important; but let me turn now to what Astin says "is more strongly related to satisfaction with college than any other type of involvement or, indeed, any other student or institutional characteristic: Student/Faculty Interaction" (1985, 149).

STUDENT/TEACHER INTERACTIONS

Let's discuss the interaction between students and faculty members as teachers first. Ernest Boyer probably said it best: "All the talk about excellence is superficial unless we acknowledge that good teaching is at the very heart of good schools" (1983). And it is in the classroom that faculty/student interaction takes place most

systematically over a long period of time. In large universities and in many larger colleges this interaction is not very personal: large lecture classrooms with more than one hundred students spread around the room (clustered at the back if possible), a teacher at the front with a microphone, newspapers rattling, the hum of distracting conversation, no focus or attention of any kind except periodically when the lecturer says something like: "You better get this down because it may be on the test." Then all but the most hopelessly bored (they are nodding off) grudgingly copy down what the lecturer has written on the overhead.

This scene doesn't occur in this extreme way very often at Saint Joseph's College. Even those who periodically grumble about Core lectures would agree, I think, that even in that setting there is usually more interaction between faculty members and students than there is in the large university lecture class where students are known to the lecturer by their social security numbers and few by little else. No one is a number at Saint Joseph's College. At Core lectures faculty and students sometimes interact in interesting ways. Professors X, Y, and Z move around the room in periodic conversation with colleagues and students. Professor B takes roll and sits with her students. Professor W is handing back papers and Professor F is in a spirited debate with a student who is preparing to lead class discussion. No numbers here, then. But are teacher/student interactions in the lecture hall and in our regular classrooms as empowering of student success and well-being as they might be? Let's examine some of the discussion of successful interactions in classroom settings and see how we are doing.

THE CLASSROOM

Everyone, it would seem, knows what a good teacher is. Boyer, in his book, *College: The Undergraduate Experience in America*, says: "The central qualities that make for successful teaching can be simply stated: command of the material to be taught, a contagious enthusiasm for the play of ideas, optimism about human potential, the involvement of one's students, and--not least--sensitivity, integrity, and warmth as a human being. When this combination is present in the classroom, the impact of a teacher can be powerful and enduring" (154).

John and Suanne Roueche, on the other hand, say that "the three key human and professional qualities involved in teaching excellence" are (1) love and concern for others, (2) the ability to create a positive learning environment, and (3) commitment to the teaching profession" (285). They continue: "Teachers who possess these qualities get students involved, make the classroom a place where students want to be, and provide an image of professional commitment to teaching" (285). But how do effective teachers actually manifest these qualities in such a way that students and colleagues recognize their effectiveness and point them out as models of teaching excellence? Wilson and Gaff studied the differences between successful and less successful teachers and their results reveal how qualities of the kinds emphasized by Boyer, the Roueches, and others depend upon the way successful teachers interact with students.

Wilson and Gaff developed a "Faculty Characteristics Questionnaire" which tested faculty opinions on a wide variety of beliefs and practices and gave it to faculty at eight colleges and universities (University of California at Berkeley, Northeastern Illinois State College, University of California at Santa Cruz, Luther College, University of the Pacific, Monteith College, Clark College, and Shimer College).

In addition, students at these same institutions were given "The Omnibus Personality Inventory" as freshmen and seniors as well as "Freshmen" and "Senior" questionnaires. The "Senior" questionnaire asked students to evaluate many aspects of their college careers, including their relationships with faculty. Seniors were asked to name the teacher of their most stimulating course and additionally to name "one faculty member who you feel has contributed most to your educational and/or personal development" (92). They were then asked to describe their relationships with these individuals.

Faculty surveyed were asked to name two outstanding colleagues and one individual teacher "who seems to have significant impact on the lives of students" (92). The characteristics of faculty members who were nominated at least twice were then compared with those who received no nominations. In both nominated groups, a number of similarities were found. These similarities were said to constitute characteristics of effective faculty. Some of the most surprising and gratifying results found by Wilson and

Gaff are the qualities of faculty members which evidently did make a difference in their effectiveness. Age seemed relatively unimportant, for instance, and sociopolitical attitudes ranged rather equally across the liberal/conservative spectrum, suggesting the diversity of these attitudes among both faculty and students, even at the time these surveys were made in the late sixties and early seventies. The differences between effective and less effective faculty, when attitudes make a difference, tend to cluster around the effective faculty members' attitudes towards undergraduate teaching. Effective teachers valued teaching and expressed their feelings to students. On the other hand, they had a less positive orientation towards research (104-5). How they act rather than what they believe is reported more consistently. They make more interesting presentations in their classes. "Specifically, they more often reported using stories and analogies to make a point and sharing examples from their own experiences and research" (105). Effective teachers weren't found to be more organized than their less effective colleagues. "It seems to matter very little whether an instructor prepares and distributes course outlines, describes objectives, or uses detailed notes in class, for example" (105). But effective teachers do talk about a variety of contemporary issues (106). They show greater concern for issues of paramount importance to students than their less effective colleagues and they tend to hold open discussions of issues rather than espousing one view or another (106-7). The single biggest difference, though, was the "extent to which they interacted with students outside the classroom" (107). In fact, when the three indicators of in and out-of-class behaviors are compared (Interesting Presentations, Discuss Contemporary Issues, Out-of-class interaction), out-of-class interaction is most often named by both faculty and student nominators as the key ingredient of success. Fifty-five and fifty-four percent of those teachers who received two or more nominations as effective teachers were cited for this. (106)

"Given the importance of such contact to perceptions of effectiveness, the data would seem to indicate that much effective teaching-impact may take place outside the classroom" (107). Strategies which result in such out-of-class activity, then, will enhance the effectiveness of teachers by producing more meaningful interactions than are taking place inside the classroom.

Let's return for a few moments to that Core lecture hall I pictured earlier. One of the advantages of Core lectures is that they let faculty and students meet together in a kind of hybrid in/out of the classroom environment that we should make better use of. One way to do this is to have the faculty's student tutors present, advising both faculty members and students of problems or successful activities she has engaged in with the students she is tutoring. My tutor in Core 1 did this last year. She was particularly helpful there because she praised student writing in front of student authors and let me reinforce her suggestions and recommendations. Another advantage of our lecture environment is that we quickly discover that we share similar problems and often similar satisfactions by joining together to listen to lectures.

Having praised the Core lecture environment as a place where interactions between students and faculty members can take place, let me now spend a little time criticizing it. If an architect tried to create an inappropriate place for students and faculty to gather for a lecture, I think he'd create something very close to our auditorium. First of all, it is entirely too large for most groups we use it for, and we haven't seemed to find a way to bring our students together at the front of the auditorium where they are more likely to interact with each other and their teachers and pay attention to the day's lecturer. We've tried assigned seating, block seating, roping off the back and doing nothing, all with little noticeable success. The result is a frustrating experience for both students and lecturers. The lecturer has to try communicating with a group which is spread all over the auditorium, with many at the back who pay no attention at all. If students are forced into assigned seating, they resent it and often show their resentment by coming late, and sitting at the back or not attending at all. Those who do attend come into an auditorium which is usually dark, gloomy and hot. If the windows are opened it is noisy and cold. No wonder our students complain about Core lectures!

What about film and video presentations? For both the sound system is inadequate and the two monitors we use to show video tapes are too small and misplaced at the front of the auditorium, guaranteeing, I think, that absolutely no one can see or hear much of anything.

Engineers use the word ergonomics to describe electronics equipment which is both well designed and functional. St. Joseph's

College needs an ergonomic make-over in its lecture facility and most classrooms which exhibit most of the problems of the auditorium on a smaller scale. As we develop classroom and lecture space in the new Core building, I urge us to give special attention to the basic design of these new facilities. They should be appropriate in size and, in the case of a lecture hall, adjustable. They should have high quality sound and video equipment which has been designed and installed by audio and video engineers. They should be bright and conducive to active academic interactions between students and faculty.

Despite the problems of bad design in our auditorium and classrooms, one of the most pleasurable experiences I've had as a teacher took place in both Cores 1 and 2 when we opened up lectures for questions and comments. This was done only twice, but in both cases students and faculty participated (the latter without dominating), and in both cases the discussions begun in lecture carried over into the discussion groups which followed. Those two days I felt good about teaching because I felt that we were seeing students develop their own potency in a large public forum.

This ability to change student behavior was most significantly reflected in the Wilson and Gaff study by the fact that 78 percent of the student-nominated and 68 percent of the colleague-nominated faculty named seniors upon whom they felt they had had a significant impact. Only 48 and 49 percent of the faculty not nominated by either named such students (107-8). Wilson and Gaff further found that the perception of having an impact is often dependent upon the faculty member having experienced a *continuing* relationship with individual students over a significant period of time (125). Faculty advising is one interaction device frequently named by both faculty and students as the vehicle for long term relationships. In fact, 25 percent of the seniors upon whom faculty felt they had had an impact were advisees. Let's turn to that topic now and see how these findings might affect advising programs in the next decade.

FACULTY/STUDENT INTERACTION THROUGH ACADEMIC ADVISING

I began this brief paper discussing my role as an academic advisor, disturbed by how inadequate the kind of advice I was given as a college student is for the diverse kinds of students I am asked to deal with today. Because of their vocationalism and self-centeredness, which arise from their fears of a forbidding job market in an uncertain economy, current students make very different and more challenging demands upon us. I didn't realize when I was an undergraduate, but "be anything you want to be" advice is simplistic and not very responsive to real concerns. It is also misleading and of almost no help to the students I teach today. Many students now come to college with relatively high aspirations, or they are at least open to new ideas and new challenges; but then they begin to slip. By the second semester of the freshman year I can sense their growing uncertainty. By sophomore year some have become fearful and shy; their college work is almost meaningless to them and, when they come in with their "What do I do with the rest of my life?" question, they invariably begin by asking me to tell them why they are in college in the first place. They don't like college; they don't like books or discussions in the dorms; they aren't having any fun: "What am I going to do?" By junior year they have quit coming in. They get their answers from each other, or they just quit asking. In class they whine and complain if asked to do anything substantial. They are just putting in time, waiting to get out--out of the classroom, out of college, out of thinking about anything even resembling the intellectual. These students need help, and I've stopped telling them they can be anything they want to be because I'm sick of graduating students less impressive and interesting than they were as freshmen. Now I help them get some control over their lives. I'm identifying the ones who should consider graduate school as early as I can, and I'm giving them unmistakable directions on how they are going to have to behave if they want to get there. The same holds true for others with different goals, including those who want to go into business. These students need some guidance, also. They need to be directed to people "out there in the real world" (as they call it) who have learned the score and can help prepare them for the business world as it really is, where hard work, really hard work, is often demanded; where the ability to communicate in speech and writing is vital to success, and where it is often cold, dull and dispiriting. "Is this what you really want," I ask them? If they say, "Yes," then I get them into internships, whenever possi-

ble; and, if the business world seems to be too much for them, I pursue other options with them. When their interests start to slip, I call them in and read the riot act to them! If they still vacillate, I get even more intrusive. I insist on signing everything that has to be signed to get through this place. "Don't I have the right to change my mind?" they ask me.

"Sure, you do," I say. "But don't change your mind without consulting me. It's rough out there, you know. You can't get along in this world, anymore, thinking you can just be anything you want to be."

What I have come to do, instinctively, is to see advising as a developmental process. Crockett defines such advising in this way:

Academic advising is a developmental process which assists students in their clarification of their life/career goals and in the development of educational plans for the realization of these goals. It is a decision making process by which students realize their maximum educational potential through communication and information exchanges with an advisor; it is ongoing, multifaceted, and the responsibility of both student and advisor. The advisor serves as a facilitator of communication, a coordinator of learning experiences through course and career planning and academic progress review, and an agent of referral to other campus agencies as necessary. (248)

Advising viewed in this way encourages active involvement of students with their academic advisors of the kind that Astin feels is necessary for students to gain "satisfaction" with their college experience.

Advising, I've come to believe, should be long-term and I think we should seriously consider extending our present freshman advising program beyond the second semester of freshman year to encompass the entire four year program of an entering freshman. I am not proposing the elimination of academic advising in a student's major department, but I think that freshman advisors could maintain a formal relationship with their advisees that would over this extended period more resemble a mentor relationship than a strictly academic one. Wilson and Gaff emphasized the importance of a long term, continuous relationship in faculty/student interac-

tion and perhaps we are not taking advantage of our resources as well as we might. Deloz in *Effective Teaching and Mentoring* calls mentors "guides who lead us along the journey of our lives" (quoted in Johnson 119). Mentoring has been described in literature throughout the ages (noteworthy in Homer's *Odyssey*), and it is the best term I have found for describing what I think an advisor ought to do over a longer-term for students at St. Joseph's College. "Mentoring involves dealing with individuals in terms of their total personality in order to advise, counsel, and/or guide them. (Cross 1976, 205). Mentors are particularly helpful to the at-risk students we will find in greater numbers in the student populations of the 1990s.

Mentoring enhances the success of women and nontraditional freshmen. Collins in *Professional Women and Their Mentors* found that women were positively affected by the personal attention that they received from the mentor relationship. Mentoring has also been found to be a "critical factor in the success of black freshmen. Fleming, in her studies of black students on both black campuses and primarily white campuses, found that the Levitz and Noel 'one caring person' variable in freshman success applied to black freshmen and that the race of the mentor was not an issue" (Johnson 121).

My own experience this last semester in an advanced writing class, which enrolls a large number of nontraditional students, convinced me that they are particularly in need of a more personal advising relationship. In letters they wrote to vice presidents of the college and to the Student Association president they sought answers to the kinds of questions I answer routinely for my freshmen advisees. They were particularly anxious about how well they were taking advantage of our total resources and their anxiety was clearly alleviated by written and personal responses they received from Mr. James Thatcher, Dr. Allen Berger (as Freshman Dean) and Miss Patricia Leurck, the Student Association president.

Mentoring benefits all students, though, by helping them become involved in the total life experiences available to them on a college campus. Cosgrove in a freshman mentoring-transcript study concluded that students who participated in a mentor development program "experienced significantly more positive attitudes toward the overall university environment" (122). In

addition they also exhibited more confidence, and were more goal oriented and better problem solvers (122-4).

The freshman academic advising program is an excellent model for a longer advising relationship at Saint Joseph's College. In semesters following the freshman year, perhaps the relationship could be extended to include meetings each semester to review a student's progress; lunches could be scheduled monthly where advisors meet with their groups; an annual dinner for advisors and their advisees could be held on or off campus; and a special celebration for graduating seniors would be an appropriate way of honoring graduates and the advising relationship itself. In addition each advisor should convey, however the method, that he or she is available and willing to talk with any advisee who needs help.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, I have described a number of ways we might improve interaction between faculty and students and demonstrated why such interaction is beneficial to both groups. I have also shown that greater interaction will be particularly beneficial to the diverse students we will serve in the 1990s. Perhaps my strongest argument for greater interaction by faculty is that interacting with students in and out of the classroom will make them more effective educators. As Wilson's and Gaff's study makes clear, faculty members who are skilled at these kinds of interactions are the ones most often cited by students as having had a lasting and important impact on their lives. These teachers know they belong, they know *their* students are growing and developing. These teachers find their work satisfying and rewarding, because they are indeed being rewarded by those students upon whom they have had an influence.

These, of course, are implicit rewards. Effective teachers and advisors need explicit rewards as well. The kinds of interactions this paper recommends take time, lots of time, and not every faculty member will be able to give that time or feel comfortable behaving as personally and openly as this paper suggests. However, all can be encouraged to do so with training, recognition and financial rewards. I am pleased to say in this conclusion that we do a good job at Saint Joseph's College in developing faculty talent, training faculty as advisors and rewarding faculty for making the extra efforts

that are needed to develop and maintain long term relationships with students.

Students benefit in as many and various ways as faculty. Knowing someone is there is the most frequently mentioned benefit by students in Wilson and Gaff (130), and intellectual stimulation and the demand for good work by interactive faculty are also frequently cited as a source of satisfaction by students. Perhaps the most important benefit, and again one which fits the special needs of today's students, is that interactive faculty often are cited by Wilson and Gaff as those who encourage students to examine their own values and develop a more lively and critical sense of self-awareness. When this happens we are serving our students and our profession in the highest way possible.

SEE NEXT PAGE FOR CITATIONS

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RELATIVISM, HISTORY, AND DEMOCRACY: ANTHROPOLOGICAL LESSONS FOR CURRICULAR REFORM

Allen H. Berger

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1. Introduction

The political and cultural mood in America in the late 1980s and early 1990s is perhaps best captured by the transformation of liberalism into an electoral liability. Recent elections have witnessed candidates from the ideological Left rushing to distance themselves from the "L-word," as they substitute euphemisms like "progressive," while their opponents from the Right use the word "liberal" to slander their rivals. That the term has become so unsavory is partially due to its association with big government and escalating taxes, two trends that voters have come to resent. Of equal importance, however, is the equation of liberalism with excessive tolerance. Thus, when George Bush zeroed in on Michael Dukakis' membership in the American Civil Liberties Union, he was encouraging Americans to see in a liberal victory not just an expanding federal budget, but more significantly the specter of civil

blasphemy and public anarchy being given official sanction. The success of Bush's campaign tactics and the continuing unpopularity of the A.C.L.U. demonstrate how anxious many Americans have become about a perceived tendency in our society toward desacralization, disorder, and moral decay. Freedom, it seems, has gotten out of hand. In this climate of anxiety and concern, it has become fashionable to hold relativism responsible for the ills of the age and to label it a threat to our democratic institutions. More and more, according to critics, young people are being taught that all conceptions of the good human life are equally valid. Two responses to this supposed trend toward value-free openness (and the *laissez faire* policies it logically produces) are noteworthy: 1) the efforts of prominent educators such as William Bennett (1984), the Secretary of Education in the Reagan administration, and Allan Bloom (1987) to reintroduce a classicist canon of texts as the foundation of a liberal education, and 2) the efforts of conservative politicians such as Jesse Helms and Robert Dole to banish whatever makes the majority exceedingly uncomfortable (e.g., homoerotic art, lewd rap music, flag-burning) and to restore, by law, those traditional American values that are cherished in the collective memory. Both of these responses represent a return to the orthodoxy of absolutism. Both are motivated by the fear that our moral fiber and our political community will dissolve unless we carefully nurture and protect from pollution that which is True and Right. It is this tendency to politically enshrine absolutes and to discourage or punish irreverence, I would argue, that is the real enemy of democratic society. Other advocates of this position recently have responded vociferously to Bloom *et al.* According to Arthur Schlesinger, for example, "history suggests that the damage done to humanity by the relativist is far less than the damage done by the absolutist--by the fellow who, as Mr. Dooley once put it, 'does what he thinks th'Lord wud do if He only knew th'facts in th'case'" (1). Benjamin Barber in a review of Bloom's book adds, "it was the tyranny of 'Truth' politicized that justified the divine right of kings, the Inquisition, the Reign of Terror, and such modern orthodoxies as totalitarianism" (64). These responses are virtually identical to that given fifty years earlier by John Dewey in reaction to Robert Maynard Hutchins' proposal that general education ought to be structured around the great books of the Western world (cf. Shea 1989). Dewey believed that the creation of a canon threatened

democracy; authoritarianism, initially intellectual but then also political, would predominate. Thirty years before Hutchins' effort to redesign the curriculum at the University of Chicago Dewey despaired about the impact of any curriculum designed to preserve fixed and eternal truths. "Such a condition of intellectual subjection," he argued, "is needed for fitting the masses into a society where the many are not expected to have aims or ideas of their own, but to take orders from the few set in authority. It is not adapted to a society which intends to be democratic" (356).

Lest I be taken myself for a blasphemer, it is important at the outset that I explain my philosophy. My advocacy of relativism, I believe, is not inconsistent with Christian religious teaching. After all, theologians as diverse as Augustine, Calvin, Rudolf Bultmann, and Reinhold Niebuhr, given the frailty of humans and their estrangement from God, have encouraged believers to exhibit modesty and caution, not arrogance and certitude. Niebuhr, recognizing the danger of a politicized absolutism, warned against "the depth of evil to which individuals and communities may sink ... when they try to play the role of God to history" (quoted in Schlesinger 27). Bultmann, in calling for a thorough "demythologizing" of knowledge and thought, argued that living without absolutes may in fact be the greatest sign of trust and faith in God (84).

But the source of my relativism is not Christian theologians. I take myself instead to be a fairly faithful follower of Dewey (so long as that does not imply advocacy of an alternative canon). I have also been influenced in my philosophy of education by Paulo Freire. For Freire (1970), education can and should be a "subversive" force in that it has the power to liberate individuals from the "cultures of silence" and the "circles of certainty" in which they are imprisoned. It thereby can enable them to "make their own truth." But education does not have to be liberating. Freire also envisions a "banking education" which turns the student into a container or a receptacle to be filled (with truth) by the teacher. According to Freire, "the capability of banking education to minimize or annul the students' creative power and to stimulate their credulity serves the interests of the oppressors, who care neither to have the world revealed nor to see it transformed" (60).

Dewey's and Freire's contributions to the theory of education have been to suggest that in a democratic society (Dewey) or a society where the oppressed are to be empowered to seek liberation

(Freire) educators must incite *doubt* and stimulate *imagination*. For if the citizenry is to be capable of active participation in the shaping and governance of society, it must be more than informed; it must be *critical*. Colleges and universities have a key role to play in this process, especially in the United States where "education up to the age of eighteen or nineteen . . . is mostly a matter of socialization--of getting the students to accept the moral and political common sense of the society as it is" (Rorty 4). However, if as college teachers we treat the great texts of our cultural inheritance as inerrant guides, we undermine the possibility of developing critical thinking, dialogue, and debate. In addition, we avoid the issue of how these same texts may have helped to create or maintain (e.g., by mystifying and/or mythicizing) social relations that exploit, impoverish, and oppress. As an alternative, I would urge that we commit ourselves to historical education (cf. Giroux and Kaye) and to the development of relativistic thinking.

Such a pedagogy would not ask students to abandon their pre-existing beliefs and values and to accept alternative claims to truth as equally valid. Nor would it portray such standards as merely matters of whim and happenstance. Instead, it would enable students to see how all perspectives, including their own and those of their elders and teachers, are anchored in history, in personal and national experience. People with different histories will have different values. A broad awareness of this sort will inevitably cause students to engage in considerable introspective questioning. The college's job, it seems to me, is not to leave them adrift at this point, but to challenge and guide them toward the reaffirmation of old values and/or the formulation of new commitments. Such commitments will not have been taught by rote; instead they will have been nurtured within a curriculum that has stimulated doubt as much as it has encouraged a respect for faith.

This paper explores the value of such a pedagogy, first by examining the consequences of the historical transformation in cultural anthropology, my own discipline, toward historical inquiry and cultural relativism, and second, by arguing for the possibility and necessity of an analogous cognitive and ethical transformation in today's college students. Finally, I ask whether it is appropriate and possible for educators to pursue such an agenda in *Catholic* colleges and universities, institutions affiliated with a church whose internal life is predominantly authoritarian and hierarchic.

2. Cultural Relativism and Historical Inquiry in Anthropology

a. Anthropology Before Relativism

Though cultural relativism and historical inquiry are almost taken for granted as part of the methodological and conceptual framework of modern anthropology, the incorporation of these perspectives into the discipline did not occur until the twentieth century. Anthropology itself is much older than that, with roots in the Enlightenment--the new intellectual climate which enveloped Europe in the eighteenth century. According to Marvin Harris, "it was actually the seventeenth-century philosopher John Locke who provided the metaphysical foundation upon which anthropologists over two hundred years later were to rear the first formal definitions of culture" (10-11). Locke's *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Harris argues, was the "midwife" of psychology, sociology, and cultural anthropology--modern behavioral science disciplines which examine the relationship between the conditioning environment and human thoughts and actions. Locke stated simply that all knowledge comes from experience. The mind at birth is like an "empty cabinet." The knowledge or ideas that come to fill it (and here Locke meant not only sense perceptions--sensation--but also the operations of the mind for sorting and arranging those perceptions--reflection) are acquired during a process that today we would call enculturation. For Locke, humans may have distinct capacities which differentiate them from animals, but they do not arrive in this world with innate ideas.

The inescapable consequence of Locke's theory is that different experiences will produce both individual and national differences in behavior, norms, attitudes, etc. Yet Locke did not abandon the pre-Enlightenment notion that there were universally valid moral beliefs and right and wrong rules for governing human conduct. As Harris phrases it, "neither Locke nor his followers cared to leap from the elusiveness of innate ideas to the abeyance of moral censure" (13). Instead, Locke and the Enlightenment *philosophes* placed their faith in reason. Correctly applied, reason would eventually lead people everywhere to the same social institutions and moral beliefs, i.e., to the same absolute truths. As Thomas Greer has

described it, "sinners were [eventually] to be redeemed not by the grace of God, but by human reason" (364). In the meantime, the watchword was tolerance. Toleration of alien ways was an attitude which characterized the work of Descartes, Voltaire, Diderot, Montesquieu, and most of the other Enlightenment thinkers.

But the *philosophes* thought of themselves as scientists, not just moralists. During this period, the possibility of creating a branch of learning that would do for human affairs what Newton had done for the physical universe--discover its laws--acted as a powerful stimulus, causing Enlightenment thinkers to search for the principles of order in human history. Theories of sociocultural evolution--for example, explaining man's progress from "savagery" to "barbarism" to "civilization"--abounded. These models typically evinced a sense of moral satisfaction with evolutionary trends. Usually they were smugly ethnocentric--for example, Condorcet proposed a nine-stage model of human history in which the final stage, the moral apex, was labeled "the French Republic." For Condorcet and most of the other universal historians, civilized man had thought himself out of earlier, more primitive stages by steadily inventing more and more reasonable customs and institutions. At the same time, however, cross-cultural differences in customs and in apparent rates of change caused Enlightenment thinkers and their heirs to also focus on the impact of particular or localized geographic (in modern parlance, environmental) factors.

Thus there existed in early evolutionary thinking a tension between the need for moral certainty and the need to accommodate an accumulation of diverse social facts. This tension remained acute throughout the nineteenth century, as evolutionary theory expanded (there was a surge in evolutionary formulations after 1860) and the original theme of progress was supplemented by themes of struggle, or survival of the fittest, and racial determination. According to J. W. Burrow, theories of social evolution during the Victorian era

provided a way of being both relativist and not relativist; of admitting that many diverse modes of organizing and interpreting social life might have something to be said for them, and might play vital roles in the lives of human beings, while continuing to maintain the absolute validity of one such mode--the positivist. The Victorian social evolutionists

achieved this *tour de force* by admitting that other modes of thought and social behavior might have been valid *once*, but asserting or assuming that these were only part of a larger process--social evolution--which had to be understood in a positivist manner, and which led ultimately in a direction satisfying to those who cherished an ideal of absolutely rational--which in this context means primarily economic--social behavior. (263-4)

By the nineteenth century, then, the evolutionary approach had forced a recognition of the fact that some form of culture, however "crude" or "primitive," existed among all men. But evolutionism led to more than just a notion of cultural plurality; it also implied a kind of functionalism in the realm of morals and values. According to George Stocking, "that certain primitive beliefs represented stages in the evolution of their civilized counterparts implied also that they served similar functions in the control of behavior, that the social purposes of a moral standard might be accomplished in any number of ways" (88). This functionalist viewpoint pointed in the direction of modern-day relativism, but as a necessary, not a sufficient, condition. A genuine anthropological relativism depended in addition on a revised attitude--whether it be critical detachment, disillusionment, or alienation--toward European culture. Without that, the "culture" concept for all its pluralism still remained normative (i.e., only slightly developed beyond its earlier English meaning of "cultivation").

The Victorian notion of culture, of course, was perfectly suited to an age of European expansion and imperial domination. On the one hand, evolutionary theory justified a belief in European superiority (itself buttressed by visible evidence of European material progress). Yet on the other hand, differences in sociocultural achievement meant that each group had to be judged on its own terms and treated in a manner appropriate to its stage of development. These two attitudes routinely came together in the pronouncements of colonial administrators, missionaries, merchants, and industrialists. They are found, for example, in the following remarks about polygamy among the Igbo of Nigeria by G. T. Basden, an English missionary of the early twentieth century. On the one hand, Basden had an unshakeable faith in the inferiority of African custom:

In itself there can be no question that polygamy is a deadly evil, blighting to the mind, degrading to the body . . . The inevitable outcome of the system . . . is practically unrestricted adultery . . . The custom is productive of bestiality, and the dulling effect of the mind is such that a polygamist is rarely capable of any real mental attainment, and certainly of none demanding strain for a lengthened period. (102-3)

Yet Basden also felt that polygamy was understandable and maybe even, for the time being, appropriate, given the biocultural peculiarities of the African "savage." Agents of change, therefore, ought to act with caution:

In spite of the admitted evils of polygamy, yet, as matters stand, a general introduction of monogamy would, for a time, be attended with serious difficulties from political and social standpoints. It would lead to wholesale illegitimacy. One doubts whether a single case amongst the heathen can be quoted of an Ibo woman attempting--or even manifesting the slightest inclination--to live a celibate life. Her constant yearning is for a home and children of her own. She will strive for the latter though she be deprived of the former; so long as polygamy exists she can have both. (101)

Though hardly objective, the ethnographic accounts of observers such as Basden were certainly detailed. These data were incorporated into larger theoretical models by "armchair" anthropologists back in the mother country who utilized a procedure known as "the comparative method." The basis of this method was the belief that in the present conditions of the African tribesman, the American Indian, or any other "savage," Europeans could "behold, as in a mirror, the features of . . . [their] own progenitors." This explication of assumptions was provided by Adam Ferguson in 1767, but the same logic informed evolutionary speculation throughout the nineteenth century. Regardless of whether "savages" were viewed as miserable, innocent, or noble, they were consistently used to illustrate the conditions out of which European society was presumed to have arisen.

b. The Relativist Critique

Today the comparative method is applied with caution in cultural anthropology. In the nineteenth century, however, given the frequency of biased and inaccurate data, the absence of constraint on speculative flights of fancy, and the overly mechanical application of the key, but often implicit logical assumption (that simpler forms are older forms), the method was frequently abused. This abuse became the main target of Franz Boas and his students, the first generation of university-employed anthropologists in the United States. Their critique of the comparative method led to a near-total reformulation of anthropology, including the introduction of cultural relativism and historical inquiry. But the many shortcomings of the Boasian critique also eventually led to both a rethinking about relativism and a reconceptualization of history. The controversies that the Boasians introduced are at the heart of the discipline still today, and they hold important lessons for contemporary curricular debates.

According to the Boasians, the evolutionists as a class failed to see "the limited range of cultural facts for which progress could be directly demonstrated." Furthermore, a fatal fallacy of their reasoning "lay in its naive equation of modern primitive groups with the primeval savage," since "even the simplest recent group has a prolonged past, during which it has progressed very far indeed from the hypothetical stage." This equation, the Boasians argued, led many evolutionists "into absurd underestimation of recent tribes and uncritical acceptance of tourists' tales" (quotes in Harris 154, 162). The heart of their critique, thus, was the relativistic message that scientific procedure required a more careful avoidance of subjective judgments. According to Boas, nineteenth-century social science had been damaged by a "subjective element, emotional in its sources, which leads us to ascribe the highest value to that which is near and dear to us" (quoted in Stocking 229). Boas explained the paradoxical persistence of this subjectivism in a society which emphasized scientific rationality by drawing attention to the cultural determination of behavior even in the West. What Europeans deemed rational, Boas said, was really as much determined by cultural tradition as the customs of "savages" whose differentness was the main criterion of their inferior rationality. Just as it was "impossible for us to appreciate their values without having grown

up under their influence," so also "the value which we attribute to our own civilization" was "due to the fact that we participate in this civilization, and that it has been controlling all our actions since the time of our birth" (Stocking 229).

This relativistic lesson was coupled with a new research agenda--in place of logically fabricated and factually suspect worldwide parallelisms, anthropological field workers were to immerse themselves in the particular histories of particular peoples. Each cultural whole needed to be placed in its own historical context. Boas was not an anti-evolutionist, but he believed that, in the interest of high standards of scholarship, cross-cultural generalizations needed to be postponed. Eventually, he felt, the patient accumulation of historical data would make possible more legitimate efforts at nomothetic theorizing (i.e., parsimonious explanations of *general*, cross-cultural patterns).

Given my position that contemporary college and university educators ought to design curricula so as to encourage the growth of relativistic thinking in students, it is especially relevant in this context to try to trace the source of the Boasian urge towards relativism. Intellectually, Boas and his students were influenced by neo-Kantian philosophy, specifically by the epistemological claim that the interpretive activity of the human mind had a great deal to do with the character of the objects observed in the "external" world. This philosophical bent caused them to distrust evolutionary positivism. But, in addition to scholarly influences, the broader cultural and political milieu deserves emphasis. Boas' personal history is instructive. In describing the events which helped shape his worldview, Boas himself drew attention to the ideals of the Revolution of 1848, which "were a living force" in his childhood home. George Stocking, who has studied his personal correspondence, reports that Boas' parents "were Jewish liberals, freethinkers who had 'broken through the shackles of dogma'; but his father, Meier, a prosperous merchant, still 'retained an emotional affection for the ceremonial of his [own] parental home'" (149). Unfortunately, Germany in the 1880s was hardly a congenial atmosphere for Jews or for people of this political persuasion. Anti-Semitism had become a significant political force (Boas himself bore the scars of several duels he had fought with fellow students who had made anti-Semitic remarks), and Bismarck's government was clearly aligned with the landed

and industrial elites. Key to Boas' personal growth, then, was a keen alienation he felt from his own society.

That Boas was sympathetic toward an egalitarian-relativistic, instead of an inegalitarian-absolutistic perspective was also due to his personal experiences of immersion in a foreign culture. In 1883 Boas (then a geographer) traveled to the Arctic for a year of research among the Eskimo of Baffin Island. He suffered numerous hardships, including hunger, loneliness, and temperatures which dipped below -45 degrees Centigrade. Yet he marveled at the successful adaptation and generous hospitality of his hosts. In one of his letters he wrote, "I often ask myself what advantages our 'good society' possesses over that of the 'savages.' The more I see of their customs, the more I realize that we have no right to look down on them" (quoted in Stocking 148). Boas, of course, spent the major part of his adult life (1889-1943) in another foreign milieu, the United States. As a member of an immigrant minority, he was especially sensitive to prejudice and nativistic sentiment, and he was unwilling to concede the cultural or racial superiority of the dominant, white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, intellectual and business elites.

In summation, Boas' own enculturation experiences contributed greatly toward his relativistic outlook. Perhaps his personal history offers support for the generalization that "serious anthropology is . . . possible only once the easy confidence in one's own culture and intellectual standards has been shaken" (Jarvie 39). Yet Boas' history offers another lesson: every cultural milieu is productive of its own version of ethnocentrism (which therefore might be labeled the natural condition of humankind). Boas' own experiences caused him to be relativistic, tolerant, and contextually-comprehending with regard to "savages" and racial and cultural minorities, but he and a whole generation of anthropologists were occasionally absolutistic and intolerant with regard to many members of their own society who did not share their comprehending outlook and were therefore themselves "ethnocentric." As Ernest Gellner has noted, "the anthropologists were roughly liberals in their own society and Tories on behalf of the society they were investigating: they 'understood' the tribesman, but condemned the District Officer or the Missionary" (29). This observation perhaps lends support to a philosophical objection often used against relativism--that it leads to a paradox when applied to itself. But Gellner's comment also

confuses intellectual and moral relativism. Although cultural relativism is often interpreted to be a moral and ethical position (we should not judge people according to standards they do not share; we should distrust our own commitments), it need not be. Being able to understand the forces that shape ideas and behavior (Boas' goal) is one thing; evaluating those ideas and behavior is quite another. Boas encouraged the use of cultural relativism as an intellectual tool, but he did not advocate it as an instrument of moral judgment.

c. Limitations of Boasian Relativism

Relativism as an intellectual tool has created its own set of problems. A modern anthropology textbook defines cultural relativism as "the insistence that the behavior of the members of a group can be understood *only* according to the culture of that group" (Swartz and Jordan 77, emphasis added). This interpretation might be labeled "conceptual relativism"--every society can be understood only through its own concepts. Such an interpretation would vitiate the possibility of a nomothetic anthropology. A thoroughgoing emic approach (i.e., a total reliance on a conceptual framework supplied by the native, not by the community of scientific observers) might contribute to anthropology's humanistic agenda, but certainly not its scientific agenda. Ernest Gellner has expressed the essentials of this argument as follows:

Western science is involved in anthropology not merely as a cultural feature of Western society, but as a premiss shared by all anthropologists (whatever their culture of birth). One does *not* interpret an indigenous society in terms of its own concepts, though one *does* interpret those concepts. . . . It simply is not true that anthropology, as actually practiced, is relativistic in the sense of being committed to explaining each society in terms of its own concepts only. On the contrary, it sees every society as coping with and functioning within a natural environment. Thus, the natural environment does enter into the account and explanation: and it is seen in an identical non-relative way (i.e., through Western eyes) for all societies. (200, emphases added)

But parsimonious explanations of cross-cultural differences and similarities are not the only objective of anthropology. If the discipline also has among its goals the promotion of self-understanding, an enlightened sense of the human potential, and cross-cultural communication, then attempts at immersion in the natives' view of things are perfectly appropriate, in fact necessary.

An additional problem which followed from the Boasian commitment to cultural relativism has been the assumption that anthropological inquiry can or should in some way be presuppositionless. The idea, of course, that science should be value-free or presuppositionless is self-contradictory. The ideal is impossible to achieve. Anthropological fieldwork, like any other scientific inquiry, cannot be totally unaffected by preconceptions. These notions originate in the anthropologist's personal life experiences and in his or her academic training. Often, they are also closely entwined with one's ideological and political commitments. The key to good science is not avoiding such preconceptions, but acknowledging them and making them clear. Then and only then can their appropriateness and impact be assessed by others in the scientific community.

Boas' own research was guided by important, not always clearly stated, preconceptions. One which has recently been a target of significant criticism is his notion of history. As important as Boas' contribution in insisting on placing each culture in its own historical context was, it also tended to produce another type of misunderstanding. Although technologically primitive peoples were no longer portrayed as "savages," their cultures were treated as bounded entities. Interestingly, this unstated assumption was connected not just to Boas' relativism, but also to his insistence that anthropology needed more reliable data. Under his leadership, fieldwork--direct communication with people and participant observation of their ongoing activities *in situ*--became a hallmark of anthropology. Unfortunately, as Eric Wolf (1982) has pointed out, the success of this method lulled ethnographers into a false sense of confidence. Their detailed knowledge of local affairs and local history made it easy for them to ignore extra-local processes and to regard their locus of study as an independent unit of analysis. The end result for the discipline was a series of ethnographies in which particular villages, towns, or tribal groups were treated as wholly

separate cases. Furthermore, each field locale was assumed to be representative of a larger, isolated cultural whole.

Artificial assumptions of closure, of course, are not unique to anthropology. Nations and societies (the units favored by political scientists and sociologists), like cultures, are often treated as integrated and bounded systems, set off against other equally bounded systems. Transformed into discrete natural objects, they can be labeled and isolated as topics for study. Although the boundaries thus created are convenient mental constructs, they often come to be regarded, at least implicitly, as real lines of separation. As a result, linkages and interrelationships tend to be ignored. In anthropology, cultural names are turned into things, and the task of the discipline too often becomes the description and comparison of these artificially isolated wholes (an approach which Edmund Leach [1961] once labeled "anthropological butterfly collecting").

Thus, as valuable as the transformation toward relativism and historical inquiry was in anthropology, it had its limitations. This movement was an essential corrective to the ethnocentric assumptions and shoddy research standards which characterized eighteenth and nineteenth-century social science. Yet relativism brought forth a host of new problems--the belief that it is desirable to remain aloof and free from making value judgments, the valuation of idiographic (i.e., exhaustive explanations of *particular* facts) over nomothetic inquiry, and the assumption that the quest for objectivity requires that scientists be presuppositionless. Meanwhile, the simultaneous turn toward historical inquiry resulted paradoxically in the removal of peoples from history--i.e., from the economic, political, and cultural connections which over time have tied them together. But none of these problems are inherent to the relativistic and historical perspectives. What they demonstrate is the necessity of going beyond a simplistic relativism and a simplistic historicism. The lessons of this intellectual journey in anthropology, I believe, are relevant to contemporary debates over liberal arts education and its cognitive and ethical impact on students. In the next section, then, I argue that the historical maturation of anthropology as a discipline (from ethnocentrism to cultural relativism and history to a redefined, grounded relativism and an enlarged history) needs to be paralleled by an analogous transformation in the individual student (sort of a cultural ontogeny recapitulating phylogeny).

3. Relativistic Thinking and Historical Education

a. The Big Picture

Today's college freshmen, if we can trust recent surveys and assessments (e.g., Astin, Korn, and Berz 1989; Levine 1989), are characterized by parochial and small visions of their own futures, a lack of hope, a sense of impotence, a me-orientation, and a willingness to trust authorities. Each of these qualities is problematic if we wish to graduate four years down the road young people capable of responsible citizenship in a democratic society. Such citizenship, I would argue, requires more than patriotism. It requires, among other things, a predisposition to ask questions of the prevailing consensus, a talent for hope (in the Emersonian sense of feeling oneself heir to a tradition of increasing liberty), an orientation toward activism, and an appreciation of the pluralistic nature of our society. If we are to cultivate these qualities through the liberal arts curriculum, it is essential that we conceptualize post-secondary education as a process of developing perspective, encouraging doubt, and stimulating imagination and curiosity. If instead we view education merely as socialization, i.e., as acquainting students with what their elders have taken to be true, then we are not educating them for freedom.

My view does not demand that we totally do away with the notion of a literary or philosophical canon, but instead suggests that we engage students in a historically grounded and critical reading of it. Furthermore, it is appropriate that the canon be enlarged to incorporate and reflect the experiences and aspirations of women, minority groups, and foreigners. Both of these ideas are resisted by Allan Bloom. On the one hand, Bloom envisions a philosophically grounded liberal education that is more concerned with revealing fixed eternal truths than with active, critical argument. He approvingly quotes Maimonides to the effect that the end product of a philosophical education should be intellectual rest, not unrest:

This then will be a key permitting one to enter places the gates to which were locked. And when these gates are opened and these places are entered into, the soul will find rest therein, the eyes will be delighted, and the bodies will be eased of their toil and of their labor. (271)

Paradoxically, this point of view is contrary to that of Socrates, whom Bloom wishes to emulate. The Socratic demand for ceaseless self-questioning is ignored in his work. According to Martha Nussbaum, "Bloom knows that he knows; Socrates knew that he didn't" (21). Secondly, unlike the "expansionists" who want to extend the curriculum to encompass what traditionally has not been there--be it Virginia Woolf, James Baldwin, or Gabriel Garcia Marquez--Bloom is a staunch "restorationist" (cf. Gamson 1989). Instead of arranging for our students an immersion in "the other" analogous to that experienced by anthropologists in participant observation, Bloom sees the perspective of "the other," e.g., feminists, as threatening. They are "the latest enemy of the classic texts" and they provide "much more a liberation *from nature* than from convention or society" (99-100, emphasis added).

Bloom's faith that he knows what things are rational and natural, and his conviction that these are Western, is not very distant from the ethnocentrism of the Enlightenment and nineteenth-century evolutionists. Unfortunately, most freshmen arrive in the academy (even Harvard!) ready to gobble up the authoritative pronouncements of Bloom-like teachers. According to William Perry (1981), they are typically dualistic thinkers. The assumptions of the dualist are that all knowledge is known, authorities know it all, and it is up to authorities to give students the right answers. Dualistic thinkers are thus locked into Freire's "culture of silence" (their job is to listen and absorb) and also into his "circle of certainty" (there is no room in their thinking process for contextual or conditional reasoning; everything is either right or wrong).

Fortunately, unlike death and taxes, dualism is not permanent. Perry's main contribution has been to provide a theory of cognitive and ethical development beyond dualism in the college-age student. This growth, though possible, can occur only if nurtured in a proper educational environment. The first step beyond dualism is labeled by Perry "multiplicity." It represents a significant broadening of the student's understanding. The world is no longer seen exclusively in right-wrong terms; instead the student begins to realize that there might be more than one "right" answer or way of looking at things in some areas. In the later stages of multiplicity, the recognition that experts often have different points of view results in a "do your own thing" kind of attitude--i.e., if the experts don't agree, then one idea is

as good as another. It is this attitude of non-criterion openness that Bloom criticizes as "relativism."

For Perry, relativism is a stage subsequent to and distinct from multiplicity. Its key ingredient is an ability to think in contextual terms. Relativistic students not only understand that there are different points of view on a given topic, but they recognize that these multiple perspectives derive from the different assumptions and different personal histories of the diverse experts to whom they have been exposed. This relativism is analogous to a Boasian cultural relativism. Students who have reached this stage can argue one side of an issue with one set of assumptions and then turn around and argue another side with a new set of assumptions. There is a sense of empowerment that occurs, as they realize that they can trust their own reason. But there also may be a sense of frustration--because there are fewer right answers and so many ways of viewing things.

This sense of frustration is directly analogous to that felt by many anthropologists swamped by the mass of separate studies produced by the Boasian historical particularists. How were they to establish some order out of all this information? The key, of course, was to ask different kinds of questions (nomothetic as opposed to idiographic) and to apply a consistent language of analysis--an etic (imposed by the community of scientific observers) rather than an emic standard. Similarly for students, the way out of relativistic frustration is to ask a new kind of question (if everything is relative, on what basis can I make my own decisions--and thereby create order in my own life?). Such questioning, here too, leads ultimately to the affirmation of a standard, in this case a set of values and principles that can be applied to diverse concerns. This growth (in Perry's terms, the student has now entered the stage of Commitment--with an uppercase C) is not a structural change in cognitive development; rather, it is a qualitative movement made in the awareness of relativism. As with the growth of anthropology, so too in the student's case: what has been abandoned, rather than relativism, are commitments (with a lower case c)--beliefs that have never been questioned.

The maturation of anthropology took a painful 200 years. Fortunately, the analogous process in students can occur much more quickly. Even though most of them come to college as dualistic thinkers, they can be nudged in one semester or one year toward

a relativistic perspective. The challenge, then, is to design our teaching strategies and curricula to invite, encourage, and support students in this development. To do otherwise, to teach freshmen information instead of thinking skills, would be to risk reinforcing not only their simplistic views of education, but also their uncritical dependence on authorities.

b. Saint Joseph's College

I believe the Core program at Saint Joseph's College, particularly the six-credit Core 1 segment for first-semester freshmen, serves to promote the kind of cognitive development I have advocated (however, whether this was a part of its original design and whether this should be its current purpose are controversial issues among some of the faculty). In Core 1, students examine, through novels, autobiographies, and ethnographies, the growing up experiences of a variety of Americans from different racial, class, and regional backgrounds. The impact of background characteristics and personal experiences on value-formation and beliefs is stressed. Gradually, the focus of the course then shifts from the individual to society, as students are exposed to a variety of perspectives on America, all the product of different disciplines, different theories, and different ideologies. This learning process occurs in an atmosphere of small classes where the emphasis is on participatory learning. Students write and rewrite papers every week, all the while sharing and comparing their own experiences and viewpoints with their peers.

The writing assignments in Core 1 are also designed with developmental ends in mind. First, narrative essays, culminating at the end of the semester in a major autobiography, develop students' abilities to tell about their own values, attitudes, and ideas and to put them in the context of personal experiences. The more they examine their own past in these narratives, the more they are forced to see that their ways of doing certain things are best described as *habitual* and *not natural*; that theirs is *a* way of life, not *the* way of life to be imposed on others from different backgrounds. The resultant attitude is not quite Boas' alienation, but it is a kind of critical detachment. Second, summaries develop students' abilities to recognize how authors and lecturers organize and utilize facts. The students come to see that facts are relative to assumptions. Finally,

position papers develop students' abilities to fit evidence to an argument and to recognize and play with alternative points of view (their "trying on" of others' assumptions and ideas is in some ways analogous to the experience of the anthropological fieldworker, who must learn to behave appropriately in another culture).

The students' movement toward relativism is best facilitated if the other points of view they experience belong to classmates rather than distant, almost anonymous authors. At Saint Joseph's College many students come from relatively homogeneous communities and high schools. In college, we should arrange for them to experience people from other cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds. Their journey to Rensselaer, then, becomes analogous to Boas' journey to Baffin Island. Though not quite as exotic, it should provide a personal experience of the cultural other. That is one, though not the only, reason why Saint Joseph's College must maintain a firm commitment to pluralism, e.g., through more aggressive recruiting of minority students, faculty, and staff.

There is a risk with a curriculum designed to promote relativism that students may respond with panic, first to the discovery that their teachers and authors often disagree, and second to the invitation to enter the fray. The Core 1 experience, therefore, demands extremely supportive teachers and a highly structured curriculum (so that students do not experience "double" ambiguity--in teacher expectations as well as course subject matter). But there is another risk as well, one that comes from outside Core, that I became aware of after gathering syllabi and sample tests and surveying the teachers of all freshman-level courses during the 1988/9 school year. Because the tendency of many faculty, I believe, has been to delegate to Core the responsibility of liberal education, and because there is a significant amount of dualistic teaching in some departments, students may continue after their freshman year to look in their majors for the ultimate rightness and certainty promised by Authority, even though Core has facilitated their movement in other areas from dualism into relativism.

Should we be alarmed? On the one hand, psychologists report that individuals typically mature their cognitive structures at different rates in different areas of their lives. According to Perry, "lateral growth" does sometimes occur--students can often "transfer the more advanced patterns of thought learned in one area to areas in which they have been thinking more simplistically" (89). On the

other hand, retreat is also a possibility, especially if career-driven, credential-oriented students are given the message, either intentionally or unintentionally, by departmental faculty that the memorization of facts constitutes knowledge. Discussion and argument, then, risk being perceived as serving no serious purpose; they become just the game one plays in Core, where everyone has a right to his own opinion. In the major, conversely, the student sees Truth, so that is where, he is likely to conclude, he had better put his major effort. In Core, he's likely to think, he can get away with "bullshitting"; in the major he's got to know the right answers. Such a student is not likely to graduate much beyond Perry's stage of multiplicity. That does him and our society little service.

Like Boas', Core's commitment to relativism includes a commitment to historical inquiry. But in this case that inquiry is turned mainly inward, toward the Western experience (Cores 2-4). The benefit of such a curriculum, according to Giroux and Kaye (1989), is that it cultivates perspective, critique, consciousness, remembrance, and imagination. By "perspective," they mean an awareness that the way things are is not how they always have been or always must be in the future. "Critique" is more specific, involving a de-reification of the socioeconomic, political, and cultural orders in which we live. By "consciousness," they mean an awareness of "the sum of effort and sacrifice which the present has cost the past and which the future is costing the present," i.e., an appreciation of the making of history. "Remembrance" refers to a valuation of the past, not as a source of truth, but as a reservoir of experience. Finally, "imagination" "commands that we recognize the present as history" and thus consider the possibilities it offers for furthering democracy and freedom in the future. I think it is clear that a curriculum which achieves these several objectives must inevitably enlarge the parochial visions and diminish the hopelessness and sense of impotence that characterize contemporary students.

Educators who plan historical curricula, however, also need to learn from the anthropological experience. The creation of separate units (e.g., America, Europe, Latin America, Africa, China), each with its own historical section, risks creating the same artificial assumptions of closure that have troubled the social sciences. When connections are acknowledged, as they sometimes are in the Core curriculum, they typically emphasize what "we" have done to or for "them," thereby underestimating how "they" have helped shape

"us." A corrective might be to give more emphasis to world-systems theory, integrating it into both Western and non-Western segments of Core. An analogous change was recently made in the sociology department when we transformed our American Minorities course (which had separate units on different minority groups) into a Racial and Ethnic Relations course.

Unfortunately, no matter how we revise our curriculum, one fact remains--students today arrive at college, in E. D. Hirsch's terms, "culturally illiterate." That too is problematic for democracy. Although I have argued in this paper that college educators must prioritize the individuation of students (i.e., their self-creation), that process can not occur when students have not also been properly socialized (i.e., "introduced to the moral and political common sense of the society as it is" [Rorty 4]). As far back as 1945, the Harvard Faculty Committee on the Objectives of a General Education in a Free Society argued that both types of education are essential:

It is impossible to escape the realization that our society, like any society, rests on common beliefs and that a major task of [general] education is to perpetuate them. This conclusion raises one of the most fundamental problems of education, indeed of [democratic] society itself: how to reconcile this necessity for common belief with the equally obvious necessity for new and independent insights leading to change. (46-7)

One way of reconciling these tasks is to create a division of labor between high schools and colleges. Students need to learn about their American and Western heritage in high school. Today as college teachers we unfortunately find ourselves having to undertake remedial education (mainly, but not entirely, socialization), while at the same time we attempt to meet our main liberal arts agenda (individuation). That creates an enormous logistical and pedagogical burden, and so I cannot help but agree with Richard Rorty's controversial comment that "it would be well for the colleges to use some of their public relations facilities to remind us that nineteen is an age when young people should have finished absorbing the best that has been thought and said and should have started becoming suspicious of it" (8).

4. The Pursuit of Individuation in a Catholic Context

For individuation to occur, college students need to find themselves in an environment where dissent is valued and "loose canons [not canons!] are free to roll about" (Rorty 9). Although I have lauded the Saint Joseph's College Core program, there is some doubt as to whether Catholic colleges and universities really provide an appropriate intellectual milieu. George Bernard Shaw, for example, once called Catholic universities contradictions in terms. Richard Hofstadter once charged that Catholicism "has failed to develop an intellectual tradition in America or to produce its own class of intellectuals" (136). To be fair, these criticisms may have ignored the unique situation of Catholic colleges and universities in America until the 1960s. With the American Catholic population still largely first and second-generation immigrants, and with Catholic college students typically the first in their families to pursue post-secondary education, Catholic colleges and universities may have seen as their primary function training the sons and daughters of immigrants for success in a new culture. The creation of a Catholic intellectual cohort may have been a distant secondary concern. However, I have argued that individuation is an essential process, not just for intellectuals, but for all citizens in a democracy. Therefore, it is still important to ask whether that process is now possible and has in the past been possible on Catholic campuses.

It is particularly relevant, then, to consider Gordon Zahn's claim that whereas medieval universities were "oases of freedom, where all those questions which elsewhere were suppressed or forbidden were discussed with what hostile critics described as brazen impudence," Catholic colleges and universities in twentieth-century America have become "citadels of caution," despite the fact that they "continue to claim [the medieval schools] as their most revered ancestors" (232). Zahn's criticism was sparked by several controversial cases during the 1960s (e.g., at St. John's University, Catholic University of America, Marquette University, St. Louis University, and the University of Dayton) where faculty members were reprimanded for allegedly teaching "heresy" in the classroom or where "controversial" speakers (sometimes world-renowned scholars) were refused access to campus. In a number of instances, institutions were censured by the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), the national guardian of the princi-

ple of academic freedom. Since that time, many Catholic schools have witnessed dramatic changes, e.g., lay boards of trustees, an increasing percentage of lay and non-Catholic faculty, and new policies securing academic freedom. Furthermore, outside academe the Church has made more room for diverse voices to be heard through the establishment of a great variety of councils at parish, diocesan, regional, and national levels. Is there still cause for concern?

I believe there are conflicting signs. On the side of optimism, there is a thriving critique of Catholic absolutism. Rosemary Radford Ruether, for example, has criticized the Church's "imperialist universalism" which, she charges, "fails to be authentically universalist" and "actually amounts to absolutizing one particularism" (66). This sounds like Boas in religious garb. Ruether has also suggested:

We must see Christology, not only as proleptic, but also as paradigmatic. We must accept its relativity to a particular people. This will be a more difficult principle for many Christians to accept, but it is equally inescapable. The Cross and the Resurrection are contextual to a particular historical community. (72-3)

Such a position bodes well for the academic freedom of non-Catholic faculty and students on Catholic campuses. But what about the Catholics? There are voices which are cause for optimism here, too. William Shea, for example, has recently argued in *Current Issues in Catholic Higher Education* that "Catholic higher education may be legally private, but it is morally public" (35). As such, it has an obligation to foster openness and encourage debate. Shea is not afraid of the potential results: "dialogue need not, indeed most often does not, mean the dissolution but rather the reappropriation and transformation of a heritage" (36). The same insight might be phrased in the developmental language of William Perry: while there is the danger that some students may leave the Catholic fold, there is also the exciting possibility (from the Church's perspective) that many may transform their initial commitments into Commitments.

Timothy S. Healy, the ex-President of Georgetown University, has staked out a position similar to Shea's. According to Healy, a key

aspect of [even] the [Catholic] university and an uncomfortable one for most theologians is that it is essentially a forum of questions. It is of the nature of universities to question assumptions, and indeed to the extent that such questions are absent, the university fails to achieve the fullness of its own being. The university is not a think tank fed by industrial, governmental or military sources in order to churn out research in which the one common note is that the assumptions of its donors are never questioned. (9)

Healy has also recognized that all universities must be "nervous about the intellectual vice known as absolutism," and called attention to the fact that "intellect and faith cannot meet on any ground where either is so much in control that the other is effectively excluded" (9,10). Such a milieu, where there not only is room for doubt, but where doubt is cultivated, is most likely according to Andrew Greeley to produce graduates who remain faithful to the Church, though they also may be highly critical members.

But there is also cause for pessimism. A number of recent writers have suggested that academic freedom on a Catholic campus must stop at the door of the theology department. This is the argument of Paul Goda (writing after the controversial case of Fr. Curran):

The emphasis has always been on assent. I believe this emphasis should be true not just for the individual believer but also for Catholic universities, *insofar as they are religious institutions*, and for Catholic theologians. (15, emphasis added)

This position is consistent with that of Pope John Paul II, who has called upon the Catholic university to "guarantee its members academic freedom," but has cautioned that theology must be "taught in a manner faithful to Scripture, Tradition, and the Church's Magisterium," and theologians must "respect the authority of the Bishops and assent to Catholic doctrine according to the degree of authority with which it is taught" (12,18,24).

In response, I would argue that we cannot promote true individuation in our students if we attempt to hermetically seal off domains in the university where academic freedom does not apply. Fr. Goda, himself, is evidence that absolutism tends to seep outwards. He writes: "I am not enamored of dissent as the prevailing modality for the modern university, let alone for the Catholic university" (17). This absolutist tendency has just recently been reinforced in a 7,500-word "instruction" for theologians and bishops that was drafted by the Vatican's Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith and announced on June 26, 1990. The Catholic Church, it pointed out, is not a democratic institution: "Standards of conduct appropriate to civil society or to the workings of a democracy cannot be purely and simply applied to the Church." Yet the Catholic college or university must prepare students for life in a democratic society. The question, then, is: Is the tension between political democracy and hierarchic religion mediable? The challenge for Saint Joseph's College is to make sure that it is.

Individuation, Democracy, Freedom:

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These are Berger's absolutes!

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TEACHING ONCE UPON A TIME

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There are two ways of getting to know things: either you acquire knowledge of them on your own, through experience or experiment, or you learn them from others, through teaching or communication. These are not alternative options, allowing you to choose now one way, now the other. Many things, like objects past or absent, can be known only by being taught them. Only those things that are present to a person, actually here and now, can be objects of personal knowledge. Accordingly, few are the things you get to know by your own efforts; most of what you know you have learned from others.

Since teachers are the main source of what we know, there is every good reason for concern about the good character of the persons who teach and the competence they bring to their task. But more important still, at least to my mind, is an understanding of what many thinkers today call the 'foundations' of education: such issues, for example, as the underlying conditions, the unspoken assumptions, the cultural implications, and, indeed, the moral dimensions of the activity called teaching. Sound structures require firm foundations.

But the presuppositions or fundamental principles of the teaching enterprise are manifold and complex. To identify them, especially the more important ones, we need a standpoint or perspective from which to view them. I propose to uncover certain of these fundamentals by examining the understanding our ancient ancestors had of teaching, particularly those who invented the Latin, Greek and Hebrew languages. One gains insight into their minds by studying the terms they created for various acts or elements of teaching and learning, terms which are undoubtedly expressions of their thinking and which they bequeathed to us in the form of roots to words in current English. The main references in this essay are therefore to the etymologies found in standard dictionaries.¹ What I intend to examine specifically are language and myth as preconditions for teaching, revelation and enlightenment as both the primary acts and the first effects of education, and fi-

nally the religious dimensions of teaching in all cultures but a few modern ones.

THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE AND MYTH IN TEACHING

The earliest clues to what a teacher is and does are found in the languages and myths that our preliterate ancestors devised to explain the world of reality to their children. The first teacher children have is obviously their mother. Most of her time is devoted to their physical and social nurture, one of her most important tasks being to teach them the language of their people. This function is most probably the basis for the old Navajo myth which attributes the invention of language to the first woman. How important this task was is evident in the etymology of the classical term for child, namely 'infant' (from the Latin *in-fans*, meaning 'not [yet] talking'). These evidences imply that, in a sense, an infant is not really human, hardly more than an animal, until he or she is able to communicate with others in the conventional symbols of human language rather than the instinctual sounds of natural speech.

This distinction between natural speech and human language poses the question: whether human nature, though admittedly evolved from animal nature, is essentially different from the latter. Are the more than 3000 languages and major dialects listed by the French Academy nothing more than mutations of the whistles of whales or the pipings of chicks? Or do the artificial symbols of human creation imply free choice and thus really differ from the products of nature? However one answers this question, there is no doubt that, while infants learn to speak on their own initiative, they can learn a specific language or dialect only by being taught it.

But a given language is not merely a set of conventional symbols; it is likewise a system of meanings. Words are signs. They signify. That is to say, they stand for and point to, e.g., objects and modes of perception, contents and intents of certain states of mind, and certain media between the knower and the known. Above all words indicate a unified context or world of relations in terms of which things make sense to all who speak the language. Ultimately what fulfills this last function and grounds the culture of a given people is the common fund of stories--or, properly, myths--by which people understand their world and explain it to their off-

spring. Along with the rudiments of language, then, children need to learn the myths that give meaning to life in their world.

But how can we today, whose cultures are based on our own myths, understand and interpret the myths of antiquity? We must be careful not to read our own views into others' minds.

Although the myths of ancient peoples vary widely in detail, most of them exhibit remarkable similarities. For example, many of them assert or assume that the original condition of the universe was a state of emptiness, darkness, or confusion. Surprisingly all three of these conditions are stated or implied in the opening verse of the Bible: "In the beginning, when God created the heavens and the earth, the earth was without form and empty; darkness shrouded the face of the abyss, and the spirit (or wind) of God hovered (or swirled) over the surface of the waters." Emptiness is translated by Teutonic myths as the 'Yawning Gap,' that is, the formless and empty space between earth and sky, called *aether* by the early Greeks and by most physicists until modern times. Darkness is identified as the original state of being in many early myths and by various archaic synonyms for 'Abyss.' This last name suggests in turn the notion of 'Chaos,' which the classical Greeks conceived of as a confused plenum instead of an empty vacuum and as the original stuff of existence. Subsequent theories of reason and doctrines of faith--for example, that matter is not created but eternally existing, that creation is nothing more than the emergence of order out of chaos, or, as most Christians believe, that God creates everything out of nothing--add very little more than sophistication to the mythologies which our earliest teachers invented to enlighten and entertain us.

Unfortunately, many people look upon modern sophistication as refuting the supposed errors and superstitions of the pre-scientific mind. That is totally wrong! Modern theories are derived from different principles, developed by different methods, and verified or refuted by different standards and tests, than those which mythological reason and religious faith presuppose. The mistake is one of interpretation: that is, of judging ancient cultures and achievements, not on their own terms, but in terms of modern philosophy or science. One of the main reasons for this misrepresentation lies in people's failure to realize that knowledge based on common experience is altogether different from knowledge based on hypothe-

sis and experiment. The former embodies a human, subjective element which the latter deliberately strives to suppress.

If people are often guilty of misunderstanding or misinterpreting the myths of antiquity, where do they go wrong? What precisely is their mistake?

The mistake consists mainly in reading myths literally instead of figuratively. That is to say: when myth-makers, for instance, speak of darkness, emptiness, or confusion at the beginning of time, they are not predicating these conditions of the actual, material universe, but of the newborn, infant mind. They are not telling us how things were when the world began, for no one was there to observe it. Rather they are reminding their hearers of how the world first appeared to them as infants, in childhood. Evidence that myths record early memories rather than primeval facts can be seen in their many differences and contradictions. How, for example, could the newly existing world be confused and empty at the same time, or known to be either confused or empty if it lay hidden in darkness? How could practically every ancient people known to us believe that they were living in the center, or 'navel,' of the world? How could the first creation story in Genesis record the forming of 'the Man' ² on the sixth day, that is, after the creation of plants or animals (Genesis 1:21-7), while the second account says clearly that God created the Man before there were any plants and animals on earth (Genesis 2:7-9)? Is it not clear, rather, that the two Genesis stories teach, not the priority, but the superiority of the Man over the rest of creation, not the order of events in pristine reality, but the way the world appears to infant perception? Since myths arise out of diverse peoples and cultures, they are bound to reflect different insights and outlooks and thus to differ from each other as much as do the languages in which they are articulated, the environments which they describe, and the degree of civilizations which they suppose. To read mythology literally, therefore, is to misrepresent the mind of the myth-maker and to stultify the myriads of geniuses who not only created and preserved the myths, but also employed them to educate the human race and to humanize and civilize the world.

The first things that infants learn from their teachers, therefore, are the language and the myths of their people. What is it, exactly, that is accomplished thereby? First of all the learner receives two indispensable tools of education, namely the means of com-

municating with others, language, and a common ground of meanings on which to build human discourse, myths. Here is the main source of what used to be called 'common sense.' Besides these the learner becomes the beneficiary of two other gifts. I choose to call these 'revelation' and 'enlightenment.' The former is the preferred term of Western minds; the latter, mainly of Eastern minds. The words are not exactly synonymous, but they are in many ways equivalent. The differences between them call for separate treatment.

TEACHING AS REVELATION

Revelation, like all nouns derived from participles in Latin, can be understood both actively and passively, that is, as an act of 'unveiling' (*re-velans*) or as something 'discovered' (*re-velatus*). Of these two senses the first is primary, for the doing precedes the thing done. Implied in every revelation is a revealer whose action uncovers something hidden and exposes it to light. This implication needs to be emphasized because concentrating attention on an object of study often tends to overlook both the agent and the act by which it has come to be. This is a common oversight in the routine process of abstracting concepts from sensory perceptions. Who, for instance, regularly thinks of the 'maker' (*factor*) or the 'making' (*faciens*) when he or she is considering a 'fact' (*factum*)? Or who is generally aware of the giver and the giving of 'datum' (from the Latin for 'given'), the hurler and the hurling of an 'object' (*objectum*, thrown at), or the source and the path of an 'event' (*eventum*, outcome)? The myth-maker and his audience, on the contrary, are deeply cognizant of these things, for the whole purpose of telling and retelling the myths of a people is to enlighten the hearers on the origins of whatever exists or occurs in their world. The fact that sources or causes are generally personified, even deified, only underscores the tendency of human beings to view reality subjectively, in terms of their own experience in mastering and employing it. In relating the myths of their own people, therefore, the Eskimo shaman, the African griot, the Irish fili, and all the story-tellers of the world have not only provided their audiences with entertainment, but also, by uncovering the mysteries of reality and throwing light on their world, have helped them to overcome the darkness of ne-science, to gain mastery over the forces of nature, and to be fully in-

tegrated into the life of human society. Here you have education in its purest form.

Besides alerting the human mind to causes and forces at work in nature, revelation affects its hearers in another and remarkable way. The effect is often called magical or mystical, but is more properly designated 'metaphorical' (from the Greek *meta-pherein*, carry beyond). Just as a metaphor 'transfers' (*trans-ferre*, carry over) attention from a present word or phrase to a past or absent object, so does revelation 'transport' (*trans-portare*, carry over) a hearer from the narrow confines of home to past times and vast spaces of the universe. That, I contend, is likewise the true meaning of 'education' (*e-ducare*, draw or lead out). The story-teller, who is the aboriginal teacher, takes a child by the ear, so to speak, and leads him or her out of the security of the home into the threatening but also inviting world of adventure. By the magic of metaphor, furthermore, teachers are able to reverse the process. Besides transporting learners to the world outside the home, they can also 'convey' (*con-vehere*, carry together) objects of other times and places into the realities of here and now. This function of metaphor is obviously 'representational,' in both the usual sense of 'mirroring' or 'picturing' something other than itself and the etymological sense of making it 'present again' (*re-praesens*). As a metaphor, then, revelation resembles a funicular railway: not only transporting its hearers to a mountain top, as it were, where they are granted visions of many different times and places, but also conveying cargos of new and unseen realities into the laboratory of present awareness where they can be examined and experimented with at will.

Inasmuch as metaphor is commonly understood as a 'figure of speech,' there is no need to repeat here the caution that revelation, like myth, is often to be interpreted figuratively rather than literally. But what one must clearly advert to is the dominance of subjective perception and cultural understanding in historical revelations over objective reality. That is to say, revelation, as teaching, does indeed alert the hearer to real objects in the world, but is at the same time devoted to exposing them for the recipient mind to experience things personally. In effect, there are far more overtones of the human mind in the revelations attributed to God in the past than we have hitherto suspected. The revealer is at the mercy of the responder, you might say, just as the teacher is often a pawn of the pupil. Mistakes occur as readily in revelation as in education. I use the

word 'mistake' advisedly, for, although 'error' (*errare*, stray) and 'fallacy' (*fallere*, fall or fail) are commonplace in all rational endeavors, they are not at all possible in revelations that truly come from God. Divine revelation cannot err or fail; it can only be 'taken amiss.'

REVELATION AND ENLIGHTENMENT

Another benefit which learners receive from teachers, and hearers from story-tellers, is a direct result of revelation, namely, 'enlightenment.' Revealing or discovering something ordinarily means exposing it to light or casting light on it so that it can be seen. In this sense teaching is practically synonymous with 'enlightening.' So likewise is learning, for by means of it a person is 'enlightened.' Light is therefore an apt metaphor for the functions of teaching and learning, and was employed as such in many ancient mythologies. In the very first story of Genesis, for instance, light, although elsewhere noted as deriving from the sun (e.g., Isaiah, 30:26), is said to be the first of God's works, and its main purpose was to separate day from night (Genesis, 1:3-5). This narrative cannot possibly reflect reality in physical nature, for light can no more precede the sun than can an effect antecede its cause. No, the story reflects rather the sequence learned from experience: first you encounter the darkness of night (or the womb), next the light of day, and finally that which makes the difference, the sun. Light is not the first of God's works, therefore, not yet the first thing human beings get to know; it is rather the primary and indispensable condition for knowing at all.

From these reflections it becomes evident that light, both physical and intellectual, functions as a 'medium' between the person who sees or knows something and the thing itself that is seen or known. A medium is a strange, paradoxical thing, for at the very moment it separates two objects from each other, i.e., distinguishing the knower from the known, it likewise unites them to each other, i.e., in the act of knowing itself. Both knower and known emerge from darkness and come together in the light, so to speak, where they are exposed in their individual differences as well as their common interests. In effect a medium is at once divisive and unitive. It is in this respect very much like a word in human discourse which not only stands between speaker and hearer and distin-

guishes them as such, but also binds them together in mutual intercourse. These images of light and word were not lost on mythologists of the Levant, the so-called 'cradle of civilization,' who saw the universe as issuing from the mouth of the Creator (e.g., Marduk of Babylon,³ Ptah of Egypt,⁴ Elohim ~~of~~ YaHWeH of Israel⁵). In this same vein many later philosophers of Greece and Rome elevated the spoken 'word' (*logos*, from the Greek *legein*, say or speak) to the status of a mental word or concept, and ultimately to the level of a demi-god, the Divine Logos.⁶ Speech, then, is as much a source and symbol of knowledge as is light and both function as media in revelation and education.

But there is a problem here in defining the acts of teaching and learning as media, as if the light which they throw upon reality were, like a word, a third and static kind of being (the act of knowing) standing on its own and on equal terms with knower and known. The problem arose, I submit, with the invention of writing, first in the form of hieroglyphs in the third millennium B.C. and later in the form of syllabic and alphabetic scripts still in use today. These devices enabled our ancestors to capture the fleeting acts of knowing and speaking and to immobilize them in conventional symbols like written words, syntactical sentences and mathematical formulas. The effect of this ingenious tactic was like making slides of individual scenes or moments, as in movie making, and thus turning mental acts and oral words into visible objects. It was, in the often repeated phrase of Marshall McLuhan, like "trading an ear for an eye." As a consequence of this exchange--of orality for literacy, of rhetoric for literature--civilized peoples may indeed be able to see better and to think more clearly than their forebears, but their hearing has become, you might say, one dimensional, at least as regards the thoughts and voices of the past. Where our ancestors delighted in telling and hearing the story of creation, we today chafe under the discipline of having to read and master 'the book of nature.'

Revelation and enlightenment, then, are indeed media standing between knower and known, but etymology shows that they were originally understood much more dynamically. That is to say, revelation and enlightenment are primarily actions on the part of agents (i.e., mediating knowledge); only secondarily and derivatively are they things in their own right (i.e. mediated information). Thus it was impossible for our intelligent but illiterate ancestors to

conceive of revelation and enlightenment abstractly, as we do today. They could only understand them concretely as acts of teaching by a teacher and of learning by a learner, inseparable therefore from the person or being of the doer. Not the thing given or taken, but the giving and taking of knowledge, are the original meanings of revelation and enlightenment.

With these observations and reflections as principles we are now in position to study the context or matrix that gave birth to the notions of myth, revelation and enlightenment, namely religion, which is in turn born of Man's response to:

GOD AS OUR FIRST TEACHER

Religion, whatever its original meaning (whether from the Latin *re-legere*, to read again, *re-ligare*, to bind back, *re-eligere*, to choose once more), is fundamentally a response on the part of human beings to what or whom they perceive as the first source of all things, or more authentically, as the true author(s) of everything that exists and occurs in the universe. According to the traditions of the major religions of the world, the 'voice of God' comes to Man in two ways: first, through 'nature,' understood as the whole of created reality, and second, through 'history,' viewed as the remembered record of what God has done for his people in space and time. These two modes of divine revelation differ radically from each other. They require careful elucidation.

Natural revelation is addressed to everybody in every time and place, and is perceived for the most part as constant and enduring in being, rhythmical and cyclical in process. The fact that the vast majority of the human race believes, and has always believed, that God speaks to Man in terms of what he had made justifies the sociological definition, 'homo religiosus.' On the other hand, the equally vast diversity among religions shows that, though child and adult, savant and fool experience the same or similar events in nature, interpretations of them vary as much as do the individual persons and peoples who preserve and advocate them. The differences between religions, therefore, come down mainly to people's understanding and interpretation of the revelations they believe in. These, in sum, are expressed in their received myths and doctrines.⁷

Historical revelations, on the contrary, are based on the remembered or recorded events of each race or people in space and

time. Note well! It is not the actual course of events in the world to which people listen for the voice of God, but to those recorded in their minds and hearts. Our ancestors knew nothing at all, for example, about the progression of geological ages or the evolution of life on earth. (That is why it is not only wrong but foolish to read such occurrences into the revelations of the past.) Not unlike natural revelations, then, revelations in history address people democratically, one might say, not just people who are learned or who happen to live in later or more advanced cultures.

But which events, precisely, are those that capture attention and impress themselves on the minds and the hearts of a given people? Those, specifically, that come to be collectively accepted as 'visits' by God, if not in person, at least in objective apparition or subjective experience. But again, how do certain events come to be construed as divine visitations? Questions like these doubtless gave rise to certain religious persons who believed themselves, and were believed by others, to be, as biblical tradition expresses it, "called from the womb," to speak in the name or by the authority of God himself. Such persons came to be called 'prophets' (from the Greek *pro-phemi*, to speak in behalf of [God]). Let us listen to the most widely recognized prophets of history.

The Qur'an states the primary dogma of Islam in this way: "There is no God but Allah, and Mohammed is his Prophet." The traditions of Islam portray Mohammed as, literally, the 'mouthpiece' or 'spokesman' of Allah, and as the last and greatest of a long line of prophets stretching back to Abraham, the common father of Arabs and Jews. Mohammed heard the voice of Allah in states of ecstasy, the traditions say, and it was in such circumstances, witnessed by his followers, that he dictated the entire Qur'an. Similarly, Moses, the prophet without peer in Hebrew history, was believed to have conversed with YaHWeH, the God of Israel. The author of Exodus 33:11 tells us, "YaHWeH used to speak to Moses face to face, as one man speaks to another." Was the experience Gautama Buddha had while sitting under the Bo Tree similar to that of Mohammed and of Moses? We cannot say for sure, because the five ascetics who witnessed the event left no record of it behind them. We do know from other data, however, that visits by the gods, called 'avatars,' were believed frequent in the culture in which Gautama was reared, and that on at least three occasions the gods were said to have contravened his father's plans

for his son and set the young man on the road to enlightenment. In any case, the very suddenness of the event proves that enlightenment was not the fruit of Gautama's learning but came to him as a gift. The Buddha does not enlighten himself; he is the Enlightened One. It is reasonable to conclude from these evidences that God, not the prophet, is the real author of revelation and enlightenment. The prophet is only God's mediator or medium.

The examples just adduced are paradigmatic of the way in which ancient peoples understood revelation and enlightenment. Every recurring event in nature, every miraculous occurrence in history, points to God as its Author. One of the ways God insures human awareness and acknowledgement of his authorship is through the teaching of his special agents, the prophets. As a 'man of God' the prophet is charged with the mission of constantly reminding people of both the 'doer' and the 'doing' of each fact or event in nature and history. This is likewise the main purpose of religion, which, by the very prefix of the term, implies human response to divine action. In the simple words of the Disciple whom Jesus loved, "We love because he loved us first" (I John 4:19). The primary role of the prophet, therefore, is to distinguish the spurious from the genuine 'works of God' and to bear witness to the authenticity of the latter.

In this task the prophet is very much like the teacher. Teachers, to be sure, are not as such agents of God. But their dedication to the 'truth' is no less requisite and expected than is the devotion of the prophets to God. As a matter of fact, the primitive and ancient mind invariably associates truth with God. For, in the order of common experience, discovering whether a thing is true or false is a matter of tracing it back to its origins. Thus, when things derive from their natural or historical sources, they are designated by various synonyms of true: for example, genuine pearls, natural foods, pure breeds, original paintings, autographs, manuscripts, authoritative decrees, authentic signs, etc. Conversely, when a being indicates something other than its regular or proper origin, it is said to be artificial, counterfeit, fictitious, spurious, synthetic, or simply, false. In so far as anything means or points to its natural or proper source, then, it is usually and justly said to be true. But every finite source points, in the religious mind, to God who endows things and acts in the universe with the quality of truth. When teachers and

prophets are faithful to this mentality, they are as a consequence real and proper professors of truth.

But truth is not only a property of things and events in the world; it is also predicated of agents and actions. Truth was not viewed in ancient times as something theoretical or abstract, as for example, the classical definition of truth as the *adequatio rei et intellectus* --agreement of mind with fact. It was understood, rather, to stand for truthfulness in speaking or trustworthiness in teaching. That was exactly the meaning of 'truth.' For our ancestors, then, the opposite of truth was not error, but lying or falsehood. As a consequence truthfulness, veracity, was expected and demanded in both the ancient teacher and the act of teaching. Without it the educational venture is doomed to failure.

THE ULTIMATE REASON FOR TEACHING

In the first paragraph of this essay it was stressed that there are certain things which human beings cannot know except by being taught them. One of the things they need to know and can learn only by being taught it is that God, whom the individual person cannot directly know or see, is really and truly *in love* with him or her. Merely knowing that God exists, that God creates and sustains and governs the universe, that God made Man to be the crown and steward of all his creations--these truths are not enough to prove that God really loves each and every human person in the strictest sense of the word. The very sins and crimes of religious people demonstrate this ignorance. Nor is it enough for God to reveal his love in an indirect or mediated way, i.e., through nature or history or by means of his prophets. Such media, you will find on close examination, are not really revelations of divine love, but only tokens or reminders of it. True love is by both definition and experience immediate. Indeed, immediacy is the very heart of love, and intercourse is its way of life.

This notion of intercourse must not be taken in the usual senses of sexual coition, verbal discourse, or mental telepathy, for these acts are at most also only reminders or signs of love. No! The term must be understood as spiritual intercourse, in which, in language canonized by mystics of all ages and cultures, the very persons or selves of lover and beloved so interpenetrate each other--without intermediary whatsoever--that one becomes indistinguishable from

the other. Is a person in ecstasy, for example, divine or human? Can you be conscious of anything but love in a moment of rapture or transport? So intimate is this experience that many mystics interpret it as an absorption of temporal being into the eternal All or One or Nothing (*Brahman, Atman, Nirvana*) of Hindu religion or the transformation of both God and person into the 'Selfless Self' of Zen Buddhism. The problem with this view is that it tends to imply a pantheistic understanding of both divine and created realities. For this reason most Western mystics, following the tradition of the Greek Fathers of the Church and such spiritual giants as Pseudo-Denis, Bonaventure, Teresa of Avila, and John of the Cross, see the above view as a confusion of knowledge with reality--the fatal flaw in Plato's philosophy--and hold rigidly to an absolute difference between God and man. In terms of ~~the~~ human consciousness the union of God with Man in love is so intimate that it indeed seems to be a unity of being. But it is and remains in fact a separable union. At most, says John of the Cross, "the soul becomes God by participation."

To sum up: while religions are divided on precisely what God reveals to Man, they are almost without exception united on the fact and the need of divine revelation or enlightenment. Most of all, the women and men who devote their whole lives to religion, the nuns and monks, the saints and mystics of the world, all agree that what God makes known to them is first and foremost, if not exclusively, himself/herself as their undoubted and undeniable Lover! Jeremiah the prophet speaks for all of them:

Behold, days are coming, says YaHWeH...when I will put my Torah within them and write it on their hearts; I will be their God and they shall be my people. No longer shall each person teach his neighbor and each his brother, saying, "Know YaHWeH," for all shall know me, from the least of them to the greatest. (31:31-4)

Obviously, human teachers cannot enter into such an immediate relation with their pupils as God seeks with his creatures. Nor is intimate love an intended or expected motive on the part of either teachers or learners as such. This is not because human beings cannot have immediate relations with each other. Such relations are, in fact, the precise intent and purpose of Christian sacramental mar-

riage. Rather, the reason is that, in the context of education, language is the indispensable medium between those teaching and those taught. Not intercourse but discourse is the operative factor in education. Nevertheless there is a quality often found in great teachers analogous to spiritual love, and it is a property often predicated of God in the Bible. This quality is most often translated by the familiar term 'kindness' (*hesed* in Hebrew), because it is characteristic of persons living together in family. Etymologically the word derives from the Anglo-Saxon *cynn*, from which in turn derive such terms as kin, kindred, kind (genus), ken (knowledge), etc. Moreover kindness, which along with another familiar word (i.e., '*emunah*', faithful, truthful), forms the brace of attributes most often predicated of YaHWeH in the Hebrew Psalter--the love poems that Israel sang to their divine Lover. It has already been noted that teachers must be devoted to the truth; here it needs to be stressed that teachers must also be kind persons. The reason is that there is no point whatever to pedagogy unless it is exercised for the sake of the learner. Students learn nothing from indifferent or hostile professors. Kindness and truthfulness, then, are essential traits of great teachers, and of effective teaching as well.

CONCLUSION

The kindness that religious persons find in God and the truthfulness of his revelations lead them to look for, and even to demand, the same dispositions in prophets. If these are absent, the prophet is denounced as a false prophet and an enemy of the people. That these qualities should characterize the persons and actions of teachers, to say nothing of all leaders in human society, is obvious. But more pertinent to our context than the presence of these properties in the communicator is the response they engender in the receiver. Just as the kindness of God and truthfulness of his revelations beget faith in the believer; so do the same traits in teachers and teaching produce the equivalent effect in the learner: namely, belief, trust, reliance, confidence, acceptance, etc., which are simply various forms of faith. With this notion of faith we have now a justification of the premise on which this essay is based: namely, that one gains real and true knowledge of things not only on one's own--a truism admitted by everyone--but also and for the most part from such

teachers as are kindly disposed toward their charges and truthful in their teaching.

Here is not the time or place to develop or pursue the notion of faith further. Let me conclude this essay with a few reflections on the relation of human faith to the matter discussed above.

Since infants are totally dependent on their parents for life and health, they have no choice but to accept parental communications on faith. By means of ~~it~~ ^{them} they come to know the language and the myths of their people along with everything that goes to make up their world and their common sense of it. Hence the childlike nature of faith, an observation Jesus, the teacher par excellence, once made to his disciples:

I give praise to you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, for although you have hidden these [mysteries] from the wise and the learned you have revealed them to mere infants. (Matthew 11:25)

It is generally not till adolescence, when error and deception are encountered in human discourse, that human reason begins to function in critical fashion. Teenagers, particularly, begin to doubt and to challenge their parents and teachers on what they have learned from them in childhood. This common occurrence is not without value for human society, for human faith is open to error, failure, and mistake, as are all human endeavors. On the other hand, human reason is not meant to be used only critically or scientifically. Reason can and should often be used reflectively, as in philosophy and theology. In such cases, enlightened by revelation and faith, it can ascend to heights that are unimaginable to the empirical or scientific mind.

What faith contributes to reason above all is a 'holistic' approach to both subjective knowledge and objective reality. That is to say, whereas reason alone is capable of abstracting facts from their actual and total contexts, such a procedure is impossible to faith. Faith can never overlook the reality of both the teacher and the teaching, any more than one can eliminate the doer and the doing from the actual deed. By faith in divine revelation, therefore, human reason is capable of being enlightened on matters above and beyond the limitations of both the finite mind and the strict methods of science. You can only be satisfied by the *whole truth*. Not so?

NOTES

¹ The main source used in writing this article was Skeat, *Concise Etymological Dictionary of the English Language*, Oxford, 1948. Unless otherwise noted the words in italics in parentheses are Latin or Greek or Hebrew.

² The article appears in the Hebrew text, i.e., *ha'adam*. I capitalize the term 'Man' to indicate the generic term for human beings, without reference to gender or sex. Some such device must be employed if one wishes to translate the Hebrew '*adam*', the Greek *anthropos*, or the Latin *homo* correctly and to differentiate it from the male sex.

³ Boman, Thorleif, *Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek*, Norton, 1960, p.58.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 59.

⁵ Psalm 33:6-9: "By the word of YaHWeH the heavens were made; by the breath of his mouth all their host..he spoke and the earth was made; he commanded and it stood forth." Elohim and YaHWeH are the usual names for God in the Hebrew text. The unusual rendering of the latter name indicates that it is the sacred tetragrammaton, which Jewish custom refrains from pronouncing.

⁶ Boman, *Op. cit.*, p.68.

⁷ The term Homer uses regularly for 'word' is not *logos*, which the Greeks tended to see visually, i.e. , as a *written* word. His term, rather, is *mythos*, the *spoken* word, whence 'myth' is obviously derived. The implied speaker or teller of myths is God or the gods. In similar fashion, the Hebrews spoke of their foundational literature, i.e., the first five books of Moses in the Bible, as *torah*, which literally means 'teaching.'

CIVIL TONGUES: THE SEARCH FOR APPROPRIATE DISCOURSE

John D. Groppe

The dialogue form has been used by such diverse thinkers as Plato, Aristotle, Erasmus, Diderot, and Newman, but it did not develop its status as the preferred form and even a preemptive form until recently. The beginning of its prevalence as the preferred form in certain circumstances is easy to date. John Cogley, a former religion editor of *The New York Times* and a staff member at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, recalled in his autobiography when he first heard the word dialogue. The Center had initiated a series of seminars on a range of topics. Cogley, who was responsible for the discussion entitled "Religious Institutions in a Free Society," organized a week long gathering for May, 1958, and it was at this affair that he "first heard the word 'dialogue.' It was proposed," he recalls, "by Walter Ong, S. J." (68). Cogley's memory is supported by David Lochhead, who discovered while researching dialogue that "in the *Religious Index to Periodical Literature...*, the word appears as a subject heading only in the mid 1960s." Lochhead goes on to observe:

This (emergence of dialogue), not quite coincidentally, is contemporary with Vatican II. The entry of the Roman Catholic Church, under John XXIII into the mainstream of ecumenical discussion stimulated discussion of how traditions, long alienated, could come to understand and appreciate each other. 'Dialogue' became the key concept in this discussion. (46)

Indeed, it was the dialogical stance toward people of other religions and to the world itself taken by the Second Vatican Council of the Roman Catholic Church that brought dialogue into prominence in the mid 1960s. There were books and articles prior to the Council that included the term dialogue in their titles, for example Stephen Neill's *Christian Faith and Other Faiths: The Christian Dialogue with Other Religions* (London: Oxford

University Press, 1961), but these books do not include a self-conscious reflection on dialogue as a mode of relationship. In addition to frequent references to dialogue in various Vatican II documents, what distinguishes the Council's use of dialogue is precisely that self-conscious awareness of entering into a new mode of relationship. That new mode of relationship was based on the Council's recognition and proclamation of the solidarity of the Roman Catholic Church with all peoples. All peoples share a common dignity as they are all created in the likeness of God. The Council's emphasis on dialogue is founded on that common dignity.

Everything we have said about the dignity of the human person, and about the human community and the profound meaning of human activity, lays the foundation for the relationship between the Church and the world, and provides the basis for dialogue between them. In this chapter, presupposing everything which has already been said by this Council concerning the mystery of the Church, we must now consider this same Church inasmuch as she exists in the world, living and acting with it. (*Gaudium Et Spes*, #40)

Right from the very beginning of its prevalence dialogue was perceived to have great if not miraculous powers.

Every man is a potential adversary, even those whom we love. Only through dialogue are we saved from this enmity toward one another. Dialogue is to love, what blood is to the body. When the flow of blood stops, the body dies. When dialogue stops, love dies and resentment and hate are born. But dialogue can restore a dead relationship. Indeed this is the miracle of dialogue: it can bring relationship into being, and it can bring into being once again a relationship that has died. (Howe, 3)

It is this perceived miraculous power of dialogue that gives dialogue its preemptive power for, according to this position, whatever is not dialogue is monologue and is to be avoided. The ethical relationship which is called dialogue is understood almost exclusively in terms of the verbal relationship of a small number of people engaged face-to-face in intensely personal talk. Therefore,

whatever discourse is not cast in the form of an intensely personal verbal relationship between two or among a small group of people is monologue, and we can expect no miracles from it. The dialogue-monologue dichotomy forces much of human discourse into the category of unmiraculous monologue. For example, Leonard Swidler, a practitioner of interreligious dialogue and the editor of the *Journal of Ecumenical Studies*, sees no place for argumentation within the category of dialogue:

Dialogue is *not* debate. In dialogue each partner must listen to the other as openly and as sympathetically as he or she can in an attempt to understand the other's position as precisely and, as it were, as much from within, as possible. (1)

The logic of this position is that we are ethically constrained both to avoid such discourse and not to encourage its use by teaching it even though some of these modes of discourse have traditionally been seen to play a vital social function. Indeed, according to Aristotle, rhetoric or debate is the discourse for decision making in both legislative and judicial assemblies. In other words, it is the discourse of political life. However, Reuel Howe found politics "in desperate need of dialogical spirit and action," and his solution seems to be to replace debate with dialogue:

The abuse of dialogue has gone on so long that politicians find it difficult to break out of their monological fantasies and move toward a dialogical meeting. What is needed is the coming of men of conviction from their respective camps who are willing to talk honestly with one another in the face of mutual criticism and loyalty to their own views. If these men would speak with one another not as pawns on a chessboard but as themselves in the sanctuary of truth, the sphere of public life would be transformed by the miracle of dialogue. (11)

Howe seems to require that politicians give up politics so that political life can be transformed. He casts doubt on the legitimacy of politicians because they present their convictions as members of a party seeking to win the consent of some assembly to their point of view. There is no place for argument in Howe's index of appropriate discourse. For him it is an uncivil tongue.

However, debate has its defenders. For John Courtney Murray, argument is the civil tongue par excellence: "The specifying note of political association is its rational deliberative quality, its dependence for its permanent cohesiveness on argument among men" (6).

And dialogue has its critics. The inability or unwillingness of dialogue participants to bring closure to the dialogue and to agree on some common action has prompted John B. Cobb to identify the need to go beyond dialogue: "Beyond dialogue, I suggest, lies the aim of mutual transformation" (48). And this transformation in interreligious dialogues is not to be limited to the participants as individuals. It must also affect the communities they represent. Going beyond the dialogue with representatives of other religious communities or other religions will require stepping out of the dialogue from time to time:

However, once a Christian has learned something of first importance from the partner, much of the work of internalizing and integrating this new understanding may better be done in solitude or with other Christians rather than in further conversation. Only when some significant progress has been made in this work will it be important to meet again to take up the dialogue at that new place to which the participants have come. (48)

Moreover, dialogue may inhibit certain pursuits. David Tracy calls the relationship among scholars a conversation rather than a dialogue as the intimacy of a close relationship may restrict the inquiry from going where it should go:

When human beings converse, they may converse, of course, about themselves. They may exchange their narratives, expose their hopes, desires, and fears. They may both reveal and conceal who they think they are, and who they think the other may be--the other now become the conversation partner. But in this kind of conversation, as in any conversation where the subject matter is allowed to take over, we can experience Aristotle's dictum that in the pursuit of truth, friendship must yield. His dictum is all the more striking, coming as it does

form the thinker who, more than anyone today, insisted upon the difficult demands of the reality we call friendship. (18-9)

Dialogue has become a term of many meanings. Some uses are so inclusive that nearly all forms of verbal relations--lectures as well as various written forms--are within the word's extension. Other uses are so exclusive as to thrust some traditional modes of discourse into the outer darkness of monologue. For some, dialogue is the only mode of relationship; for others it is an appropriate discourse stance in some circumstances, but not all.

Much of the ambiguity of the word dialogue results from a confusion of a mode of discourse with an ethical stance. Dialogue is a metaphor for a particular kind of relationship among people, a relationship that includes but is not limited to face-to-face verbal relationships. The possibility of this confusion arises within the explanation of dialogue by its chief proponent, Martin Buber, for whom dialogue is an ethical stance. For Buber ethics is the proper relationship between humankind and nature, humankind and spiritual beings, and between one human being and another. Those relationships are effected by a certain mode of address. The relationship between humans and nature is beneath the level of speech. "Creatures live and move over against us, but cannot come to us, and when we address them as *Thou*, our words cling to the threshold of speech." About our life with human beings, however, he says, "There the relation is open and in the form of speech. We can give and accept the *Thou*" (1958, xvii). When he elaborates the I-THOU stance, he clearly indicates that such a stance can be taken wordlessly. Maurice Friedman points out that "dialogue is not merely the interchange of words--genuine dialogue can take place in silence, whereas much conversation is really monologue" (Buber 1972, xvii). Furthermore, in the case of the dialogical relationship with nature, the stance can be taken with things that cannot speak. From this perspective, dialogue is not a verbal genre at all but a metaphor for a certain kind of relationship.

Dialogue then, as some authors understand it, seems to restrict uncritically the modes of civil discourse to intimate and personal modes. In addition, dialogue causes us to be suspicious of other modes of verbal relationship on which the human community has depended for public decision making for thousands of years, and argument is the prime suspect. There are two schools of thought

which give moral status to dialogue and none to debate. Theorists of interreligious dialogue stress the intimate relationship of dialogue as a sort of end in itself to the exclusion of any instrumental character it might have, but they also hold that, in time, the dialogical relationship will bring about a common action. On the other hand, secular theories of dialogue believe that almost no action is possible without coercion, but the intimacy of dialogue provides a degree of solace in a coercive world. For either of these schools of thought debate is simply not a civil tongue. I will first examine secular theories of dialogue that give dialogue a preemptive status over debate. Following that analysis, I will examine theories of interreligious dialogue that similarly give dialogue a preemptive status.

In his examination of white, middle class American culture, Robert Bellah found that one of the representative American cultural traditions has a characterological inclination for dialogue as the only authentic mode of verbal relationship. This subtype of the American character Bellah calls the expressive individualist, and it is best represented by the therapist. People of this character type "express frustration, disappointment, and disillusionment with politics. Indeed, for many of them, suspicion of politics amounts to a sense of the moral impossibility of politics" (131). Politics is morally impossible to this character type because all morals are relative.

The complexity of such issues as abortion, welfare, and child abuse is only increased by emphasis on the relativity of individual feelings, values, and priorities with respect to them. Given the objective complexity of the issues and the chaos of conflicting subjective reactions to them, therapy's empathic face-to-face communication can make little headway. It cannot span the gap between the one-on-one situation and the great social scale and bureaucratic density of public life. (132)

It is the relativity of the issues that makes them appear unsolvable. One of the representative Americans Bellah's team interviewed, a woman called Elizabeth in the book, expressed her frustration with politics in relation to dialogue: "I don't think there are answers in life. I think there are only really good dialogues" (132-3). In this view dialogue is not a means to establishing consensus as no consensus is possible: "There's just no one right," Elizabeth observed.

Still, dialogue does have something to offer. It makes divergent relationships less conflictive and more comfortable. Nonetheless, in spite of what degree of comfort dialogue might offer to Elizabeth, political decisions still need to be made, and they cannot be made through dialogue.

"I mean I think political action *needs* to happen by people who are convinced that there's one right. I don't think it works any other way. And in fact it doesn't work very well if the people within it are always dialoguing. I mean you've just got to go out and change the world based on what you believe. I just can't do that." (133)

Elizabeth seems to recognize that dialogue has some degree of social power, although it is far less than miraculous. Nonetheless, dialogue is not an instrument of political decision making, and if, like Elizabeth, one can only dialogue, one also feels impotent. Only those who believe that they are right in a world in which "there's just no one right" can take political action; that is, only the coercive can act politically.

Alasdair MacIntyre finds that this stance is not limited to just the American character. Rather it is characteristic of the modern world. In *After Virtue* MacIntyre argues that, beginning with the Enlightenment, the moral tradition of which Aristotle's thought was the core was repudiated and that the task the Enlightenment undertook was to discover a new rational foundation for morality. The failure of this project is the basis for the modern stance on moral judgments, a stance he calls emotivism: "Emotivism is the doctrine that all evaluative judgments and more specifically all moral judgments are *nothing but* expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character" (11-2). In a world in which moral judgments are only expressions of preference, "There's just no one right." Hence, according to MacIntyre, disagreements among moderns are unresolvable:

The most striking feature of contemporary moral utterance is that so much of it is used to express disagreements; and the most striking feature of the debates in which these disagreements are expressed is their interminable character. I

do not mean by this that such debates go on and on and on--although they do--but also that they apparently can find no terminus. There seems to be no rational way of securing moral agreement in our culture. (6)

MacIntyre cites a number of moral philosophers who continue to endeavor to find a rational basis for moral judgments that do not depend on any notion like Aristotle's concept of the human good, but as he balances the moral foundation of a Nozick with that of a Rawls, he finds only an irreconcilable difference. There is only one modern philosopher, according to MacIntyre, who has grasped the failure of the Enlightenment project and who has proposed an alternative solution: Nietzsche:

The underlying structure of (Nietzsche's) argument is as follows: if there is nothing to morality but expressions of will, my morality can only be what my will creates. There can be no place for such fictions as natural rights, utility, the greatest happiness for the greatest number. I myself must bring into existence 'new tables of what is good'. 'We, however, *want to become those we are*--human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves' [quoted from *The Gay Science*, 266]. The rational and rationally justified autonomous moral subject of the eighteenth century is a fiction, an illusion; so, Nietzsche resolves, let us replace reason and let us make ourselves into autonomous moral subjects by some gigantic and heroic act of the will. (113-14)

People like Bellah's representative American Elizabeth recognize that they share no consensus of a common good with others and that, therefore, they have no way either to resolve debates or to propose a public policy without engaging in a dominating act of the will. In such a milieu, debate as an instrument of rational decision making is futile and can be seen only as a contest of wills.

Gregory Clark, in a study on the role of conversation in the social construction of reality, also finds rhetoric to be most uncivil because it is inescapably coercive:

(W)e use rhetoric to impose upon others the ideology that is our reality by attempting to establish it among them by a consensus characterized by nothing less than complete agreement....

An attempt to establish this kind of consensus within a community is essentially coercive because it requires that alternative beliefs, values or actions be considered inherently incorrect, denying the possibility of conflict by situating rhetorical exchange in a closed context where disagreements are either suppressed or ignored. (54)

But Clark is no more able than Elizabeth to find anything but an interminable conversation. His solution to rhetoric perceived as a Nietzschean act is to become proficient in pluralism.

A community that is proficient in pluralism is constituted on the basis of a very different kind of consensus than the authoritarian consensus that would reconstruct a community in the ideological image of the person whose rhetoric promotes it. Pluralism requires that conflicting notions of shared, social knowledge coexist, and that the conflicts themselves be publicly explored. Consequently, it necessitates that the conversations that sustain a community proceed not toward agreements that would end the exchange but toward the exposure of disagreements. (57)

This pluralistically proficient community would not be able to act on common concerns. It privileges conversation over debate. Clark does allow for debate, but debate must become conversation:

Although made in response to the conversation of a community, every rhetorical statement necessarily claims independence from that process when it portrays one person's preferred version of the knowledge shared by the people it addresses as a truth that is already authorized by their consent. In essence, the private purpose of every rhetorical statement is to isolate itself from the collaborative activity that it is the public function of rhetoric to sustain. Because ethical social action in a community of equals not only demands collaboration but is collaboration, rhetoric cannot function

ethically within a community until it is subjected to the authorizing process of critical evaluation and exchange that the conversation model describes. (61)

The act of rhetoric is intended to bring about a public decision for common action, but to keep the process ethical, the audience must resist the appeal to agree on a course of action by returning to pluralism and conversation. Debate remains for Clark an uncivil tongue, but his privileged mode remains impotent.

Clark understands the human community as pluralistic to the core, that is, as a collection of diverse, atomic individuals who have little more in common with each other than that they share the same place at the same time. That accident of history may also have brought them to some condition of exigency which needs to be addressed. However, as atomic individuals, they have nothing in common. Any and all solutions to the exigency are individual solutions and are, therefore, alien to all the individuals except one of the societal atoms. All the other atoms would have had to have been coerced into acceptance of that solution. Clark's understanding of rhetoric is not the traditional understanding. In his study of the Aristotelian concept of the enthymeme, Lloyd F. Bitzer identified the relation of persuader and audience as a cooperative and a not a coercive one. That cooperation is possible because of shared concerns and values, that is because of some identity possessed in common by the persuader and the audience.

The point to be emphasized, then, is that enthymemes occur only when speaker and audience jointly produce them. Because they are jointly produced, enthymemes intimately unite speaker and audience and provide the strongest possible proofs. The aim of rhetorical discourse is persuasion; since rhetorical arguments, or enthymemes, are formed out of premises supplied by the audience, they have the virtue of being self-persuasive. Owing to the skill of the speaker, *the audience itself helps construct the proofs by which it is persuaded*. (408)

Clark's rejection of rhetoric as uncivil is based on a vision of the social contract requiring "nothing less than complete agreement." Clark suggests that such complete agreement would in-

clude both the general principles that would constitutionally govern the community as well as all of the practical decisions resulting from applying those principles to contingent circumstances. I would agree with Clark that such total and complete consensus is impossible, but I disagree that the alternative is an endless exploration of our pluralism. While that eternal conversation might seem civil enough in many circumstances, it is always uncivil and horrendously self-indulgent in the face of unaddressed sufferings and injustices.

When we turn to interreligious dialogue, we find, at least since the Second Vatican Council, a self-conscious practice of dialogue. The acceptance of dialogue as a step toward ending centuries of the scandal of disunity was a self-conscious starting place, and the continuing reflections on the many different formal interchurch dialogues that have been initiated since the end of the Council have provided a developing theory of dialogue. However, the practitioners of interreligious dialogue also privilege dialogue over debate. One of the leading practitioners of interreligious dialogue is Leonard Swidler, the editor of the *Journal of Ecumenical Studies*. To guide participants in such dialogues Swidler has developed a "dialogue decalogue." Because "dialogue is not debate" and because "interreligious dialogue is something new under the sun," Swidler offered his rules "learned from hard experience." His first commandment clearly distinguished dialogue from debate:

FIRST COMMANDMENT: *The primary purpose of dialogue is to change and grow in the perception and understanding of reality and then to act accordingly.* Minimally, the very fact that I learn that my dialogue partner believes 'this' rather than 'that' proportionally changes my attitude toward her; and a change in my attitude is a significant change in me. We enter into dialogue so that WE can learn, and grow, not so we can force change on the other, as one hopes to do in debate--a hope which is realized in inverse proportion to the frequency and ferocity with which debate is entered into. On the other hand, because in dialogue each partner comes with the intention of learning and changing herself, one's partner in fact will also change. Thus the alleged goal of debate, and much more, is accomplished far more effectively by dialogue. (1983, 1-2)

By such arguments dialogue becomes preemptive. Dialogue preempts debates because it is said to be more effective in accomplishing debate's "alleged goal" and because it achieves much more. That greater achievement is usually identified as an intimate relationship among the partners of the dialogue. Dialogue is a moral instrument because, unlike debate, it does not rely on force. Dialogue also has a moral end--intimacy as opposed to coercion. Joseph A. Volker maintained that the prime achievement of dialogue, or at least a stage of the dialogical process, is a deeper personal relationship.

Intimacy, then, is the second stage of dialogue. Having grappled with our own fears, frustrations, weakness, and bias--having recognized them through our encounters with the other--we acknowledge them and confess them before one another. Having given thanks for this grace, we found ourselves in another place. The very same words and the same encounter now take on a totally different form, a new reality. No longer where we were, we have entered a new world of intimacy. This encounter now enables us to see the beauty of the other. In acknowledging and confessing it, we discover our own beauty. We gather up the flowers of our faith and offer them as a gift to one another. We find our beauty in the giving not diminished but, wonder of wonders, enhanced. (291)

Mr. Swidler leaves us no alternatives. We either dialogue or violate the commandments and, thereby, I guess, lose our souls. He does not even hint at a possible moral function for debate, and yet there are serious limitations to his position. Dialogue is not the whole of discourse. The proponents of secular dialogues hold that debate is always coercive because they can find no common ground, just endless pluralism. Mr. Swidler and other proponents of religious dialogue, however, do believe in a common ground, one that can only be reached through dialogue. Yet the practitioners of interreligious dialogue refuse to recognize that there are circumstances that, either morally or pragmatically, call for debate. My argument with the practitioners of secular dialogue is that debate is not inherently coercive. Rather, it is a decision making tool that was developed to help communities agree on a common action in order

to avoid being torn apart by an explosive pluralism. Hannah Arendt holds that argument was the relationship that distinguished the civility of the ancient Greek polis from the despotic settling of differences by violence.

In the experience of the polis, which not without justification has been called the most talkative of all bodies politic, and even more in the political philosophy which sprang from it, action and speech separated and became more and more independent activities. The emphasis shifted from action to speech as a means of persuasion rather than the specifically human way of answering, talking back and measuring up to whatever happened or was done. To be political, to live in a polis, meant that everything was decided through words and persuasion and not through force and violence. In Greek self-understanding, to force people by violence, to command rather than to persuade, were prepolitical ways to deal with people characteristic of life outside the polis, of home and family life, where the household head ruled with uncontested, despotic powers, or of life in the barbarian empires of Asia, whose despotism was frequently likened to the organization of the household. (26)

My argument with practitioners of interreligious dialogue is that dialogue and debate are not contradictory modes but complementary ones, and that neither one by itself nor both taken together constitute a full universe of discourse. Unlike Bellah's Elizabeth, Swidler holds that there is an end to dialogue--the mutual realization of new areas of reality. On the basis of this realization, dialogue partners finally can and must act. Since Swidler holds that dialogue is an instrument to decision making and action taking, I will use his decalogue to show the complementarity between dialogue and debate.

Some of the limitations of Mr. Swidler's position can be immediately seen by comparing his theory of dialogue with the traditional Aristotelian theory of rhetoric. First, the characteristics of dialogue as Mr. Swidler understands it.

According to his commandments 1, 3, 5, and 9, the purpose of dialogue is knowledge. The first commandment states, "*The primary purpose of dialogue is to change and grow in the perception*

and understanding of reality and then to act accordingly" (1). This emphasis on the knowledge-producing function of dialogue is typical among theorists of interreligious dialogue. Another self-conscious dialoguer, Monika Hellwig, defines the purpose of dialogue this way:

The point of the dialogue is not proselytizing but the clarification of one's perception of the position of others, in order thereby to clarify one's position and engage in more realistic and authentic relationships. (430)

Swidler's commandments 3, 5, and 9 set forth the conditions of this knowledge. According to the 3rd commandment, the participants "*must come to the dialogue with complete honesty and sincerity.*" According to the 5th, the participants must have achieved a degree of self-clarification and have already defined themselves. And according to the 9th, the participants "*must be at least minimally self-critical of both themselves and their own religious traditions*" (2-3).

Dialogue clearly requires special preparation, and, therefore, not everyone can be partners in a dialogue. With his 7th commandment Swidler restricts the dialogue to equals. With such preparation dialogue can lead to a condition of intimacy. Based on mutual trust, which is required by the 8th commandment, dialogue can lead, according to the 10th commandment, to experiencing "the partner's religion from 'within'" (3).

Moreover, dialogue is a small scale relationship. Swidler always speaks of the partner in dialogue as part of a one-to-one relationship.

Dialogue also takes time. Swidler recognizes that the process leading to the cognitive and spiritual goals of dialogue must be a prolonged one and, in elaborating the 8th commandment, he cautions the necessity of a slow beginning.

But dialogue among persons can be built only on personal trust. Hence it is wise not to tackle the most difficult problems in the beginning, but rather to approach first those establishing the basis of human trust. Then, gradually, as this personal trust deepens and expands, the more thorny matters can be undertaken. Thus, as in learning we move from the known to

the unknown, so in dialogue we proceed from commonly held matters--which, given our mutual ignorance resulting from centuries of hostility, will take us some time to discover fully--to discuss matters of disagreement. (1983, 3)

Dialogue requires time for preparation for the dialogue and time for the dialogue itself. During the time of dialogue, we must withhold proposals for action on polemical concerns in order not to destroy the growing relationship and, therefore, we must postpone action on such concerns. Only when the process has been fully entered into and carried through can we legitimately propose a collective action:

If we are serious, persistent, and sensitive enough in the dialogue, we may in time enter into phase three. Here we together begin to explore new areas of reality, of meaning and truth, of which neither of us had even been aware before. We are brought face to face with the new as-yet-unknown-to-us dimension of reality only because of questions, insights, probings, produced in the dialogue. We may thus dare to say that patiently pursued dialogue can become an instrument of new "revelation," a further "un-veiling" of reality--on which we then must act. (1985, 130-1)

Argument, on the other hand, is done within a deadline. Aristotle distinguished three subclasses of rhetoric: deliberative, judicial, and epideictic, which is sometimes referred to as ceremonial rhetoric. Deliberative rhetoric is the discourse of legislative assemblies, where policies are made, priorities established, directives given. The deadlines that obtain are both the procedural ones that establish the operating conditions of the assembly, such as the number of days the legislature can be in session, as well as the substantive ones emerging from the need to respond to a new situation. Judicial rhetoric is the discourse of courts. Here people's actions are judged on the basis of policies established elsewhere. Again there are procedural deadlines--statutes of limitation, for example--as well as substantive ones--the need to redress grievances or to deal with what our constitution calls clear and present dangers.

The purpose of the debates in both the deliberative and judicial assemblies is not to arrive at a state of knowledge but to produce an

action. One part of the debates in either assembly will be to set forth what is known, but the goal of the debates is not knowledge. The actions of the deliberative assemblies are to develop and allocate resources, to direct that certain actions be taken, and to restrict certain actions by declaring them subject to punishment. In the judicial assembly the action at stake is whether to invoke previously legislated punishments. Dialogues do not result in actions, certainly not large scale actions.

Dialogues are pursued by individuals in their own right and, in the case of interreligious dialogues, as representatives of their respective ecclesial communities but not as delegates authorized to initiate actions that would mutually obligate their ecclesial communities. In debate the relationship of the participants is not a relationship of individuals but of factions or groups who may not be directly present and who address each other through spokespersons. We divide members of deliberative assemblies, for example, into the left and the right, and the legislators refer to their absent but nonetheless involved constituents. In criminal courts, the defendant finds that his or her opponent is the state, the members of which are present only through their representatives. These factions and spokespersons endeavor to present the positions of their constituents and not to achieve self-knowledge as an end in itself or as a step toward an intimacy based on revealed self-knowledge. Debates appropriately have spectators, whereas spectators at a dialogue may be distracting, or, worse yet, destructive of the intimacy that dialogue moves toward. Swidler's commandments clearly indicate the personal character of dialogue. In debate, however, the participants seek to marshal social-psychological forces, the hopes and fears of groups.

Finally, those contending for the decision of the assembly or the jury do not have the kind of equality and preparation Swidler holds is essential to dialogue. They do have a procedural equality and, in our tradition with our affirmation of human rights and the equality of all people, they have a substantive equality. However much we have been able to realize our claim to protect the dignity of all people, we must admit that the idea of equality proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence is not the kind of equality Swidler has in mind.

Finally, rhetoric operates within a condition of limited knowledge. In his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle defined the enthymeme and not the

syllogism as the logical structure of a rhetorical argument. The enthymeme is like a syllogism as it is a structure of reasoning, but its propositions are statements of probability and not certainty:

Most of the things about which we make decisions, and into which therefore we inquire, present us with alternative possibilities. For it is about our actions that we deliberate and inquire, and all our actions have a contingent character; hardly any of them are determined by necessity. Again, conclusions that state what is merely usual or possible must be drawn from premises that do the same, just as 'necessary' conclusions must be drawn from 'necessary' premises; this too is clear to us from the *Analytics*. It is evident, therefore, that the propositions forming the basis of enthymemes, though some of them may be 'necessary,' will most of them be only usually true. (28)

In a debate, the facts needed to make a decision are not all in, and those that are on the table may be only circumstantial information or questionable. The deadline under which the debate must operate precludes further exploration to gather better information.

In summary, the purpose of rhetoric is to bring a body of people to a decision to act within the contingencies of a situation. The purpose of dialogue, as Mr. Swidler understands it, is to bring a small group of highly trained and specially prepared participants to a condition of intimacy based on extensive self-knowledge over a prolonged period of time. I cannot agree with Mr. Swidler that dialogue accomplishes the goal of debate and much more besides. Rather, it accomplishes something different, and what it accomplishes is not antithetical to debate but complementary to it.

Clearly, dialogue and rhetoric have different purposes. They function in different settings with different kinds of participants who have come together to accomplish different goals. However, neither one should preempt the other. Both have legitimate claims to being moral modes of relationship as well as efficacious modes. The practitioners of dialogue claim that ultimately their actions are based on a careful and thorough study of the situation, on the gradual development of mutual trust resulting in an intimacy among the partners, on a clearer and deeper understanding of the situation

resulting from that intimacy, and on a stronger and more human foundation for action. Debaters might respond that while the dialoguers wait for that ultimate enlightenment, large groups of people with whom the dialoguers do not have intimate relations and who, for one reason or another, cannot speak for themselves continue to suffer real injustices. This view seems to lead us to a dilemma between postponing action until we have developed sufficient intimacy and knowledge or acting now in ignorance as a member of a vociferous and antagonistic faction by coercing or forcing those who hold different views into submission. That is not necessarily the case.

Paul Ricoeur's distinction between what he calls the "socius" and the neighbor is helpful here. His essay "The Socius and the Neighbor" is a meditation on the parable of the good Samaritan. One of Ricoeur's preliminary conclusions is that "there is no sociology of the neighbor. The science of the neighbor," he says, "is thwarted by the praxis of the neighbor. One does not have a neighbor; I make myself someone's neighbor." According to Ricoeur, the first three men in the parable, the ones who did not stop to help the beaten and robbed man, represent people who are absorbed by their social roles, people whose function occupies them to the point of making them unavailable for the surprise of the encounter. The Samaritan, on the other hand, is

not encumbered by his social responsibility, ready to change his itinerary and invent an unforeseen behavior, available for encounter and the presence of the other. The conduct that he invents is the direct relationship of 'man to man.' His conduct is of the nature of the event, for it takes place without the mediation of an institution....It innovates a hyper-sociological mutuality between one person and another. (99-100)

Ricoeur's concept of the neighbor is close to Swidler's concept of the partner in dialogue. Although Swidler discusses interreligious dialogue in which designated participants relate to each other as individuals and as delegated representatives of their respective ecclesial communities, his discussion of dialogue always emphasizes the person-to-person relationship and not group-to-group. Swidler deinstitutionalizes, or in Ricoeur's term desociologizes dialogue as much as possible so that only I's and

Thou's remain. This desociologization of dialogue has its foundation in Buber's theory of dialogue. Friedman describes this aspect of Buber's thought.

Genuine conversation has in mind the other or others in their present and particular being and turns to them with the intention of establishing a living mutual relationship between himself and them. (87)

MacIntyre holds that this desociologization is a characteristic of the modern view of the self in which the self is detachable from its social and historical roles and statuses. And it is a view that he rejects.

For the story of my life is always embedded in the story of those communities from which I derive my identity. I am born with a past; and to try to cut myself off from that past, in the individualist mode, is to deform my present relationships. The possession of an historical identity and the possession of a social identity coincide. (221)

Ricoeur does not reject the socius--the sociological person--in favor of the neighbor, for the neighbor is an eschatological relationship and not a historical one.

The criterion of human relationships consists in knowing whether we influence people. But we have neither the right nor the power to apply this criterion. In particular, we do not have the right to employ the eschatological criterion as a process of enabling us to privilege direct relationships at the expense of indirect and abstract relationships. For in reality, through them we also exercise a kind of charity with regard to persons. But we are not necessarily aware of this. Thus, so long as the sociological veil has not fallen, we remain within history, that is within the debate between the *socius* and the neighbor, without knowing whether charity is here or there. (109)

For Ricoeur institutional roles through which we mediate our relationships to each other are an inescapable part of history. The

relationships of neighbor or dialogue partner offers us a nonhistorical and nonsociological perspective on all our relationships, a perspective that enables us to glimpse the ultimate meaning even of institutions. But it is not an insight that can replace institutional relationships or that can allow for a privileged status for dialogue. In fact, the socius relationship is what characterizes all institutions. However much we yearn for one-to-one relationships in all aspects of our lives, that realization is beyond possibility. That it cannot be fully realized, however, does not preclude the possibility of the efficacy of institutional relationships which are mediated by conflictive discourse. Ricoeur concludes:

The *ultimate* meaning of institutions is the service they render to persons. If no one draws profit from them they are useless. But this ultimate meaning remains hidden. No one can evaluate the personal benefits produced by institutions; charity is not necessarily present where it is exhibited; it is also hidden in the the humble, abstract services performed by post offices and social security officials; quite often it is the hidden meaning of the social realm. It seems to me that the eschatological judgment means that 'we shall be judged' on what we have done to persons, even without knowing it, by acting through the media of our most abstract institutions, and that it is ultimately the impact of our love on individual persons which will be judged. This is what remains *astonishing*. (109)

Both Ricoeur and Swidler hold us accountable to a judgment for our actions, but Ricoeur rejects Swidler's grounds for such a judgment. Indeed, we are to be judged by "what we have done to persons" (and I would add "for persons"), but the normal mode of our relations to most people is as socii and not as partners in dialogue. We are not just transcendent I's yearning for intimacy with transcendent Thou's, both of whom happen to be imprisoned in some sort of sociological casing. Rather, as socii, we are tempered by the Thou's we meet who can help us to recognize and maybe even to realize the possibility of a mutual encounter. On the other hand, as I's endeavoring for mutuality with a Thou, we are also tempered by the array of other relationships that we have both through and because of our social roles, relationships that are char-

acterized by a mutuality of another sort, nonetheless real, nonetheless valid, nonetheless human.

Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg were working together in 1927 when they were confronted with the claim of Erwin Schrodinger that matter at the atomic level behaves as if it consists of waves, which thereby threatened the validity of quantum theory. Each man developed separate but complementary responses to Schrodinger, Heisenberg's to be called the uncertainty principle, Bohr's the principle of complementarity. An Italian physicist, Emelio Segre, explained complementarity as follows:

Two magnitudes are complementary when the measurement of one of them prevents the accurate simultaneous measurement of the other. Similarly, two concepts are complementary when one imposes limitations on the other. (Rhodes, 132)

Dialogue and debate reveal different dimensions of human relationships, dimensions which cannot be perceived simultaneously from each perspective. Each, thereby, limits the other. Neither one is to be privileged, nor to be allowed to preempt the other. Only by holding rhetoric and dialogue complementary can we start to make a judgment of human actions and relationships that is just. For David Tracy "argument is a vital moment within conversation that occasionally is needed if the conversation itself is to move forward" (23). People locked together in argument is an image of a mad house. They are incarcerated by their anxiety and anger, but, since their argument is interminable, their debates produce no common actions on which to ground a common identity and nothing to celebrate or talk about. Being bound together in conversation or dialogue is a lot more attractive, and is more appropriately a sign of what the Preamble to the Constitution calls domestic tranquility. Nonetheless, we often have to risk that tranquility to establish justice, to promote the general welfare, to provide for the common defense, and to secure the blessings of liberty for others as well as ourselves. Tracy reminds us that "pluralism can collapse into a repressive tolerance" (31). We cannot purchase our tranquility at the cost of the dignity of others. Their dignity and ultimately our own is the aim of both our dialogues and our debates. Each is a civil tongue in its appropriate time and place.

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What Is "Nature" in Natural Law?: Relating Phenomenology and Etymology

Robert Garritty

I

When, in moral demonstrations, ethicists call upon natural law for the basis of their position, what--precisely--are they speaking of? Are they referring to the pre-Socratic *physis* (nature), the source from which all things have grown? Do they mean the Platonic *eidos* (form) from which we derive our conceptual knowledge of things; or the Aristotelian *physis* (nature), a principle of motion and change? Do they mean the Stoic conformity to *logos* (reason), living in the manner of Zeus? Did Aquinas intend any, or all, of these meanings in his treatment of *lex naturalis* (natural law)?

Within the Core Curriculum at Saint Joseph's College we frequently refer to the natural law theory. In what was "old" Core 4 we referred to it when the aberrant social contract theories of the modern world were studied; in "old" Core 3 we took a rather extensive look at Thomas Aquinas's view of the topic, distinguishing it from the positivist's consideration of law as nothing but *de facto* rulings; in "old" Core 2 we called upon it when discussing the plight of Antigone. During our recent "Humanities Across the Curriculum" faculty workshops, we made Aquinas's *Treatise on Law* one of the major texts. It is thus only fitting that this linguistic excursion into the notion of "nature" in natural law be made.

The view of natural law I wish to stress in this investigation is drawn not so much from literally tracing the words of the natural law advocate, as from trying to follow some of the progress of the concept of natural law in its historical development. The blind adoption of "natural law" as an unexamined major premise of an ethical syllogism (Natural law says X; X is involved in this act; therefore, this act is right or wrong) may have led to the plight of modern man's temptation to scrap the entire notion.¹

Does the "nature" of the human person lie in a power to control the world that reveals itself? Is human "nature" the Stoic accep-

tance of a cosmological/biological *status quo* that one dare not touch? Or is something else intended? I see this as a focal question in this investigation of the terminology associated with natural law. It seems that the main difficulty which we see embodied in the contraception dispute today, for example, is that concerning the meaning of the expressions "human nature" and "natural law." Hence, any philosophical argument that invokes "natural law" in its premises is subject to the question: what do you mean by "nature"?

Why concentrate on vocabulary when dealing with such a topic? The reason for this is simple. Philosophy involves thinking of things in order to give an explanation of them. But explanation must occur within the context of words, of sentences. Take away linguistic expression, and you leave philosophy within the mind of its originator. This may be thinking, but it is not explaining. Moreover, the ancient Greeks, who have given us philosophy, have given it within the limits of their own language. Later thinkers provided us with Latin equivalents for the terms used by these Greek thinkers, and as with all translating, may have left behind some Greek connotations while unwittingly adding some distinctively Roman ones. The problem can become compounded when such works are translated into the modern languages. Hence, a look at the vocabulary actually used when the notions of "nature" and "law" were first being put into writing becomes desirable.

Jean-Paul Sartre has written that "...it is impossible to find in each and every man a universal essence that can be called human nature".² But he immediately adds: "there is nevertheless a human universality of *condition*... (i.e.)...all the *limitations* which *a priori* define man's fundamental situation in the universe."³ Sartre, throughout the essay in question, *Existentialism and Humanism*, used the term "essence" as the sum of formulae and qualities that make the production of a thing possible.⁴ This meaning of "essence" is the one I shall refer to as the Platonic *eidos* (form), and we shall see how this use of the word is almost equivalent to Aristotle's use of *techne* (art), the principle of a "made" being.

Transferred to the realm of ethics, a term such as "nature," in the sense of "definition"--as with Plato, is remote from the given situation of man's experiencing the "ought." The lived situation of experiencing moral obligation does not occur with any being other than the human person. Man as social, incarnate, truth-seeking,

perspiring presence in a world inhabited with others like him--this is the subject of the moral imperative.

Hence, to reduce "human nature" to the *eidos* (form) that reflects only man's rational animality (his definition) is to emphasize a useful definition of man at the expense of his complete nature. Indeed, if the fact that "action follows being" is to be applied here, then in practical matters we should refrain from letting one intelligible form (man's definition) substitute for the concrete being man. The reason for this is that the originally given being--socially existent man--is fuller and richer than any derived definition of that totality.

A reflection such as the one above should lead us at least to this conclusion: that our conception of natural law is possibly crusted over with the accumulation of centuries of disparate cultures. All that I propose to do in the next part of this article is to point to the original use of *physis* (that which springs up spontaneously), its assimilation into the notion of *eidos* (the formal structure of a given being), and the necessarily partial view of man that results from its moral application. But since ethics proposes to question the moral imperative of man in his living situation, an understanding of man's nature that is more complete and more original than that contained within a definition must be sought.

II

Any approach to the topic of natural law necessarily involves a preliminary discussion of terminology. This follows from the fact that since philosophy is not only thinking, but expressing thought in language, it seems that many of our philosophical "problems" might be deeply rooted in the basic fact that they are expressed in language. For this reason, and within the context of the present reflection, a brief tracing of the notion of *physis* (nature) is in order.

The word used in English translations of *physis* is "nature" (cf. "physics"), which is the Latin *natura*. But since *natura* is the passive participle of the verb *nasci* [originally *gnasci*] (to be born), it seems that the Greek root for "nature" was actually gen-, as in genesis, generate, genus--all of which contain the notion of "birth." Some change from the original Greek to the later Latin expression must have occurred.

Also, since an investigation "concerning being" is called metaphysics, it seems that the root in "physics" and in "being" should be the same. Indeed, the more one examines notions such as these, the more one sees that we may be dealing in our standard translations with attitudes that are, as Heidegger phrases it, "*schlechthin ungriechisch* (simply non-Greek)." ⁵ Listen to the initial consonant sound (with Grimm's Law in mind) and note that the Greek *physis* also is related to the Latin *vis* (power), the accusative case of which (*vim*) is used in English as the French use *elan* (impetus). Now compare this with the rather passive feeling associated with the Platonic "essence" of a thing. Note the loss of the originally perceived dynamism once we move from primordial experience toward definition.

When something exists *physei* or *kata physin* (according to nature), it is said to be opposed to what exists *nomoi* or *kata nomon* (according to law). Since the verb *nemein* (the base for *nomos*) means "to assign or to allot" (cf. to name), and since *phyomai* (the base for *physis*) means "to spring forth or to grow" (cf. neophyte), it seems that a difference lies in the fact that the *kata nomon* (being arbitrary) must have its positing explained, while the *kata physin* (being spontaneous), need not be so justified. Note also that in this distinction, the translated terms "nature" and "law" are placed as opposites. This gives rise to the impression that a juxtaposing of the two terms in the phrase "natural law" may involve a contradiction.

Similar to things that exist *kata nomon* are those that have been produced by art (*techne*). But the principle of a made-being (the product of art) is not in the made-being itself, but in another--the *architekton* (designer). ⁶ It seems, then, that one can establish the following analogy: the principle of what is produced by art is to the artist, as the principle of what is produced by law is to the lawgiver. And since what is according to nature (*physis*) differs from what is according to law (*nomos*), it seems that the principle of what is by nature is not in another, but is rather nature itself. If designers contain the principle of made-beings, then lawgivers contain the principle of laws.

When Aristotle wrote of natural things (*ta physika*), he wanted to express himself in such manner that he felt called upon to coin a word in a new philosophical usage. *Ousia* meant in everyday language "that which is lying in front of you," or "presence." What

presents itself as "lying under" (*hypo-keimenon* = sub-ject) your view is *ousia*.

But for the earlier Greeks "being" (*phyomai*) meant "appearing into the unconcealed".⁷ *Ousia* as "presence" means "revealing itself into the unconcealed." Here we see the relationship between coming to be (*phyomai*) and appearing (*phainomai*). What a thing is becomes expressible as what a thing looks like: as Heidegger puts it, *Sein* (being) and *Schein* (appearing) are considered as one. *Ousia* is taken from the present participle (*ousa*) of the verb "to be," and hence (with its active participial origin) it implies "presenting" rather than "presence" (a term larded over with passivity). This tendency to translate activities as if they were states seems to be the result of the "Platonizing" of philosophy. To be as a growing entity (*phyomai*), and to appear (*phainomai*), are both rooted in *physis*. This notion might be seen in the fact of the relationship between *phyomai* and *phos* (light)--that which comes to be spontaneously, indeed springs forth into the light of day.⁸

Martin Heidegger reminds us that the presenting of things that are according to nature (*physei onta*) occurs to us as a moving: "things that are according to nature are changing things; their being is movement (die *physei onta* sind *kinoumena*, ihr *Sein* ist die *Bewegtheit*)."⁹ *Physis* thus is seen to be "placing into appearance." Such a notion reveals that the critical problem of how to join the known object to the knowing subject was foreign to the ancient Greek mind. The rise of such a subject/object dichotomy is consequent to that age in the history of philosophy. There is no need to seek to unite what already exists in collectedness (*logos*). According to Heidegger, in the beginning of Greek philosophy "being is thought of as *physis* (das *Sein* als *physis* gedacht wird)."¹⁰

Nevertheless, the manifesting of *physis* is not complete. It always appears into the unconcealed. But the unconcealed (*Unverborgenheit*) is in Greek *aletheia* (truth), and "we are not allowed to forget that non-concealment is permeated with negativity, for *lethe* (hidden) is not only prior to *a-letheia* (un-hiding) but remains intrinsic to it at all times."¹¹ Who can summarize all this better than Heraclitus? "Being loves to hide (*physis kryptesthai philei*)."¹²

Yet despite its inclination to remain concealed, being has manifested itself to the human spirit in the course of philosophical

history. Our present concern is with the ancient Greek notion of *physis*. Let us examine the growth of this notion in the thought of those men referred to by Aristotle as those who studied nature (being ?) (*hoi physikoi*).

III

Thales, according to Simplicius, was the first man who revealed to the Greeks the investigation concerning nature (*he peri physeos historia*).¹³ As we have already mentioned, an investigation concerning *physis* is meta-physics. In this sense, Thales might be classified as a metaphysician. But his writings have not come down to us. What we know of him is by hearsay. In all that historians record of him there is however at least one statement that is for our current purposes worthy of comment.

Aristotle writes that the early thinkers searched for the *physis* from which things come to be. Among these men, Thales claimed water (*hydor*) to be such *physis*--"and hence that the earth had showed itself forth out of water--*dio kai ten gen eph' hydatos apethaineto einai*."¹⁴ Earth comes out into unconcealment from the all-encircling water (cf. Sanscrit *a-cay-an-ah* = the all-encircling, which gives us the root for "ocean") never fully e-merging, but rather leaving itself rooted in concealment. The very making-evident of earth is its being. Hence, being and appearing are in reality one.

Anaximander held that the principle (*arche*) can not be water, nor any other element, but the indeterminate (*apeiron*) from which all heaven and earth have come.¹⁵ For how could water, or air, or any determined substance be the principle of all things? Things differ in their determined states, and hence the origin of the totality can not be limited to the dry, the wet, or any other determined principle. Things seem to stand out of *to apeiron* and thus incur a penalty. In the most indisputably genuine fragment of all those attributed to Anaximander we read:

according to necessity; for they pay penalty and retribution to each other for their injustice according to the assessment of Time. (*kata to chreon. didonai gar auta diken kai tisin allelois tes adikias kata ten tou chronou toxin.*)¹⁶

While not wanting to "read history backwards" from Heidegger to Anaximander, I nonetheless regard Anaximander to be saying in effect: "As punishment for emerging as individuals from primordial unity, all must return to *apeiron* as their end." In other words, standing out (*ex-sistere*) by a kind of indulgence from what really is, demands that what ex-sists be as if it were not; this non-being of ex-sisting things is the penalty that is exacted of them for stepping into being.

In this light, Anaximander and Thales agree in saying that emergent things never quite succeed in shaking off their rooting in concealment--that every "come-to-be" being bears within itself its grounding in no-thingness. By way of moral application, I am convinced that the human person can never emerge as purely authentic. We all bear--necessarily (*kata to chreon*)--our grounding in the inauthentic. True "relative" authenticity will be our lot only when we face and come to grips with the inauthenticity that is ours.

The thinking of Xenophanes crystallizes itself concerning our topic in his belief that "what we call all things are actually one--(*henos ontos ton panton kaloumeno*)."¹⁷ We call them "all things," when in reality all is one. To rephrase this insight anachronistically in Aristotelian terms: the principles of becoming may be more than one, but the principle of being is being itself--whether *physis*, *hydor*, *apeiron*, *hen*.

As with Thales and Anaximander, with Xenophanes we can use the simile of an iceberg. A portion of the huge mass obtrudes itself out of the water, while the concealed portion provides the ground and support for the part that e-merges. Indeed, Xenophanes reminds us that the earth beneath our feet roots itself into its own origin.¹⁸ This e-mergence of earth from sea, of ex-sistent from being, is not a closed-off separation by any means. The failure of human beings to replace themselves into their ground may lead to "homelessness," but they discover their ground only in dialogue with the no-thingness of their origin. Xenophanes taught that "a mixture of the earth with the sea is going on--(*mixin tes ges pros ten thalassan ginesthai*)"¹⁹--a dialogue of Earth "face to face with" Ocean occurs.

With Heraclitus we find our original notion of *physis* as the grounding of ex-sistents, but now expressed as collectedness (*logos*). The intelligibility concerning ex-sistents can appear only if they are seen as being grounded in being, un-emerged, in

collectedness (cf. *legein* = to gather). All flow (*panta rhei*) but all are one (*hen panta*). Although ex-sistents constantly are in flux, nevertheless insofar as all are gathered in *logos* they remain one. Things are recognizable only as they appear together with their opposites. Being reveals itself in concealment; light reveals itself in collectedness (*logos*). Heraclitus calls on us to see that "an unapparent connection is stronger than an apparent one--(*harmonie aphanes phaneres kreitton*)."²⁰

Heraclitus also taught that man's experience of this collectedness of *hen panta* (all are one) occurs in "sleep," and that only when man is awake does his rational power (*dynamis logike*) gain the ascendancy.²¹ While we are asleep our breathing keeps us attached, clinging to (*prospnyseos*) being--face-to-face (*pros*) with being (*physis*)! Sleep is a type of death--death that is the ultimate *prophysis*. Our daily ex-sisting is grounded in forgetfulness (*lethe*) of *physis*. But un-forgetting (*a-letheia*) we become candid and sincere (*alethes*).

May not the well-rounded truth (*alethia eukyklos*) of Parmenides²² be a dialogue between the authentic *proshysis* of sleep with the inauthentic and seemingly ungrounded ex-sistence of wakefulness? He tells us that "the same thing exists for thinking and for being (*to gar auto noein estin te kai einai*)."²³ This is the familiar duality-grounded-in-collectedness of *phainomai/phyomai*. In what sense can Parmenides be writing in the same vein as his predecessors? For Thales ex-sistents e-merge out of being as water (*physis kai hydor*); for Anaximander all ex-sistents are drawn again by a kind of penalty into the being as indeterminateness (*physis kai apeiron*) from which they have come in injustice (*adikia*); for Xenophanes being as one (*physis kai hen*) is prior as ground to all things that we can talk of as ex-sistent; for Heraclitus it is being as collectedness (*physis kai ho logos*) that in its primordial collectedness persists while all flows (*panta rhei*). But does not the traditional rumor pose Parmenides as separating being from non-being, thus making lived time unavailing?

However, Parmenides himself seems to belie his subsequent systematizers. We need but reflect, carefully, upon the Parmenidean attitude. "One thing remains to be spoken of, that it is--*hos estin*."²⁴ What is this *it*? Of course, it must be *physis* itself. Does Parmenides deny the reality of change? No, he denies the

coming-to-be of *physis*; not the coming-to-be of growth, but the coming-to-be of the ground of growing. If the ground of coming-to-be were ever non-existent, then it would not even now be; hence, change now would be illusory. This might well be an ancient forerunner of Thomas Aquinas's third *via* of proving the existence of God.

Parmenides writes that no-thing can come from the not-being (*to me on*). No-thing-ness is the ground of being--not non-being, but no-thing-ness. In the collectedness of reason (*logos*), being (*physis*) is as yet undifferentiated. By ex-sisting, beings (*ousiai*) assume thing-ness and thus become "objects" of thinking--"the only thing that exists for thinking is the thought that it is (*tauton d'esti noein te kai houneken esti noema*)."²⁵ Indeed, expressing the thought of Parmenides in contemporary terms is not so far-fetched in this regard. He said that "thought" is forthcoming to mankind (*tos noos anthropoisi paristatai*)²⁶; being stands out in man by *nous* (mind). *Paristatai* means the same as ex-sistere and *DaSein*. The human way of standing out of *physis* is that of *nous*. For the first time, we may have a ground for later thinkers rooting moral judgment in "natural" law--human beings as human stand face-to-face with being by means of mind. If we turn our attention to the questions that arise in our special context as truly human and social beings, then we might attempt to resolve these questions by the use of what is distinctively human in us, namely, mind or reason.

These reflections are continued in the thinking of Empedocles, who said "but think on each thing in the way by which it is manifest (*noei d'e delon hekaston*)."²⁷ Despite all his seeming pluralism, Empedocles nevertheless writes that "whole-natured forms first sprang up (*oulophyeis exanetellon*)."²⁸ In contemporary terms this may be rendered as "integral beings first ex-sisted." *Physis* is thus the principle even with Empedocles.

But there is a tendency, evident in an examination such as our current one, toward a diversification in explanation as we proceed toward Plato and Aristotle. The move away from a sympathetic intuition of *physis* (being) toward a more minute analytic understanding of *physika* (physical things) becomes even more pronounced in Anaxagoras. Where former authors had written *pan* (the all), he writes *panta chremata* (all things).²⁹ They had viewed being as *totum* (a whole); he views beings as *omnes* (all things). In

one frame of reference we might call Anaxagoras the father of ontic philosophy, i.e., the tendency to look on being as individual things, thus emphasizing their differences rather than their commonality.

As cursory as this survey of the notion of *physis* may be, there are several points that nonetheless arise by way of conclusion. First, there is a monistic strain in the pre-Socratic philosophers. The only principle that occupies center-stage is *physis*, be it expressed as water, the indeterminate, the one, collectedness, or mind. Second, *physis* is obviously not apart from man--something to be studied by an objectively remote "knower." *Physis* appears as the ground of every being, including man. Sympathetic intuition might be a far better approach to grasping this pre-Socratic notion of *physis* than discursive reason. Third, there seems to be a progressive move away from such primordial experience of being toward a rather analytic view of the ex-sistents. All in all, a study of the so-called pre-Socratic thinkers must be carried out with at least an attempt at the sympathetic intuition that so characterized their own approach.

IV

Largely because of the influence of the Pythagoreans, at Plato's Academy the program began with mathematics, the eternal and unchanging truths of which led to an attitude in philosophy: the sensible world of flux is uncertain; science is possible only in the world of eternal and immutable truth. The question of *physis*, raised by Plato's predecessors, is sought no longer in its origin, but in its result. The Good, acting as motivating end, draws all beings to itself. Following the lead of Alcmaeon, a Pythagorean, Plato held that complete knowledge (*episteme*) is in the realm of eternal truths, while opinion (*doxa*) is all that one can expect in the world of sensible reality. Note the predominantly mathematical outlook here, when one finds truth only in unchanging and eternal essences.

For Plato, ideal knowledge of a thing is the expression of its essence (*eidos*). The Greek verb of this word is *eido* or *Fido*, which is the same root in Latin for both *video* (I see) and *fides* (faith). Another word that Plato used for this concept was *idea*, which also means "result of vision." One can see, then, how misleading it is to speak of "the world of Ideas" in Plato. For Plato, an *idea* was the manifest visibility of what really is. The *idea* was embodied in matter somewhat in the manner of a prisoner in a cage.

This "essence" in the realm of law was for Plato the true law that remains forever the same. Positive laws are subject to change, but their legal force depends upon their participation in the true, in the eternal law. But how can absolutes serve in any practical way as a standard for human acts? And how can the Absolute so serve?³⁰ Because Plato saw that it could not so serve, he placed the emphasis upon the value of the human acts rather than upon their participation in the end, or upon what is now called deontological (*deon* = that which is binding) rather than upon teleological (*telos* = goal, end or purpose) ethics.

Much of the subsequent teaching of natural law was to rely upon Platonic insights.³¹ But Aquinas's classic treatise on law (the culminating point of the current essay) was to emphasize Aristotelian notions and vocabulary. Therefore, it is important that we now look at *physis* in the thought of Aristotle.

V

A man is said to be by *physis* (nature), but a bed is not. This is true simply because man comes to be from man, whereas a bed does not come to be from a bed.³² What then is the *physis* of a bed? It is the wood, just as that of a statue is its bronze.³³ Wood comes from wood; man comes from man; but beds do not come from beds. All of this seems so obvious. But, if it is obvious, why does Sartre tend to equate the "essence" of a paper-knife with its technical aspects?³⁴ It is because he is using the Platonic *eidos* rather than the notion of "nature" which he is trying to exclude from the vocabulary concerning man.

It is true to say that *physis* is a principle (*arche*) of a being. But this is not so of a "made" being (*poioumenon*). The *arche* of a "made" being is *techne*, which resides not in the "made" being itself, but in another--the designer (*architekton*).³⁵ The eternal law as prototype of natural law is in the context of man as a "made" being. Hence, natural law in this sense deals with law as art (*techne*) rather than as *physis*.

But the teachings of Thomas Aquinas concerning natural law did not follow immediately upon those of Aristotle. The influence of the Stoic tradition on subsequent moral philosophy cannot be overlooked. And as we shall see, Aquinas wrote within the context of the

Judaeo-Christian notion of divine creation, a concept quite remote from the ancient Greeks.

VI

Happiness for the Stoic consists in a life lived according to nature. Conforming your life to the laws of the universe is the same as conforming it to man's essential nature, reason (*logos*). This is to live a life similar to that of Zeus, who governs the entire universe by his mind eternally. Christianity, in the age of its expansion throughout the Greek-speaking world, adopted not only the language but also many of the concepts, metaphors and connotations of Hellenic tradition.³⁶ And among these notions is the moral teaching of the Stoics.

The early Stoics said, "Live according to nature." They meant, "Follow the divinely-appointed order of the universe." To be virtuous, one had to conform one's life to the rule of reason, which is a voluntary acceptance of the eternal *status quo* deterministically ordained by Zeus.

VII

We now skip over many years to the person responsible for what is perhaps the Western world's most remarkable treatise on law, Thomas Aquinas. In it he discusses the topic of natural law in some depth. My purpose here, a consideration of the usual terminology used in philosophical reflection on natural law, will limit the look at his teachings to those points that touch upon this theme.

Thomas Aquinas sees the human person as a being who properly acts according to reason (*ratio*).³⁷ But it pertains to *ratio* to move from what is common to what is proper. Speculative *ratio* deals with what is necessary³⁸; practical *ratio* deals with what is contingent. It is in the latter domain that we find human actions. Among practical affairs there is not universal truth or practical rectitude in particular matters, but only in those that are common.³⁹

By uniting these two notions--(a) that man by *ratio* moves from the common to the proper, and (b) that universal truth and practical rectitude are found only in the common--we might conclude the following (and indeed Aquinas does so conclude): proper conclusions of practical *ratio* are neither necessarily possessed of

universal truth and practical rectitude, nor are they known equally by all.⁴⁰

Thus does Aquinas regard man's practical *ratio* as that by means of which he governs his personal conduct. But is this natural law? No, for law is what binds one, and is not the means by which one distinguishes the extent of that binding.⁴¹

There are places in which Aquinas discusses natural law as it pertains not to practical *ratio*, but to the speculative. It is in such places that natural law is explained as being a reflection of eternal law.⁴² It must be remembered, however, that insofar as natural law is discovered by human beings in reflecting upon themselves as sources of moving and acting, they regard "nature" as Aristotle's *physis*. Hence, in using the notion of "human nature" in moral (practical) reasoning, we must look at the way man emerges into the world of thing-ness, that is, as a social being whose actions are intertwined with those of his neighbor. This is why the abstract definition (*eidos*) of man is not the "nature" to be used as the principle of moral reasoning, but rather is it man's proper, living way of being in the world.

As we have noted, we do much better to speak of art (*techne*) when dealing with "made" beings than to speak of nature (*physis*). Therefore, when Aquinas calls natural law a rational creature's participation in the divine eternal law, he is thinking of man as "made" ("created," in the Christian context) being, and hence he is speaking as a theologian.⁴³ This is the reason for his grounding his discussion of natural law in that of eternal law, and saying that God can not be left out of consideration when dealing with the topic of man's consideration of natural law.

Therein lies one of our problems today. We who profess the truth of Christianity and its revealed expressions of the mind of God toward man, must take care not to try to rely upon the transcendent splendor of the Self-manifesting God to lend fire to our use of the philosophical notion of natural law. Natural law does not lie dormant in us awaiting merely being seen to be obeyed.

Through our study of Aristotle's critique of Plato we must see that the Absolute cannot serve in any practical way as a standard for human acts. Accordingly, although the eternal wisdom of God can be called the ground of natural law when the latter is being considered as a subject of speculative thought, nevertheless the wis-

dom of God cannot be the proximate principle of our concrete moral judgments.

The tendency of equating the speculative and practical aspects of natural law is, in my opinion, one of the reasons that modern man tends to discard the entire notion of natural law. Sartre's objection is a case in point. But merely because someone chooses to regard "nature" in but a single sense, there is no need for rejecting the entire notion of natural law.

With the pre-Socratics we can regard "nature" as signifying primarily the source of all ex-sistents. Human "nature," in the practical order, is the source of human acts--that by virtue of which the human person acts properly as human. Thus, we are led to look for this "nature" in the source of human acts, i.e., in our social condition and social relationships.

With Aristotle we see "nature" as a principle distinct from Plato's "form" (*eidos*), leaving to the latter the notions of exemplar, model, pre-existing "essence," etc. "Nature" is the principle of spontaneous coming-to-be, and in practical matters the nature of the human person is the manifestation of his spontaneous appetite--an appetite that needs to be controlled in our social setting by reason and by moral habits.

We might conclude with Aquinas then that even though there is unanimity in basic moral positions that are based on the most evident principles, there will not necessarily be unanimity in movements of judgment from common to proper unless there be a common substratum of custom, emphasis on moral virtue, and careful functioning of *prudentia*.

Education, therefore, so far as it affects the moral life of human beings, should lay its emphasis on the substratum (*physis*) rather than upon the more rarefied intellectual superstructure (*eidos*). In practical terms, this means that the road to moral behavior lies far more in the grounding of the moral virtues than in a detailed analysis of moral decision-making.

SEE NEXT PAGE FOR NOTES

NOTES

¹ Despite my insistence upon the validity of natural law as a moral criterion, I do not mean to disregard the trend in ethics called "situation ethics." At least etymologically, a total disregard may be foolhardy. "Ethics" is the English form of the Greek *ethos* (moral character), which as *ethos* (custom, usage) is related to *hedos* (one's seat, abode, foundation). Hence, the Latin *sedes* (seat) and *situs* (place), as used in the word "situation," is not so remote from "ethics" as one may think.

² Jean-Paul Sartre, *Existentialism and Humanism* (tr. Philip Mairet). (London: Methuen, 1948) 45-6. Emphasis Sartre's.

³ Sartre 46. Emphasis Sartre's; parentheses mine.

⁴ Sartre 26-7.

⁵ Martin Heidegger, "Vom Wesen und Begriff der *Physis Aristoteles Physik B1*." *Il Pensiero* III (1958) 2:134.

⁶ Heidegger 141.

⁷ Heidegger 156.

⁸ Cf. the Sanscrit *bhu* and Indo-European **bheu*, from which derive both "being" and "*physis*" (see also Latin *fui* [perfect stem of "to be"]).

⁹ Heidegger III 3:275.

¹⁰ Heidegger 288.

¹¹ William Richardson, S.J., "Heidegger and the Origin of Language." *International Philosophical Quarterly* II (1962) 407.

¹² Fragment 23 as found in G. Kirk and J. Raven, *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers* (Cambridge: University Press, 1957). *Lethe* (hidden); *letheia* (state of being hidden); *a-letheia* (uncovering the hiddenness) 193 (#211). This work is hereafter referred to as K & R.

¹³ K & R 84 (#83).

¹⁴ *Meta* 983b19; also in K & R 87 (#87).

¹⁵ K & R 106 (#103A).

¹⁶ K & R 107 (#103A).

¹⁷ *Sophist* 242D; also in K & R 165 (#166).

¹⁸ "but its underneath continues indefinitely (*to kato d'es apeiron hikneitai*)." K & R 175 (#183).

¹⁹ K & R 177 (#187).

²⁰ K & R 193 (#210).

21 K & R 207 (#237).

22 K & R 267 (#342).

23 K & R 269 (#344, line 8).

24 K & R 273 (#347, line 2).

25 K & R 277 (#352, line 1).

26 K & R 282 (#357).

27 K & R 325 (#419, line 13).

28 K & R 338 (#448).

29 K & R 368 (#496).

30 See Jacques Maritain, *Moral Philosophy* (tr. M. Suther et al). (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964) 25.

31 Cf. the Stoic use of *lex aeterna*, *recta ratio*, *lex naturalis* (eternal law, right reason, natural law).

32 *Phys* 193b7-8.

33 *Phys* 193a12.

34 "Let us say, then, of the paper-knife that its essence--that is to say the sum of the formulae and the qualities which made its production and its definition possible--precedes its existence. The presence of such-and-such a paper-knife or book is thus determined before my very eyes. Here, then, we are viewing the world from a technical standpoint and we can say that production precedes existence." Sartre 26-7.

35 Heidegger 141.

36 See on this the essay of Werner Jaeger, *Early Christianity and Greek Paideia*. (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1961) 6.

37 "it is proper to man that he be inclined toward acting according to reason (*homini proprium est ut inclinetur ad agendum secundum rationem*)." *S. Th.* I-II, q. 94. a. 4 c. *Ratio*, usually translated as "reason," must be read in context. Originally it was the Latin rendering of the Greek *logos*. "Reason" if it be interpreted solely as a post-Cartesian mental manipulation, cannot be reconciled with such texts as: "the divine 'reason' conceives of nothing from out of time." *S. Th.* I-II, q. 91, a. 1 c. "Conceives (*concipit*) implies the insight of understanding, which is usually referred to as *intellectus*, which in Greek is *nous*."

38 "which cannot possibly be otherwise (*quae impossibile est aliter se habere*)." *S. Th.* I-II, q. 94, a. 4 c.

39 "in operative matters, however, there is not the same [universal] truth or practical rectitude with all things so far as they are geared toward the proper, but only as they are geared toward the common (*in operativis autem non est eadem veritas vel rectitudo practica apud omnes quantum ad propria, sed solum quantum ad communia*)." *S. Th.* I-II, q. 94, a. 4 c.

40 "there is not the same [universal] truth or rectitude with all things; nor even with them is the same thing equally known (*non est eadem veritas seu rectitudo apud omnes; nec etiam apud quos est eadem, est aequaliter nota*)." *S. Th.* I-II, q. 94, a. 4 c.

41 The Greek *nomos*, from the verb *nemein*, implies "being hemmed in or under restraint." Notice the root **nem-* in "nemesis" (one who hems me in), "numismatics" (setting the value upon a coin), "numerus" (having a set given value). Aquinas uses the Latin *lex*, which in the sense of "that which is laid down" (cf. German *legen*) is the equivalent of *nomos*.

42 "the light of natural reason, by which we discern what is good and what evil that pertains to the natural law, is nothing other than an impression of the divine light within us (*lumen rationis naturalis, quo discernimus quid sit bonum et quid malum, quod pertinet ad naturalem legem, nihil aliud sit quam impressio divini luminis in nobis*)." *S. Th.* I-II, q. 91, a. 2 c.

43 "But God is the builder through his wisdom, of all things, much as the artisan compared with his artifacts." *S. Th.* I-II, q. 93, a. 1 c.

INTERPRETING NATURAL SCIENCE

William Kramer, C.PP.S.

The celebration of the centennial of the founding of Saint Joseph's College should include an appreciation of the progress of natural science in the past hundred years as seen from the classrooms of a college of this kind. It was truly a century of progress, not only in the practical applications of science which have changed the living habits of the world--from Edison's first carbon bulb in 1891 to total dependence on electricity, from Doctor Ehrlich's first synthetic drug Salvarsan to organ transplants and genetic engineering--but especially in the basic discoveries and new theories which have revolutionized science and changed thinking and teaching habits in colleges.

The first instructors at Saint Joseph's College were nearly all priests of the Society of the Precious Blood, educated in the classics and traditional philosophy and theology, capable of leading the students into these areas of the world of ideas. But natural science was fast being integrated into college and university curricula, so that the express purpose of the College of giving "Catholic young men a solid and complete classical and commercial education" had to be expanded to include science. Accordingly, Father Ignatius Wagner (1883-1958) was sent to the Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C., from 1908 to 1912 to obtain a doctorate in chemistry, the first doctorate in either the College or the Society of the Precious Blood. For his thesis he studied polymerization, and would recall somewhat ruefully forty years later that his work paralleled that of Leo Baekeland who would come on stream a few years later with the highly successful Bakelite. Father Wagner's teaching career was cut short when his talents took him into administration, as Prefect of studies, as College President, then as Provincial of the Society of the Precious Blood. In all of these positions he laid the foundations of the science program of the College.

Even though he spent only a few years in the classroom, we shall imagine that Father Wagner taught science for a hundred years and ask how the world of science would look to someone with his background in the classics and Catholic thought. He will be our

model of the interpreter of science, since a teacher is necessarily an interpreter. To understand is to make the connection between a new perception and what is already in the mind. To explain is to make the connection between a new idea and what is already in the minds of the students. To interpret is to do both against the background of the interpreter's previous experience, culture, and philosophy.

1. STUDYING NATURE

As we survey the century of science as interpreted from this classical viewpoint we may observe first that in natural science nature is the focal point of attention. To "study science" or "know science" involves a pleonasm, since science already means knowledge. But the study of science may also be taken as the study of the theories by which nature is understood. Discoveries about nature are permanent acquisitions if correctly observed, whereas theories are only temporary and destined to be revised or replaced.

A liberal arts reading of recent discoveries can hardly avoid waxing poetical. The narrative of the latest unveiling of nature is borne on a sense of awe that reaches back to the earliest human experience of the natural world and should reach a new high in our century that to an unprecedented degree saw the magnificent gesture of Creation open up into the incredibly vast, the inconceivably small, the unimaginably old, and the overwhelmingly intense. It will strike the observer that the major discoveries were largely unanticipated, not predicted on the basis of previous knowledge. Nature appears singular--an "unexpected universe," Loren Eiseley calls it. Yet "the sky above and the mud below" look pretty much as they did a hundred years ago. The new is seen only through complex instruments and elaborate constructs.

2. THE ATOM

To begin our reading with the very small, the atomic theory of 1890 was still hypothetical. It remained essentially what it had been for Roger Bacon in the thirteenth century, "either true, or useful for demonstration." Leading physicists like Faraday, Mach, and Boltzmann did not accept it. The atom had never been isolated to

show that it was an individual particle; it was not observed, and observability had by this time become the criterion of reality.

This situation changed in the 1890s when J.J. Thomson in the Cavendish Laboratories climaxed decades of experimentation on cathode rays by measuring on them the ratio of mass to charge using electrical and magnetic fields. A decade later Robert Millikan at the University of Chicago (he had attended a small college, Oberlin) measured the charge of individual particles in his oil droplet experiment. Thus the electrically charged component of matter was shown to be massive and particulate.

The clincher was supplied after Henri Becquerel at the Sorbonne discovered radioactivity in 1897. Ernest Rutherford in England was able to count the emerging alpha particles as they formed measurable amounts of helium gas, thus linking particles and atomicity with an apparently continuous form of matter, helium gas. In the early years of the twentieth century the diffraction of X-rays by crystals showed that crystalline substances exist in layers of the same dimensions as Rutherford's atoms.

Thus in the early part of our century the atomic theory of John Dalton and his distant forerunners of about 500 B.C., Leucippus and Democritus in Greece as well as the Vaiseshika School in India, was established as a fact of nature insofar as matter can be separated into particles of definite magnitude and properties. Ironically the fact was established at the cost of the original idea of the atom ("unsplittable"), since the experiments were carried out on the split-off parts of the atom, the electrons and the nuclei. The early years of our century saw atomicity established as a fact, and as the heart of chemical science.

The student of the atom would marvel at its extreme smallness. A hundred million atoms could line up across a postage stamp and it would take years to count them one by one. The hundred million piled in a heap would still be invisible under a microscope. Rutherford showed that the nucleus is still smaller by a wide margin. He bombarded metal foil with alpha particles, the nuclei of helium, and observed that most of them went straight through without hitting anything, but that a few were deflected by the massive metal nucleus, some almost straight back. His surprise was registered in the remark that it was as if you had shot a fifteen-inch cannon at a sheet of tissue paper and the shell bounced back and hit you. From this result he calculated that the nuclear diameter was

about one hundred-thousandth that of the atom, and therefore the nucleus occupied less than a trillionth of the volume of the atom. The surprising fact of nature is that only a miniscule part of the atom is matter as we understand it on the billiard ball model. But the rest is not empty space. It is an intense field of physical energy, as is the vast space between the stars.

The second surprising revelation about the nucleus was the great energy involved in its changes compared to the more familiar electron exchanges in combustion and explosions. A measure of nuclear energy was obtained from the force needed to deflect radioactive particles. Then in 1939, Hahn, Strassman, and Meitner discovered that Uranium-235 would absorb slow neutrons and split down the middle, releasing more neutrons capable of feeding a chain reaction of enormous energy. The nuclear power age was born, ushering in fifty years of division between sanguine expectation and morbid fear.

The discovery that stable matter was made up of protons, neutrons, and electrons brought to a successful conclusion the search for the atom, the stable unit of matter under ordinary earth conditions. But high energy brought more surprises. For one, as predicted by Paul Dirac sixty years ago, for every subatomic particle there can be an antiparticle, and when the two meet they annihilate each other in a burst of radiant energy. High energy atom smashers have raised the number of "fundamental" but unstable particles to about a hundred. Obviously the system still holds secrets, so supercolliders are in the works to find out what will happen next, and to probe the energies involved in the "Big Bang" that is supposed to have launched the universe.

3. THE MACRO WORLD

The heavenly bodies in their regular courses have always inspired wonder, and a liberal arts approach to modern astronomy should continue to do so. The West looks to Mesopotamia for the beginning of astronomy as a science of the orderly changes in the heavens. The Greeks had the scientific acumen and the skill in geometry to measure the size of the earth and the distances to the sun and the moon. The telescope in the hands of Galileo brought the heavenly bodies down to earth by showing that they were made of earthy material. The heliocentric system of Aristarchus finally

came into favor after Copernicus and Galileo. The telescope also showed that the fixed stars were enormously distant and actually not fixed but in motion, and that the Milky Way consists of myriads of stars so distant that they show up as mere points of light in any telescope. In the nineteenth century the starlight was analyzed into spectral lines, revealing the chemical composition of the heavenly bodies along with their temperatures.

But the second revolution in astronomy (if the Copernican revolution is considered the first) took place in the century we are celebrating. About 1905 Henrietta Leavitt at the Harvard College Observatory studied the stars of variable brightness, the cepheids, in the Lesser Magellanic Cloud, and connected their periods with their absolute brightness. This allowed estimates of the distances of other galaxies, and the island universe came to light. The Doppler shift in the stellar spectrum toward the red, compared to the spectrum of the same elements on earth, showed that the galaxies are receding. So the island universe is an expanding universe, and the galaxies, now numbered in the billions, are thought to be receding at a velocity proportional to their distance, which is measured in billions of light years. They make dazzling photographs with time exposure but remain invisible to the eye, even through a telescope.

To this awesome panorama must be added the results of nuclear studies pointing to reactions that fuel the stars and reveal their life history, from novae and supernovae to white dwarfs, neutron stars, and the bizarre black holes. The repertoire of observational methods has expanded to embrace the whole electromagnetic spectrum, from cosmic rays and X-rays to radio waves. It is a sobering thought, however, that astronomical observation must always take place from afar, across distances that can be traversed in a lifetime only in imagination. Galactic space travel remains pure fantasy, science fiction. All we know tells us that in this life we are confined to our wee spot in the universe.

For geology the discovery of radioactivity provided a measure of the age of the earth, 4.5 billion years, by chance also the half life of the principal uranium isotope. But the story of the century is continental drift explained by plate tectonics. Convection currents in the viscous mantle of the earth rearrange large plates of the more rigid outer shell, like crusts on a simmering soup, moving continents to entirely new positions over millions of years. The process causes earthquakes where plates slide against each other, exposes weak

points to volcanic eruption, and forms mountain chains and deep ocean troughs where one plate plunges under another.

The surprise in continental drift is not that the "everlasting hills" are changing, but that the theory proposed by Wegner and others at the beginning of the century on the basis of structural and fossil similarities on separated continents such as Africa and South America, and which explains so many things so well, should have spent most of the century in the anteroom of science. In 1990, however, plate tectonics rests on solid experimental grounds and the process of continental drift is well documented, being measured by satellite in centimeters per year.

In biology of prime interest to the general science of nature was the rediscovery of Mendel's research in genetics, then the elucidation of the DNA molecule along with discoveries in paleontology, which established evolution as a great unifying theory in science.

4. THE GROWTH OF THEORY

The science which opens nature to discovery is not a collection of observations but theory, the system of ideas which enable us to understand nature; and over the past century the theory has been as full of surprises as nature itself. Theory and discovery are of course interpreted differently. Discoveries are of the real world, subject to correction by more accurate observation. Theories exist in the mind and are judged by their ability to explain the real world. The great age of the earth, for example, is an extramental fact, so well established by this time that only die-hard creationists reject it; whereas natural selection, which is also observable in the real world, is basically a theory called upon to explain the evolution of species, and as an explanatory theory its adequacy is open to question.

In the past century there arose two theories that stand tall among the all-time great achievements of the human mind, the theory of relativity and the quantum theory, the first developed by Einstein almost single-handedly, and the second by the merging of many sources in several schools. The small-college professor had little input into these theories. They were produced by postgraduates, usually in their twenties. Among those who achieved breakthroughs before they were thirty we may mention Einstein, Curie, DeBroglie, Heisenberg, and Dirac. Most of them spent the rest of

their lives trying to interpret what they had wrought, and in this endeavor the liberal arts professor joins them, driven by the need to make sense of the theories and to guide the student.

5. RELATIVITY

The special theory of relativity tackles a paradox, one of nature's surprises. The wave nature of light is shown by its interference behavior, and other known waves travel in a material medium which keeps its own position relative to the source of the wave. The water waves caused by a slow boat, for example, move away from the boat faster in the rear than in front, since the water stands still. In 1887, Michelson and Morley at Case School of Applied Science in Cleveland showed convincingly that light moves from a source and approaches a detector at the same speed in any direction as the earth moves through space. There is no evidence of a medium or "ether" which stands still.

In 1905, Einstein, not very busy with his job at the Bern patent office, found time to formulate the special theory of relativity, which has been called the most absolute of all physical theories, and which he himself called the theory of invariance, since it rests on the idea that the speed of light yields to nothing but remains invariant at 300,000 kilometers a second relative to any source and any receiver in the universe. All other measurements must yield to it in the statements of the laws of nature. In particular space and time become relative to the velocity of the observer.

The professor in charge of looking out the window of a small college emphasizing the classical heritage may recall that the ancients thought of space and time as relative. Space is the measure of bodies which occupy a certain amount of it, and it is measured by other bodies like yardsticks. It has no existence of its own as an independent trelliswork. Time similarly is a measure of movement made by comparing it to other regular movements like the earth's rotation or the hands of a clock, and outside of moving bodies time is only imaginary. Newtonian mechanics introduced the idea of space as a kind of Cartesian coordinate system with an existence independent of bodies, and time was an arrow moving relentlessly onward. As Newton saw it

Absolute space, in its own nature, without relation to anything external, remains always similar and immovable. Relative space is some movable dimension or measure of the absolute space, which our senses determine by its position to bodies . . . Absolute time . . . of itself and from its own nature, flows equably and without relation to anything external. (6)

It was this Newtonian absolute space and time that Einstein superseded. He did not, however, return to the primitive relativity of space and time to bodies and movement but made them relative to the absolute speed of light.

Relativity gets along without the stationary ether but rests on an even more cryptic reality, the electromagnetic field, which lacks the usual material properties of mass and viscosity. Light seems to be waves of nothingness, and the field the nothing which waves. Nevertheless the electromagnetic field is a physical reality whose properties are revealed by the behavior of the radiation found in it.

Its properties are indeed singular. All radiation in the field is understood as the result of the relative movement of electrical charges. If the negative charge is considered in motion, the usual case, then the left-hand rule is followed. If the left thumb points in the direction of the electron movement, then the index finger points to the north pole of a magnetic field and the radiation moves out at right angles to both. Why doesn't the index finger point to the south pole? Right- and left-handedness are often singular choices in nature, and nowhere is this more striking than in the ubiquitous and fundamental electromagnetic field, which carries signals with great precision to every corner of the universe. Things might have been reversed. Electromagnetism is one of the wonders of nature, as well as one of its enigmas.

Einstein proceeded from the Special to the General Theory of Relativity, which involved rewriting the laws of gravitation. Newton's great achievement had been to bring the heavenly bodies down to earth by showing that they obey the same laws of matter as bodies on earth. The force that makes the apple fall is the same as the force that keeps the moon in orbit around the earth. Inertia and gravitation are common to earthly and astral bodies. Newton left open the question of what causes the apple to fall, since there is no observable connection between the earth and the apple. The ancients could say only that it was the natural movement of heavy

bodies to fall. Newton supposed the cause to be a force acting across a distance. Force acting at a distance is a non-explanation of the cause, even though it is a satisfactory model for calculation and for predicting the behavior of massive bodies in Newtonian mechanics. Einstein was able to show that the model of force acting at a distance is not necessary. Gravitation could be accounted for by inertial motion in a space-time continuum that curved in the vicinity of mass. There is no force pulling the apple; it just keeps moving as it had been moving until somebody's hand forced it to change that motion by holding it up.

Relativity surely stands out as a brilliant theory. It achieves its triumph, however, only by using a complex, four-dimensional space-time geometry, a geometry of events rather than space, for which there is no more direct experience in nature than there is for Newtonian absolute space. Both the Newtonian and the relativity theories are successful in the task assigned to them, but they leave many unanswered questions about the connection between geometric abstraction and the real world.

6. QUANTUM THEORY

The principle of relativity also enters the micro-world of the atom; but the central theory in that domain is the quantum theory, which arose out of the surprising discovery that electromagnetic vibrations require a definite bundle or quantum of energy to come into existence, and the higher the frequency the larger the bundle. Back in the 1890s the theory that electromagnetic radiation is produced by the oscillation of electric charges led to the apparently inescapable conclusion that if the energy is distributed randomly among all possible frequencies, very little would appear in the visible range. The situation was called the "ultraviolet catastrophe"--a catastrophe, since obviously the real world shows plenty of visible light and makes the theory look bad. Experimentally it was known that radiation from a hot body peaks in intensity at a frequency that is proportional to the temperature, a fact familiar to anyone who speaks of "red hot" or "white hot." In 1900, Max Planck salvaged the oscillator theory by inserting the quantum condition: a given frequency will show up only if it acquires a minimum amount of action (energy times time). The

minimum rises with frequency, so that at low temperatures and low energy it is less probable that high frequencies will be found.

In the mid 1920s the quantum theory of the atom undertook to account for a number of singular facts of nature, the principal ones being: 1) the periodic system of the elements; 2) the converging energy levels of the spectral lines of hydrogen; 3) the photoelectric effect--light knocking electrons out of metals, as it does in light meters; and 4) the Compton effect--rays bouncing off of electrons as though both were little particles like billiard balls, but the X-rays changing to lower frequencies as they lose energy in the process. (Arthur Compton, by the way, went to Wooster College, so small colleges are again represented.) Louis DeBroglie at the Sorbonne came out with the idea that small massive particles like electrons have wave properties, and he proposed a quantitative relationship. Merging the data into a reliable mathematical model was done from two starting points. Erwin Schroedinger in Zurich used nineteenth-century wave equations and added quantum conditions to reproduce the properties of the atom, while the Copenhagen school applied matrix mechanics to the observable data to achieve the same result.

Out of the Copenhagen school came the controversial indeterminacy theory of Werner Heisenberg, first published in 1927. Writing in 1958, he states that:

One could not fix both quantities [the position and the velocity of the electron] simultaneously with an arbitrarily high accuracy. Actually the product of these two inaccuracies turned out to be not less than Planck's constant divided by the mass of the particle. . . . These [relations] are usually called relations of uncertainty or principle of indeterminacy. (42)

At this point the common sense professor begins to shake his head in disbelief. Uncertainty and indeterminacy are not synonyms, in either German or English. Indeterminacy means that the objective world is not fixed, whereas uncertainty means we are not sure what the objective reality is. Yet Heisenberg equates inaccessibility with nonexistence, even in 1958, after thirty years of further consideration. A light wave short enough to "see" the position of an electron has enough energy to kick it somewhere else.

The light quantum is sufficient to knock the electron out of the atom and one can never observe more than one point in the orbit of the electron; therefore, there is no orbit in the ordinary sense. (48)

In 1934, seven years after Heisenberg's theory was published, the situation was ably reviewed by an alumnus of Saint Joseph's College, Father Joseph Marling, later Bishop, in his doctoral thesis in philosophy at Catholic University of America. Highlights of his criticism are these:

The illogical leap is from an epistemic to an ontological state; the equation of the physically unobservable to the ontologically nonexistent. The mere fact that nature sets up a temporary or even a permanent barrier to our observation does not transfer the indefiniteness, the void, from the realm of experience to the extramental world. (139)

Father Marling points out that the indeterminists of the Copenhagen school insist that the electron is scattered every time, not randomly or indeterminately, and they are not uncertain about this.

These are evidently determined events; they occur universally and necessarily or Heisenberg's conclusion is invalid. Moreover the error of computation as to position and velocity is admitted to alternate in strictly even fashion. The greater the precision attained as to velocity, that much less is the accuracy with regard to position. The product of both uncertainties can never be less than Planck's constant, h . It is difficult to see anything but a pronounced determinism and causal activity in all this. (141)

He cites the opposition of both Planck and Einstein to indeterminacy. Einstein's objection comes down to us in the famous saying, "God does not play with dice." Since Einstein remained agnostic concerning a divinity outside of nature (11), the above theological statement probably expresses his most profound religious faith.

Our professor might not object to saying that God plays with dice as long as the dice have a proper shape that allows them to follow the determinate laws of chance. We find this kind of chance operating in many natural phenomena, such as the weather and genetic mutation. But in these familiar instances we assume the operation of ordinary mechanical causes. Opponents of the indeterminacy theory in quantum mechanics, like Einstein and DeBroglie, labored to construct a deterministic mechanics for subatomic phenomena, but they did not succeed, whereas the statistical method of the Copenhagen school solves problems. The common sense view might be that nature at this level does not clamor for complete determinacy in terms of wave or particle which exaggerated nineteenth century materialism took for granted. Subatomic particles lie on the fringes of material existence and need not fit a familiar model. On the other hand the indeterminacy calculations, for all their success, cannot tell us that what is beyond the reach of observation does not exist in reality. They show at most that particles behave as if they were indeterminate, much as gravity behaves as if it were a force pulling across empty space.

7. LOGICAL POSITIVISM

By this time a teacher like Father Wagner with a background in the history of philosophy has undoubtedly traced the habit of confusing uncertainty of knowledge with indeterminacy in nature to the ideas of Ernst Mach and the Vienna Circle of logical positivism at the end of the last century and the beginning of this. He himself probably follows the classical scholastic theory that all human knowledge comes through the senses and becomes ideas through the process of abstraction, which is beyond the powers of any but the human species. Ideas of other people are transmitted by hearing or reading or through other symbols like art. This common sense view keeps ideas and reality neatly distinct. The two cars we might see parked in front of the house are real cars, but the idea of car and the idea of two exist only in the mind. The connecting of ideas in the mind is called logic. The logic that connects numbers is mathematics. Mathematics is a powerful tool for dealing with quantitative reality, but the real world is not reduced to a sequence of pointer readings gathered into equations. Again, logic links cause and effect inextricably: a cause is what produces an effect and an

effect is what is produced by a cause. The logic exists only in the mind, but there is a corresponding connection of cause and effect in real things. Otherwise not only could we not *know* how those two cars came to be front of the house, but no human being would have been able to drive them there, much less manufacture them.

The odd notion that the human mind cannot know causes goes back to David Hume (1711-76), who was otherwise considered a sensible and kindly gentleman. He argued that we know only what the senses tell us, the sequence of observable events, not cause and effect in the real world. In fact scientists talk of cause and effect routinely, but often shy away from their universal meaning, perhaps to avoid being drawn into four-syllable taboos like metaphysics, philosophy, and medieval scholasticism. Hume continued to be quoted uncritically into the twentieth century, and Ernst Mach concludes even more dogmatically, "Cause and effect are . . . things of the mind" (581).

The Vienna Circle of Fiegl, Frank, *et.al.*, refined Mach by saying that a statement about nature that went beyond the immediately observable was without meaning. It merely expressed a subjective attitude, like a sigh or a grunt. The influence of this philosophy on individuals in intellectual circles of Europe and America might be hard to trace in detail, but conceptually it is not a far leap from Mach and Fiegl to the idea that what remains unobservable is nonexistent. With a sigh of resignation our professor may concede that it is not necessary to follow a sensible general theory of knowledge to progress by leaps and bounds in a particular science.

8. COSMIC HISTORY

Scientific theories are of course tested internally for consistency and agreement with the evidence by using the methods on which they are based. Liberal arts professors tend to assess them externally on historical and philosophical grounds. This is especially true of the cosmological speculation of the second half of our century. As astronomers peer farther into space and atom smashers produce more strange particles, theoretical physicists are reaching deeper into time to reconstruct the first microseconds after the Big Bang of some fifteen to twenty billion years ago. Prominent in this endeavor is the Englishman, Stephen Hawking, crippled with Lou Gehrig disease, who went popular in 1988 with *A Brief History*

of Time, from the Big Bang to Black Holes. Hawking is an expert on the theory of black holes, which, since they are black, holding in light by the force of gravity, have eluded the test of direct evidence; they have not been seen. He tells us how by combining relativity and indeterminacy theory he reached the conclusion that black holes may not be irreversible, but may evaporate slowly by radiating energy on the indeterminacy principle.

The college professor approaching the frontier of theoretical physics is like David venturing into the field of Goliath. The leaders in this pursuit are intellectual giants trained from their youth to wield mathematical physics, while the latecomer can muster only a few pebbles and a sling. Fifty years ago relativity was an equally exclusive domain, when Sir Arthur Eddington is supposed to have remarked that he knew only three people who understood general relativity, and that at the moment he could not think who the third one was.

The small-college professor can appreciate positively this endeavor to understand physical nature more thoroughly by seeking a universal theory that will encompass both relativity and quantum mechanics, and be consistent not only with contemporary experience but also with a hypothetical history of the universe. Proponents of the new theories realize that their efforts are still tentative, and Hawking's book records several reversals of theory in the past two decades. More such reversals can be expected.

Our armchair observer could sling a pebble or two by observing that Hawking is as inept in handling history and theology as the historian or theologian would be handling the arcane mathematics of the physical theory. The project suddenly appears quite human, so that the amateur can now approach with less fear and trembling. In particular Hawking misinterprets the Aristotelian-scholastic concept of First Cause, assuming that it refers only to a sequence of causes in time, as acorns give rise to trees and nova explosions give rise to new stars (7). In fact the temporal sequence of causes is only a narrow dimension of what we commonly understand as cause. A flagpole stands upright because the ground holds it, long after the workmen who erected it have gone away. The continuing causality of nature, the vertical causality, in particular the First Cause of its continuing existence, is important in understanding the cause of the universe. St. Thomas Aquinas, who could see the internal certainty of the need for an uncaused First Cause, could not see that the order

of nature required that it have a beginning in time; only revelation makes that clear (46, 2). Now physics is delving into the evolutionary processes of nature and the beginning instant of the universe. That, of course, should do no harm to the notion of creation.

Unfortunately too many of the theorists who are immersed in the question of creation suffer from an ideological blockage against accepting the idea of a Creator outside the physical universe. They look for a mathematical equation that will be intrinsically necessary, and therefore make the Other, the Necessary Being, unnecessary. Hawking rather adroitly avoids the direct attack, presenting first a theory that seems to dispense with a Creator, then moving on to one that leaves Him something to do.

At this point our college professor may lay aside his pebbles and call upon Father Stanley L. Jaki, Hungarian-American priest-scientist and historian of science, who wrote a review of Hawking's book and entitled the review, "Evicting the Creator." As a physicist Jaki does not trust the extension of the indeterminacy theory to undergird a universe. That theory

moved in 60 years from the innocent-looking device of alpha-tunneling in the decay of radioactive atoms to drawing countless universes out of the bottomless tunnels of non-being. Such is the deepest logic of cosmologies based on the prevailing philosophical interpretation of the uncertainty principle. (20)

Father Jaki points out the risk of putting too much confidence in the abstractions of geometry, and even within geometry he insists on Goedel's theorem that "no non-trivial set of mathematical propositions can derive its proof of consistency from the set itself."

Then he thrusts home:

The ultimate aim of Professor Hawking's book is to make it appear that quantum mechanics, insofar as it is turned into anti-ontology by its Copenhagen interpretation, would assure the success of the supreme trick available to mere mortals. It is to eat from the tree of knowledge a hybrid fruit made of good physics and bad philosophy, and make thereby man's mind equal to that of God. (20)

That Hawking entertains such thoughts is evident from statements like this:

The quantum theory of gravity has opened up a new possibility, in which there would be no boundary to space-time, and so there would be no need to specify the behavior of the boundary. There would be no singularities at which the laws of science broke down and no edge of space-time at which one would have to appeal to God or some new law to set the boundary conditions for space-time. One could say: "The boundary condition of the universe is that it has no boundary." The universe would be completely self-contained and not affected by anything outside itself. It would neither be created nor destroyed. It would just BE. (136)

Hawking concedes that such a theory has not been achieved, but the hubris of the whole enterprise is revealed when he concludes his book with this blockbuster:

If we do discover a complete theory . . . it would be the ultimate triumph of human reason--for then we would know the mind of God. (175)

The divine mind would, of course, be bottled up like a genie in a mathematical formula!

9. THE ROLE OF THE CATHOLIC COLLEGE

Someone in Father Wagner's position would be confronted throughout these hundred years with the question: Why a Catholic college? Why shoulder the burden of a duplicate educational establishment? After all, there is no such thing as Catholic mathematics, the president of a well-known Catholic university once declared. The point is well taken in the sense that supernatural revelation is not the source of natural knowledge in general or natural science, and biblical fundamentalists have foundered in their efforts to show that it is. It was not divinely revealed, nor did the Church ever teach, that the sun goes around the earth, even though popes

and theologians throughout most of the Christian era thought that it did and resisted the Copernican model for a time.

But faith and science must live in the same mind, and Catholic thought works at harmonizing the two. Cardinal Newman, especially in the last two lectures of his *The Idea of a University*, remains the theoretician and the inspiration for such harmony, while Catholic scientists like Pasteur, Mendel, and Lemaitre are its practical models. This harmony is needed for successful evangelization. The Church's commission to preach the Gospel has moved into a new dimension in the past hundred years. The message is no longer addressed mostly to shepherds and the unlettered but must speak to a generation educated at the college level and immersed in a world of ideas that have shaped their minds, while their minds are in turn shaping the growing world of ideas. If they hear science saying one thing and religion another, religion will lose the contest.

The contribution Catholic thought should make to the teaching of science is touched upon by Pope John Paul II in his Encyclical "Ex Corde Ecclesiae" (No. 46): "The intelligence is never diminished, rather it is stimulated and reinforced by that interior fount of deep understanding that is the word of God and by the hierarchy of values that results from it."

The Catholic intellectual tradition with which Father Wagner began his career is accustomed to look to the essence of things, beginning with the College itself, which is primarily an educational institution. The aims of community, scholarship, and search for truth, important as they are in the broader horizon, must gravitate around the aim of education. Education is built around teachers who teach and students who learn. Both teaching and learning have an object, which is knowledge or science, and each science has its special object. The classical mind finds intellectual beauty in simple, carefully centered but rich concepts expressed in a word: the science of nature branching into astronomy, the science of the stars; geology, the science of the earth; biology, the science of life; chemistry, the science of matter; and physics, the science of motion. More than was the case a hundred years ago, it finds intellectual satisfaction in the underlying theory of evolution, linking stars, planets, and life in an historical unity.

This tradition follows a pre-positivistic theory of knowledge that cuts through much of the epistemological morass of modern science. It comes equipped with the rather obvious notion that na-

ture can be known by observation and understood through theory. This knowledge has varying degrees of certainty, if certainty is understood as something mental, the firm adherence to an idea. The primary human certainty is logical certainty, the certainty that two plus two equals four, after reflection on the concepts involved. The internal logic of cause and effect is equally rigorous, but error can arise in assigning causes in the real world. It is roughly correct to say that the cue causes the billiard ball to move, but more exact to say that the motion of the cue when transferred causes the movement of the ball. The loose assignation of incomplete causes, as in saying that human thought is the result of the interaction of neurons, discredits science as the knowledge of causes and leads to the Humean claim that we cannot know causes at all.

Certainty about the external world means seeing the evidence, and in studying nature we do our best to trace the theory back to the evidence, even though the path is often complex. We eschew mesmerizing phrases like "some experts believe," or "scientists say." Catholic thought has some practice in deciding who is deserving of our faith. Experimental and sense knowledge are inherently more fallible than simple logic, but the weakness is remedied by the agreement of many observers. In science the test of a new observation is repeatability. With this test we can be humanly certain of discoveries of things unknown not very long ago. The chemistry student is certain of the atomicity of matter and of the periodic arrangement of the elements even though pioneers like Faraday were not. All of us except members of the Flat Earth Society have a human certitude that the earth orbits the sun. The search for absolute certainty, however, is a phantom quest, since our certainty cannot do without or be "absolved from" the human mind.

The permanence of this knowledge of nature overrides the fashionable idea--rather discouraging to the student--that since discoveries are being made so fast, the lifetime or half-life of scientific knowledge is something like five years. Granted that specialization in a narrow field may require frequent retooling, the bulk of scientific knowledge stands firm, and this is the knowledge that should be the fare of beginning students, who will then see that their laborious study will not be labor lost.

All human knowledge, not just natural science, grows out of the twofold process of observation and thought. Each branch develops its own variation of this general method. What is known as the

"scientific method," proposed in the thirteenth century by Bishop Grosseteste of Lincoln, supplements observation by controlled experiments. If the theory suggests an experimental process, and the experiment works, the theory looks good. Obviously the method works only to the extent that experimentation is possible and significant. The scientist with some sense of philosophy should blush to read the opinion formerly published in the preface of a highly regarded freshman chemistry text to the effect that the world's problems in politics, society, ethics, etc., could be solved if only people would learn to use the scientific method.

This naive view exemplifies the reductionism that has plagued science ever since Democritus decided that color and sweetness are mere conventions, the only reality being atoms and the void, or Lucretius opined that the soul consists of very subtle and fast moving atoms. The temptation to make a brilliant and hard-won theory serve every purpose is understandable, but it does not make good science. The trend continues in our century, however, as the mind is reduced to a computer-like mechanism, the cause of the existence of the universe is reduced to an evolutionary process, and all of reality is reduced to matter with the same logic that would reduce a house to an arrangement of bricks.

Catholic thought is that we arrive at truth through science. Truth in the old philosophy is understood as the agreement between the judgment and reality. If we say that the earth orbits the sun and it actually does so, we have stated a little bit of truth. But truth is a very universal concept. A philosophy which promotes openness to genuine knowledge at all levels leads to a recognition of metaphysical reality, a real world which, while for us it is embodied in matter, does not require matter in order to be what it is. Intelligence, existence, cause, truth, and the like, are not mental constructs like numbers or categories but are extramental. They are also not bound to matter like color or length but transcend it. They can be conceived as existing in matter or without it. Awareness of this spiritual world provides a background and perspective for a more satisfying study of the natural world.

Father Jaki thinks science needs to be remade. It is evident that natural science has been largely remade in the past century and today's students will probably remake it in the next. Interpreting science from a background of a sound philosophy and theory of

knowledge can exert a healthy influence on the future shape of science.

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THE LIMITED MENU OF ECONOMIC SYSTEMS

Robert E. Schenk

In the early 1970s, when news media paid much attention to the radical left, several books appeared setting out a radical-left view of economics. These books examined failings of Western economic systems, suggesting that these systems were too corrupt to maintain or reform and that their demise ought to be a principal goal of all moral people. Only occasionally did these books stumble onto the question of how a better economic system could be constructed.¹ Marx had never answered this question, and a century later his followers were no better equipped to do so: We cannot present a blueprint or an exact specification of how a socialist 'utopia' would work; nor should we attempt to do so, since constructing imaginary utopias bears little relation to the actual task of building a decent society. Any *real* alternative to capitalism will be historically linked to the forces and movements generated by the contradictions of capitalist society itself (Edwards, *et al.* 520).

It is possible that a blind but well-intentioned search for a better society, or Marx's invisible hand of history, will lead to a society which works in a way which no one has yet imagined, but in our century the followers of Marx have only managed to produce economic systems which impoverish and enslave populations. If one starts not with faith but with analysis, one doubts the chances of this search ever being successful. Analysis indicates that in political economy form follows function and function follows form. The forms open to any society are limited. As Assar Lindbeck wrote in a devastating critique of radical-left economics, "It may be possible to make a strong case against either markets or administrative systems, but if we are against *both* we are in trouble; there is hardly a third method of allocating resources and coordinating economic decisions, if we eliminate physical force" (32-3).

The forms open to any society are limited because people can process and make sense of only a limited amount of information. This limitation gives rise to problems of coordination which must be understood before one speculates on the future of capitalism. The

essence of the most important of these problems can be illustrated with a simple example.

THE PROBLEM OF THE COMMONS

Suppose there is a resource which is open to all such as a hunting ground, grazing area, or fishing grounds. Under what conditions can we be relatively confident that it will be properly used, that is, not overused to the point that the resource is injured or destroyed?

To make this question more concrete, consider the following example shown in the table below.

PRODUCTION FROM HYPOTHETICAL HUNTING AREA		
NUMBER OF MAN-HOURS SPENT HUNTING (ANNUALLY)	POUNDS OF MEAT HARVESTED	AVERAGE POUNDS PER HOUR
100	100	1
200	200	1
300	250	5/6
400	250	5/8

The table shows the meat production possible from Hypothetical Hunting Area, or HHA, with different levels of hunting. It should be clear from the table that there will be no net benefit to hunters taken as a group if they hunt 400 hours rather than 300. However, is there any reason to expect that hunters will not devote those extra 100 hours?

Suppose that the alternative to the HHA is the Wild Hunting Area or WHA, and that every hour spent in it will always yield 1/2 pound of meat regardless of how many people are hunting there. Three hundred hours are already being spent in the HHA. You, a new hunter, arrive on the scene, and must make a decision. Do you

want to spend ten hours hunting in the HHA, where the table shows you can expect to receive between $5/6$ and $5/8$ pounds of meat per hour, or in the WHA, where you will receive only one-half pound? Clearly there is a strong tendency to go to where the yield is highest, which is to HHA. However, this is not a desirable solution from the point of view of hunters as a group. If you join the hunt in HHA, the yield you will get comes entirely at the expense of other hunters. The problem illustrated here has a name: the problem of the commons.² The problem of the commons illustrates that the uncoordinated pursuit of self interest can be harmful to the group. There are at least three “solutions” to this problem.³ The most obvious is the political solution of authority backed up by force. In this system a central decision-maker decides where people hunt.

Much less obvious is the political solution of property rights. In this system a set of incentives is devised so that the costs and benefit to the individual decision-maker parallel those of society as a whole. The least obvious “solution” is to reduce population density until the problem disappears. Though not practical for an industrial economy, examining it helps put the whole problem of economic coordination into better perspective.

SOLUTION #1: ELIMINATING THE PROBLEM

Marshall Sahlins has suggested that the most “primitive” societies, those of hunter-gatherers, were also the first affluent societies. The picture he draws is one of people who have a well-fed, leisurely life. The image of the hunter-gatherer as one living on the edge of starvation in an incessant quest for food, he says, is incorrect. Rather studies of Australian aborigines and the !Kung of southern Africa suggest that only four to five hours per day are required to obtain and prepare food.

Hunter-gatherer affluence is not one of great production but of limited wants. Because hunter-gatherers want so little, their wants are easily satisfied. Further, their style of life works to assure that their wants are kept to a minimum. Hunter-gatherers face rapidly diminishing returns to hunting. Once they settle in an area, they quickly kill most prey within easy walking distance. Their solution is to continually move their camp to new areas where game is abundant. The constant moving of camp makes material possessions a burden (quite literally). Material possessions are

costly to have, and as a result people have few and do not desire more.

The key to making this style of life work is to keep population below the natural carrying capacity of the land, which means that population density must remain low. Hunter-gatherer lifestyle encourages low density. Young children are like material possessions, a burden which must be carried from camp to camp. Women have a strong incentive to space children widely apart, and this spacing is accomplished with prolonged lactation, sexual abstinence, and infanticide. Though they may not realize that they are avoiding the problem of commons by keeping population density low, nevertheless they are.

Anthropologists debate among themselves whether we can extrapolate from contemporary hunter-gatherers to the past.⁴ Can we regard present hunter-gatherers as a living remnant of what was typical for all our ancestors before the development of agriculture and herding? Hunter-gatherers today are found only in inhospitable regions which other cultural groups ignore, such as desert, tundra, and rain forest. Are they limited to these areas because they have been pushed out of other, more favorable areas, or is their culture a special adaptation to harsh environments? The more inhospitable the region, the more the group must travel, which makes the burden of young children heavier, and gives a greater incentive to limit population growth which is essential for the stability of the way of life. For our purposes this dispute is not important. Hunter-gatherers remain as a group which has successfully abolished the economic problem by a severe limitation of wants.

There do seem to be times when hunter-gatherers did fail to limit population density, and did encounter the problem of the commons. One place such an encounter seems to have taken place is in North America a few thousand years after the arrival of man. When there were only a very few humans in North America, there was no problem of the commons with regard to mammoths. The number killed was so small that the population of mammoths could easily recover. Because there were plenty of mammoths to go around, they were not scarce.

But as the population rose, there came a time when there were no longer enough of the beasts to go around. From the point of view of the people involved, it would certainly have been desirable

to limit the kill. *But there was no method of coordination which could accomplish this end.* Because the early Americans lacked the rules to coordinate their activities, they hunted to extinction a number of large animals (Harris 22-4, and also Smith).⁵

It is easy to read all sorts of traits into primitive cultures, both those we dislike and those we admire. Hunter-gatherers have no classes or even apparent status and rank. Neither do they have much community spirit and solidarity, but rather seem to stress independence and self-reliance (Wilson 52). Status, community spirit, and solidarity serve no utilitarian purpose. Hunter-gatherers have found a style of life which avoids the problems of coordination. On the other hand, when they encounter problems which do require some sort of coordination, as the early North Americans did when various species of large animals were on the verge of extinction, hunter-gatherers have no means of dealing with them. This lack of coordination has also meant that hunter-gatherers have little resistance to other, more coordinated groups when those other groups expand. Their inability to deal with coordination problems may explain why they live only in those areas considered too harsh for other groups.

SOLUTION #2: AUTHORITY

The most obvious solution to the problem of the commons illustrated earlier is to have an individual serve as a coordinator. Such a person would be in charge of determining who could hunt in the HHA. The coordinator would determine the optimum number of hours for hunting, and tell people whether or not they would be allowed to hunt.

The exact way in which coordination by authority developed is unclear. It developed long before written history began (as did markets--many systems of writing were inventions of merchants to keep records). All early civilizations were heavily based on authority, and they have left impressive monuments to their ability to organize and coordinate people, including the Great Wall of China and huge pyramids in Egypt and Mexico.

In his *Oriental Despotism*, Karl Wittfogel called the early civilizations along the Nile and in China "hydraulic societies." He argued that their systems of authority and hierarchy developed as a means of coordinating a complex system of irrigation. For these

systems of irrigation to work, they needed massive construction projects, and only a strong authority could provide coordination needed to build them. Other societies based on authority, such as the Roman Empire, imitated the forms of the hydraulic societies.

Wittfogel's analysis of these societies has not gone unchallenged. Others have questioned if they were anywhere near as efficient and strong as he pictured them (Jones 206) or whether power was in fact used primarily for the utilitarian ends he envisions (Wilson 128-30). Nonetheless, Wittfogel constructs a picture of authority in action which illustrates it both at its ideal best and at its worst as well.

Impressive as the ancient hydraulic societies might have been, the most impressive examples of coordination through authority may have been the twentieth-century Communist societies. They involved far more complex coordination because they had far more complex economic systems, with the need to organize many more resources to produce many more goods. These systems arose in response to the ideas of Karl Marx. From their understanding of Marx, the people who set up the political and economic systems in these societies explicitly rejected market coordination. As a result, they were forced to adopt the only other method available for large-group coordination: authority. They did not adopt authority because Marx suggested that they should, but because there was no other alternative once they eliminated the market from contention.

The market was never completely eliminated, but it was drastically curtailed. The ability of the central-planning systems to coordinate these societies was impressive, and ought not to be overlooked now that we can better see the very serious limitations which this system of coordination also entailed. Those limitations are so serious that many who advocate socialism want to distance themselves from the results of these experiments in socialism. When less was known about how poorly they worked, most socialists were quite eager to embrace them.⁶

The central planners in the Soviet Union managed to coordinate their economy well enough to make their country a military superpower and a leader in space exploration. Though they did not make it an economic superpower, the planners made the economy function, which is an impressive achievement when one recognizes how fantastically complex a modern economic system really is. Everything is connected to everything else, because output from

one part of the economy is an input somewhere else. Trying to make all the pieces fit together, when there are so many pieces which are so interrelated, is a monumental task.

Though it works as a system of coordination, authority and central planning also have serious limitations. Authority works best when goals are simple, uniform, and easily measured. Fighting a war is such a goal and war efforts are almost always coordinated with authority. The goal of producing a high standard of living for the average citizen is not such a goal (because people have diverse wants), and the total value of goods which a centrally-planned economy produces will be well below potential. A centrally-planned economy lacks the feedback mechanism which a market has. In the 1950s Khrushchev could proclaim that the USSR would bury the United States by outperforming it economically, and many intelligent people worried that he might be right. In the 1990s only a few true believers have not realized that a market clearly outperforms a centrally planned economy in providing a high standard of living for the average citizen.

Coordination by central authority has a tendency to be static when the organization being coordinated is extremely complex. Once a solution is found which fits the pieces together reasonably well, planners are usually reluctant to change because there is the potential for serious mistakes. The experience of the Soviet Union and other Marxist countries has shown that building in incentives which encourage people to innovate is very difficult. Most descriptions of centrally planned societies have many stories which illustrate this problem.⁷

Coordination with central authority requires a hierarchy. Authority is a top-down system making decisions, with the center passing commands downward through intermediaries, the hierarchy. Without those intermediaries, the necessary communication and supervision would not occur, and the system would not coordinate. The structuring needed for this system destroys equality. Anthropologists and historians have noted that the emergence of civilization was accompanied by social stratification and class divisions. This development was inevitable because all early civilizations relied heavily on authority to coordinate. The emergence of inequality and stratification in Marxist countries was inevitable as well, despite their ideological commitment to equality and classlessness. When a group relies on authority to coordinate, it

will have a structure resembling that of an army, a system which most people understand is incompatible with equality.

Finally, groups which rely primarily on authority for coordination always have problems with the the potential for abuse. For an authority to be effective, it must have the ability to use force to make others carry out its orders. In an ideal world that power will be used only for the good of the group. In the real world preventing that power from being used primarily for the ends of those holding the power is inevitably a problem. Rulers holding unchecked power usually become parasitical on the population. There are a multitude of historical examples, and some have argued that the present is unlikely to see exceptions.⁸

SOLUTION #3: THE MARKET

A final solution to the problem of the commons is to use the market. The market comes into being with the establishment of transferable private-property rights.⁹ In our hunting problem, one way to establish property rights would be to assign plots of land to the hunters and restrict each to hunting on his own land. This way would not be effective if the prey were large animals which roamed freely throughout the hunting area. In this case the better way to assign property rights would be to assign specific animals to specific individuals. This is in fact what happened in pre-history with the domestication of goats, sheep, and cattle. In the American West, the bison were almost slaughtered to the point of extinction while similar animals, cattle, were increasing dramatically in numbers. This result was not due to the forces of biological evolution, but to the differences in property rights. Bison were commonly owned and thus subject to the problem of the commons, while cattle were privately owned and thus exempt from the problem.

The very idea that the market coordinates is quite new in history, being articulated only in the eighteenth century. However, the market was coordinating activities long before that, with its origins lost in pre-history. The market, for example, undoubtedly played a major role in coordinating in the ancient Greek city-states. They had a flourishing trade, and though the cities were politically separate, they were connected economically with this trade. Perhaps there were early thinkers who explored the implications of

this trade, but if there were, their ideas have been lost. Instead the legacy of Greek thought, as passed down by Aristotle, saw the need for an orderer if there was order. This idea seemed so obvious to Thomas Aquinas, who borrowed heavily from Aristotle, that he based one of his proofs of God on it.

Only with the Enlightenment did an understanding of the market as a method of spontaneous coordination arise. John Locke grasped the importance of property rights, and Thomas Hobbes made the important abstraction of the self-interested man who faces a problem of the commons (though hardly in these words). Yet not until a century later did Adam Smith establish the topic of market coordination as a subject worth studying on its own.

Economists have not been very successful in giving their insights into this complex system of coordination to the general public. One reason may be that the system generally works so well that most people are not even aware that it achieves the impressive feats of coordination which it does. To illustrate, consider the people who had some part in bringing you this essay. How many were there and who were they? Who made the paper? Who made the machines that made the paper? Who made the computer the author used? Who wrote the software? Who gave those people the education which they needed to achieve at the level needed to produce these items? Who transported it? Who made the equipment by which they transported it? When one starts tracing the indirect links, the number of people involved becomes enormous. Most, of course, had no idea that they were involved in this project.

The “invisible hand” is truly invisible, and most people think of market coordination less often than they think about the air they breathe. Just as we usually do not become aware of what a complex system our body is until something goes wrong with it, so we normally do not become aware of how complex our economic system is until something goes wrong with it. In complex organizations the complete results of one set of actions cannot be readily perceived. This fact is generally recognized in ecological systems, where complex interrelationships can result in actions having counter-intuitive results. (For example, increasing the use of a pesticide may cause an increased problem of insect pests in the long run.) The economic system is no less complex, and in it, too, one can find actions which have counter-intuitive results. (For

example, use of rent controls to help the poor may cause a deterioration of the housing stock which in the long run harms the poor.)

The existence of large corporations in market systems points out that the market has deficiencies as a system of coordination.¹⁰ Corporations rely on authority for their internal coordination. They have a hierarchy, and orders flow down that hierarchy to coordinate the members of the organization. If the market always coordinated perfectly, there would be no room for corporations. Using markets entails costs, and when authority is cheaper as a method of coordination, some entrepreneur will sooner or later find a way to use it.

On the other hand, the market limits the authority of those at the top of corporations. The head of a corporation may want to become parasitical on the lower ranks, but if he imposes too much of a burden, the corporation will fail and his parasitism will cease. If there is a market for corporate control, such parasitism will be further limited. When ownership of the corporation is widely held and can be bought and sold, as in a stock market, then poor performance at the top can be more readily challenged.

Though a few anarcho-capitalists might deny it, most economists and political theorists believe that a market economy cannot function in the absence of authority from the government. The classical liberals who wanted minimal government saw a need for a coercive power, the state, to enforce contracts and protect property rights. Thus the market cannot exist as the sole method of coordination. Property rights themselves, however, have very often developed without government guidance, and sometimes in violation of existing law. This development is not surprising when one understands that property rights are a way to overcome problems of resource use. A contemporary example of the development of a set of property rights outside the law has occurred among lobstermen of Maine (Atchinson). Though legally the sea is open to all, in fact each fisher has a defined territory where he can set traps. The territory is defended by cutting buoy lines of intruders, which is illegal. However, this implicit set of property rights limits the harvest and helps avoid overfishing.

The explanation of property rights given above differs from another view which descends from Rousseau and which yields a very different view of the market. As above, population density

increases, and scarcity replaces abundance. As a result of this scarcity, people seize control of things to secure them for their own use and to prevent others from using them.

Property rights in this view emerge only as a rationing device and perform no function in improving society's use of resources. Because some are more capable grabbers than others, they get the larger portion of things and emerge as the rich. Those who seize less or nothing at all emerge as the poor. Becoming rich or poor is thus not related to merit or economic performance; it is an accident. If one finds the existing distribution of wealth or income objectionable, the logical course of action, according to this understanding of private property, is to abolish it. This understanding of private property is especially attractive to those who try to view all social relations in terms of power, as many Marxists do.

Many people believe that a careful reading of Karl Marx will teach them the essentials of the market system. One can make the case, however, that Marx steers one away from the essentials of market systems. Marx's class analysis is a power-model view of the world. Power models are almost always zero-sum models, that is, what one person gains another loses. Social status fits this model. By its nature, status involves people above and people below, so any one person's rise means the decline of others. However, the central feature of market exchange is that both parties to a transaction must believe that they benefit or they will not agree to the transaction. The market is a positive-sum activity, in which gains by one do not necessarily mean losses to someone else. Because it can see only negative-sum interaction, a power model obscures this vital aspect of market coordination.

The emphasis on class relations leads to a picture of capitalism which is highly stratified. Marx thought the essence of capitalism was the employer-employee relationship and ignored the buyer-seller relationship which most economists put at the center of capitalism. The employer-employee relationship has many elements of a command relationship, and order and hierarchy are intrinsic to command relationships. Replacing capitalism with real socialism (as opposed to the utopian socialism of Marx) increases rather than decreases the need for hierarchy.¹¹ Hence it is not surprising that socialism has no less stratification than capitalism, and probably more. Peter Berger believes that the following

hypothesis is empirically supported: "Industrial capitalism, especially when combined with political democracy, is most likely to maintain openness in the stratification system of a society" (Berger 62).

LARGE GROUPS AND SMALL GROUPS

As Lindbeck states, economists see only two methods of coordination: the command hierarchy and the market. There are in fact other methods, but they work primarily in small groups of people who personally know each other and are very difficult to extend to the large-group situations with which economists concern themselves. Life in the family or in small villages is not coordinated (usually) by either command or the market. It relies heavily on altruism, solidarity, duty, and loyalty.

If there are only four hunters involved in the hunting problem in the table, and if they know and like each other, it is probable that they will be able to reach some informal agreement which will limit hunting in the area once they recognize the problem. When hunting exceeds 300 hours, the benefit which the "new" hunter gets is obtained by reducing the take of the "old" hunters. If our four hunters are friends, each will take into account not only the extra meat he harvests, but the reduction his hunting imposes on others. Because the number of people involved is small, each can see all the consequences of his actions.

When 500 hunters, many strangers to each other, are involved, the problem may be harder to identify and harder to solve. A reflective hunter may know that his hunting effort gives him a positive return only because it reduces the yield of some other hunter. That abstract knowledge is likely to seem less convincing and worth acting on than when one personally knows who the other persons affected are and can directly see the effects of one's actions.

The importance of seeing the concrete results of one's actions can be illustrated with another example. Suppose you are in charge of rescue service in a small city and have \$50,000 to spend on new services. This amount is fixed and there is no possibility that it can be increased. After careful study, you are convinced that staffing a new ambulance will save an average of three lives a year, and this service can be provided for the \$50,000. Before you have a chance

to spend the money, you are confronted with an emergency. A child is trapped underground and the case is attracting national news coverage. Though much volunteer labor and equipment are available, additional, specialized equipment will be needed for the rescue, and it will use your \$50,000. Even with this equipment, you have only a 50-50 chance of a successful rescue. You must make your decision, to spend the \$50,000 attempting to save the child, or to allow the child to die and spend the money on improved ambulance service which you are confident will save three, unidentifiable people a year.

I suspect that very few people would allow the child to die, and those few would not last very long in their positions. It is difficult to be moved by statistics, and easy to be moved by the plight of an identifiable person. This fact is one of the reasons that television news can have the emotional impact which it does.

It is important to realize that systems which work in small groups may not work in large groups. The nation is not just a big (very big) family. This statement is obvious to economists, but seems counter-intuitive to some others. The reason one cannot extrapolate from the small group to the large is that man is not omniscient. The knowledge one person can have is very limited. Coordination in the small group depends on people's knowledge of one another. In our families, for example, we know pretty well each other's preferences and abilities. Further, we can see the consequences of our actions on others, and we can see how their actions affect us. Hence it is easy to spot someone who is working against the interests of the group. We can try to change the behavior of such a person by withholding some of the benefits of the group, or in an extreme case, we can expel the offender from the group. In larger groups we do not have knowledge of the preferences and abilities of all other members of the group. As the group grows beyond some point, we will not even know who the other members are. Further, we are no longer able to see many of the consequences of our actions, nor can we trace bad outcomes to the malfeasance of some other member.¹²

Both the market and command hierarchies, however, can and must incorporate small-group interactions as a vital part of how they work. Indeed, one of the most important factors in judging the desirability of a political-economic system may be how well it incorporates and supports those small-group interactions. Despite

the importance given these interactions by a great many non-economists, economists have largely ignored them. They do not fit into the economic paradigm which tries to explain all behavior with self-interest. While economists have spent a lot of effort considering the proper mix of market and authority, they have ignored the proper mix of small-group and large-group coordination. Many social reformers also ignore the question of this mix because they deny the distinction between small-group and large-group solution which the preceding paragraphs make. Often reformers admire small-group values such as altruism, community spirit, and group solidarity so much that they want to make them central in the way a society is organized.

We do see examples of large-group and small-group structures interacting all around us. Though in popular discourse we often see competition and cooperation as opposites, in everyday life we often combine them. Groups which cooperate best may be the most effective competitors with other groups. Perhaps one of the reasons team sports are so fascinating in Western economies is that they reflect this aspect of everyday life: to compete effectively, one must first learn to cooperate effectively.

Finally, it is important to note that though a large group may not be effectively coordinated solely with small-group methods, small-group ways of thinking do spill out of small groups and affect large groups. Perhaps this is a matter of habit. We learn to interact in certain ways in small groups, and we may try to use those same ways of acting and thinking in large groups. Patriotism is an example. The soldier volunteering to serve his Father Land or Mother Land makes no sense at all in the economic paradigm. Maybe that is why the best soldiers are the young--they are too naive to know that volunteering for military service is not in their self-interest. If so, the argument that persons old enough to die for their country are old enough to vote is shaky. Maybe it also indicates that economics is a subversive subject. It may undermine types of action which we as a society would like to have more of (Rhoads 294, footnote 54).

CONCLUSIONS

In the immediate future, and perhaps for the long-run future, all societies will have a limited menu of economic systems from

which to choose. The ways to coordinate large groups of people are only two. When people reject the market, they must accept authority and bureaucracy. If they reject socialism, as many in Eastern Europe apparently have done, they must accept the market. There is no workable third way for a densely populated country.

This limitation may be bad news for utopians, who generally desire a system which overcomes all limitations of presently understood systems. For non-utopians it is a challenge. The two systems of coordination can be used in many different combinations, and they can be combined in many ways with small-group methods of coordination. Some of these combinations have been tried, but there are undoubtedly many which remain to be tried. Though this view may sound like the view expressed by Edwards *et al.* at the beginning of the essay, it is quite different because it sees the future as variations on capitalism rather than as alternatives to it. It also gives no assurances that those variations will be better than what we have at present. They may be worse.

NOTES

¹ Alec Nove recently noted that attempts to sketch out the workings of socialism remain extremely rare (Nove 198-9). Perhaps a reason for this rarity is that socialism is so often utopian, and as such it assumes away the problems which require analysis. For other comments on the rarity of a theory of socialism, see Schenk.

² An early exposition of the problem of the commons is in Gordon. For economists virtually all environmental problems--overhunting, pollution, deforestation, depletion of the ozone layer, etc.--involve the problem of the commons or some relative of it. Sometimes people who should understand this do not, as this embarrassing statement from Paul Ehrlich illustrates: "I had long been puzzled by the behavior of the whaling industry.... [W]hales, which could provide a permanent resource if harvested prudently, were overexploited and driven toward extinction. This mysteriously 'self-destructive' behavior of the industry was explained to me by a Japanese economist. Like most conservationists, I had assumed the industry's goals would be to maximize the sustainable annual yield of whales. In fact the industry has been trying to maximize the present value of the whale resource. If various species of whales are

driven to extinction. . . the capital can be turned to the rape of another (in the minds of economists) array of available resources. Such behavior [is] perfectly rational in the dominant economic paradigm" (10).

No competent economist would ever make the argument attributed to the Japanese economist in the quote. The very notion that industries, as opposed to individuals, have goals is alien to the economic way of thinking.

³ Vernon Smith lists four ways: 1) simulating the market through a tax; 2) institution of rights in private property and hence a market; 3) constraining by social or legal restrictions; and 4) enculturating voluntary conservationist values or behavior.

⁴ For example, see Bower.

⁵ Harris argues that they thereby set up conditions that lead to widespread cannibalism among their descendants many centuries later (110).

⁶ For example, "When Engels wrote these words, they were no more than a prophecy. History had yet to demonstrate whether his prediction of things to come was solidly based or an aberrant hypothesis of social development. Now a century later, the act of emancipation he anticipated has been effected in fourteen countries, beginning with Russia in 1917 and extending to Yugoslavia, China, Vietnam, and Cuba after the Second World War.

"Thus the scientific character of the socialist theory set forth by Engels has been verified in practice by the abolition of capitalist relations among one-third of the human race. His analysis and prognosis have been validated in essentials by the supreme test of history." George Novack wrote this on page 5 in his "Introduction" to the 1972 edition of Engels.

⁷ For example, Goldman, 40-56.

⁸ Hayek's *The Road to Serfdom* is an influential example.

⁹ All societies have some set of property rights, but not all have private-property rights. Property rights are part of the institutional structure that orders interactions with others. They determine which material items we may use and under what conditions we may use them. A key tenet of economics is that the way these property rights are structured is of vital importance in explaining economic performance of a society. For simplicity, further uses of

the term "property rights" will refer to "private-property rights" such as exist in market economies.

Some economists have envisioned systems of "market socialism" in which coordination will be based on market interactions rather than authority but private ownership of the means of production will not exist. However, the act of exchange necessarily involves a transfer of property rights, and one cannot transfer what one does not have. Without private ownership a society cannot have a true market. It can only attempt to simulate a market system, that is, to instruct its bureaucrats to act not as bureaucrats but as entrepreneurs.

It is worth noting that sometimes private property rights have been technically impossible to develop. In these situations what economists call "market failure" occurs. There are no (or limited) property rights to whales in the ocean, to the ozone layer, or to clean air or water, and in each of these cases market coordination yields results which most people see as unsatisfactory.

¹⁰ The original observation that transaction costs open the way to islands of command in the sea of markets was by Coase. His insight lay dormant for many years, but recently Williamson has developed it in ways which may substantially change the face of microeconomics.

¹¹ For the argument that the socialism envisioned by Marx was utopian, see Nove 1-67.

¹² Anthropologists have noted that there is a limit in many tribal societies to the size of villages. When they exceed that size, they split. Cities, the argument above suggests, are not just big villages but embody a different system of organization and coordination.

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THE AUGUSTINIAN VISION OF PEACE

H. D. Kreilkamp

En route to Europe by ship some years ago I met an elderly Jewish lawyer, who astounded me by declaring that St. Augustine's *City of God* was one of his favorite books, one which he read often. I was piqued with curiosity to know why the work of a Christian theologian should have such an appeal to one who did not share the theologian's faith in Christ. While I realize any Jew can read and admire Augustine's writing for the many profound things Augustine says about human nature, that he should consider the *City of God* one of his favorite books I found hard to understand, because it is a work thoroughly permeated by the Christian faith. So I asked myself as I read this masterpiece, "What is it about this book, which is so deeply Christian, that makes it appealing also to Jews?" Is it Augustine's deep and evident faith in God, which permeates the work, and which might prompt admiration in any believer in the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob? Is it the continuity Augustine finds between Hebrew Scriptures and the New Testament? Or is it Augustine's vision of peace as a goal of the human race? I suggest the answer is "yes" to all of these questions, especially to the last, concerning the Augustinian vision of peace, which draws many readers to his *City of God*. I cite some of these readers who bear witness to the influence of Augustine in our day in the course of this study.

First, one contemporary comments on where Augustine was coming from. Eckenrode describes the situation which faced Augustine, the bishop of an "emerging church in a declining empire," with a "tradition of 'caritas' . . . a reality of legitimate military defense, and, most importantly, a vision of internal peace." The same author notes rightly that this vision of peace, derived from Christ, goes beyond history; it recognizes peace as an ongoing process and is primarily concerned with keeping the process of peace-making going (1981, 252). The risen Jesus included everyone in his love, not only his immediate disciples, but also strangers on the road to Emmaus--bringing peace to all. Here is the source of Augustine's vision of peace--the risen Christ, summoning people to faith and

hope, inspiring human beings to love and fearlessness, moving them to come out from behind closed doors, out into city streets, onto highways and waterways, even to the ends of the earth. For, although Jesus gave his disciples no specific answers to many of the problems they would have to face and work through, he did breathe into them a Spirit of reconciliation, which became a mighty wind sweeping away barriers of race, language and custom, to renew the face of the earth. He warned them of sufferings to come, indicating they would, by suffering, learn the patience and equanimity he had learned, that they too might become physicians of the spirit, healers of the sick or of those alienated from God. From his own experience of forgiveness as well as from the experience of the first converts to Christianity on Pentecost, Augustine learned the power of reconciliation--which Eckenrode calls the "authentic paradigm for peace" (1981, 258).¹ Augustine went on to show, however, that this reconciliation must reach out in love not only to alienated brothers and sisters, but also across battle lines, to those in fact who hate peace. Its goal is establishing a universal peace.

As idealistic as this message of reconciliation sounds, there are those who aim at it also in our day, and who are succeeding in remarkable ways. I am thinking here of Corazon Aquino in the Philippines and of the Solidarity movement led by Lech Walesa in Poland--the first of several nonviolent revolutions in Eastern Europe which have astounded the world. All of these movements for nonviolent change stress the need for reconciliation and collaboration with opponents.

Augustine described realistically, however, also the obstacles to peace: anger, vengefulness, hostility, cynicism, and downright disbelief. Peacemaking must take on--even in the face of such barricades--courage, patience, warmth, and hope. It must, in short, be at work like yeast in society and manifest itself in the bread of social institutions.

The issues I have chosen to concentrate on in this study are how this vision of peace is reflected in Augustine's view of Roman society, as evident especially in his *City of God*, and what a difference this vision made in his attitude toward the Pax Romana, which had been "in place" for several centuries. I concentrate on peace, which Augustine--more than any other Father of the Church--made the goal of social striving, and from which both Catholic and Protestant traditions derive much, if not all, of their teaching on

peace. I seek to show how this concern for peace manifested itself in Augustine's attitude toward social structures both in the family and society.

THE PAX ROMANA

In their study of Peace in the Ancient World, Melko and Weigel have noted that peaceful societies have generally been distinguished as having systems of law giving reasonable expectations of justice, economic prosperity, generally active trade, interaction with other civilizations, religious tolerance, and artistic creativity. Such was, in their opinion, the Pax Romana which characterized the Roman empire from 31 B.C. to 161 A.D. Describing that period as the "best known of all peace periods," they observed that the Pax Romana was

a model of administrative efficiency because such a vast area of diverse nations was united in relative harmony under a government directed from one city and by one man. It . . . brought together in harmony geographical areas that had previously known incessant warfare and that had been both fragmented and plagued by war regularly since [then].(107)

Various early Christian writers thought of the Roman Empire as an instrument of providence. Melito of Sardis referred to it as the instrument which facilitated the preaching of the gospel. Origen spoke of it as the polity which rendered possible the unifying action of God healing human fragmentation. Eusebius of Caesarea considered it the kingdom of God--no less--come on earth through the leadership of Constantine. For Prudentius, the achievement of the emperor Theodosius seemed to realize the ideal Pax Romana which ensured a lasting peace.

The early Augustine also, as Markus has noted, took a similarly sanguine view. At first the Christian empire appeared to Augustine to fulfil the prophecy that the Messiah would bring all the kings of the earth to adore God (Psalm 72: 11); the spread of Christianity throughout the world, assisted by its Roman rulers, seemed also, to the early Augustine, part of God's providence for the

salvation of the human race.² This oversimplified interpretation of Augustine, popularized in the west by Charlemagne, was one of the sources of the attempt in medieval society to spread the kingdom of God by means of the sword.³

The later Augustine, however, took quite a different attitude toward the Roman empire.⁴ He became convinced that some Messianic prophecies were far from being fulfilled, e.g. Psalm 46:9, that the Messiah would make wars cease even to the ends of the earth. Persecutions of Christians had ceased, he acknowledged, but they could just as easily resume at some future time. Meanwhile it was his conviction that it was not the Christian religion which had brought the Empire down, but rather the decadent human life-style characteristic of many Roman citizens (*City* 2.19; Bettenson 70). Because of this decadence, he did not, in fact, consider his times "Christian times," nor did he consider the Pax Romana "God's chosen instrument" for human salvation. The Lord's parable of the weeds and the wheat made Augustine consider any identification of the Empire as God's chosen instrument too simple an interpretation to fit the complex reality around him of intermixed good and evil.

The Fall of Rome to the barbarian, Arian Goths in 410 further confirmed his opinion. While Rome was governed by Christian emperors, the Goths who sacked Rome were also Christians, albeit Arians. Little wonder that pagans blamed the fall of the city to these invaders on the Christian God! Nonetheless, the first part of Augustine's *City of God* gives us his interpretation of the fall of the city. Long before the coming of Christ, he noted, Roman authors had, after the destruction of Carthage, lamented the decline of Roman morality. Yet they did not blame their gods for their own self-indulgence, greed and immorality. The Scriptures, on the other hand (including the Jewish prophets as well as the Christian evangelists), contain impressive warnings against greed and self-indulgence. If Biblical teachings had been heeded by the kings and peoples of the Roman world, it was Augustine's judgment, the Roman commonwealth would have continued to reign and enrich the world. That it fell, he was convinced, was due not so much to the Goths as it was to widespread immorality in Rome itself. The Christian message had not been lived; although some had listened to the biblical teachings, others had rejected them, and "the majority found the blandishments of sin more congenial than the salutary harshness of virtue" (*City* 2.19; Bettenson 70).⁵

Amid the wars with the barbarians which then overwhelmed the Roman Empire, how was the faith of Christians to be renewed? If a man so strong in his faith as St. Jerome was so dismayed and affected by the sack of Rome that, even two years afterward, he could not--for sorrow--dictate his commentary on the prophet Ezechiel, how overwhelmed must many Christians less strong in their faith have been? In a world grown old through its continuing wars (as Augustine noted in his 125th Sermon), how was the Christian faith ever to be renewed?

AUGUSTINE'S HOPE FOR RENEWAL

Augustine's answer was (like the judgment of the Apostle Paul) through hope in God's purpose and his providence over human affairs. After citing the Apostle (Rom 8:24), Augustine adds:

As therefore we are saved in hope . . . and as we do not yet possess a present salvation, but await salvation in the future, so we do not enjoy a present happiness, but look forward to happiness in the future, and we look forward 'with steadfast endurance. 'We are beset by evils, and we have to endure them steadfastly until we reach those goods where there will be everything to supply us with delight beyond the telling, and there will be nothing any longer that we are bound to endure. Such is the salvation which in the world to come will also be itself the ultimate bliss. Yet. . . philosophers refuse to believe in this blessedness because they do not see it; and so they attempt to fabricate for themselves an utterly delusive happiness by means of a virtue whose falsity is in proportion to its arrogance. (*City* 19.4; Bettenson 857)

As many have pointed out,⁶ there is a tide in human affairs, influenced by things of which many human beings are unconscious.⁷ Augustine was also convinced from his own personal experience that the human heart is drawn by a force, a weight (in his words) which exerts itself whether we will it or not: a love for what is good which leaves us free but restless until we attain peace with God.⁸ This restlessness, expressed at length in his *Confessions* but re-

flected on also in *The City of God*, is the tide carrying all toward human wholeness, fulfillment, rest, peace. A man experiences it as a struggle, out of which no one dares presume he will emerge victorious until he has achieved that peace which is his aim in the many varied struggles of this present warfare, in which 'the desires of the body oppose the spirit, and the spirit fights against the body's desires.' Now this war would never have been if human nature had, by free choice, persisted in that right condition in which it was created. As it is, however, human nature has refused to keep that peace with God in happiness; and so in its unhappiness it is at war with itself. And yet this evil state is better than the earlier condition of this life; for it is better to struggle against vices than to be free from conflict under their domination. Better war with the hope of everlasting peace than slavery without any thought of liberation. Our desire is, indeed, to be free even of this war; and by the fire of divine love we are set on fire with longing to attain that orderly peace where the lower elements may be subdued to the higher in a stability that can never be shaken (*City* 19.116; Bettenson 993).

This same struggle is at work in the affairs of nations. That nations can attempt to resist God's peace is as much a datum of experience as that individuals can resist it (as did Saul of Tarsus). The Roman Empire had resisted the gospel, and had persecuted Jews and Christians repeatedly. It was, moreover, the conviction of Augustine, as it was of St. John the Apostle, that the spirit of unbelief continued at work everywhere in the world.

The desire of all people for peace, even in the midst of persecution and war, is the guiding theme of *The City of God*. That all nations desire peace is, as Vernon Bourke wrote, the most fundamental axiom underlying the thought of St. Augustine (162). We are familiar with Augustine's definition of peace as the "tranquillity of order" (*City* 19.13).⁹ Professor Markus rightly compares the quest for peace as Augustine described it to an Aristotelian telos; peace was the (ultimate) goal of all activity in the world, animate or inanimate, human or otherwise (1970, 68).¹⁰ I would add that a thorough hermeneutic of Augustine's use of the word tranquillity suggests a vision of peace even more universal than the Roman empire, a peace founded on an order not only within the individual (in the subordination of sense and feeling to the rule of reason and love), but also in the service of others, whether individuals, families

and groups.¹¹ For Augustine, the love of others must extend beyond a man's immediate family to all other human beings:

For this reason he will be at peace, as far as lies in him, *with all men*, in that peace among men, that ordered harmony; and the basis of this order is the observance of two rules: first, to do no harm to *anyone*, and, secondly, to help *everyone wherever possible* (*City* 19.14; Bettenson 873; italics mine).

Augustine took for granted that temporal peace--including the satisfaction of material needs, security, and orderly social intercourse--was the goal of all human activities. As he explicitly stated,

Temporal peace, in proportion to the short span of a mortal life [is] the peace that consists in bodily health and soundness, and in fellowship with one's kind; and everything necessary to safeguard or recover this peace--those things, for example which are appropriate and accessible to our senses: light, speech, air to breathe, water to drink, and whatever is suitable for the feeding and clothing of the body, for the care of the body and the adornment of the persons. And all this is granted under the most equitable condition: that every mortal who uses aright such goods, goods designed to serve the peace of mortal men, shall receive goods greater in degree and superior in kind, namely the peace of immortality (*City* 19.13; Bettenson 872).

This clear statement of the implications of the biblical command to love our neighbor indicates how positive the view of Augustine was in regard to the impact religion, i.e. the love of God, must have on our life in temporal society.

Robert Markus, however, in his earlier works regarded Augustine's view of the role of religion in society as primarily negative. Regarding the nineteenth book of Augustine's *City of God*, he wrote that Augustine, in effect, pushed such fundamental commitments as a man's religious beliefs and the values he lives by outside the field of political discourse. The only links between the realm of politics and the realm of faith and morals were now those which existed inwardly, in the way in which individuals' valuations are structured. At this personal level, political life, as all other aspects of

human living, must of necessity have some place in the overall pattern of the values which guide a man's actions, or some place in the pattern of motivation expressed in his activities. But these relations to a wider context of values and motives lie in a dimension which Augustine took care to exclude from the sphere of politics. This is confined to the outward, the social, the area which is defined, formally, by the possibility within it of coincident decisions springing from fundamentally differing structures of motivation (1970, 70).

Now this view seems plausible from the fact that Augustine had, in another place, asked "What does it matter, under whose rule a man lives, being so soon to die, provided that the rulers do not force him to impious and wicked acts" (*City* 5.17; Bettenson 205)? Secular society, Augustine realized, is indeed a mixture of those with faith and those without faith. Those without faith are concerned only with temporal security; those with faith, albeit as pilgrims in a foreign land, use temporal things as supports of sorts, but not if they prove too burdensome. Their view of peace goes beyond the horizons of this life. Or, as Augustine put it,

The earthly city, whose life is not based on faith, aims at an earthly peace, and it limits the harmonious agreement of citizens concerning the giving and obeying of orders to the establishment of a kind of compromise between human wills about the things relevant to mortal life. (*City* 19.17; Bettenson 877)

Appearing to read Augustine through the eyes of Thomas Hobbes, Markus cited Augustine as viewing political authority as "not natural to man, but a result of his sinful condition" (*Saeculum* 84). He claimed that although Augustine acknowledged the social nature of man, "he did not agree with Aristotle that it is also political"; he claimed that for Augustine, politically organized society was not natural to man (1967, 205). Man's acceptance of lawfully constituted authority was comparable to an illness or some other human distress: something to be undergone or borne, but not to be intrinsically related to perfecting human beings in any "immediately obvious sense" (1970, 86).

Again, in another place, the same author considered the eternal law of God, for Augustine, as simply a "negative criterion: what is in conflict with it cannot be just" (1970, 89). Although the ultimate goal of human desire is "eternal peace," the need here on earth--in

this interpretation--is simply for bulwarks to secure society against disintegration (1970, 95). Admitting that Augustine valued social institutions "for the sake of more than the bare possibility of life and its continuance," since they do enhance the quality of human life and social intercourse (1970, 96), Markus considered Augustine's view of human institutions as "essentially bound up with man's fallen condition. . . with no immediate relation to perfection" (1970, 98).

In a later study, however, on "Pride and the Common Good," Markus takes more seriously other passages from Augustine's writings which stress the connection between the love of God and the love of neighbor. In these passages, Markus admits that the task of government is safeguarding the common good.¹² We would note that for the same reason, the role of religion implicit in these is positive: opening people to concern for the good of others. In this study Markus notes and underlines in Augustine a theme he seems to have earlier overlooked: that "in any community, authority can be exercised 'not from craving for power, but in virtue of an obligation of caring for and guiding' [those subject to it]" (1987, 11). Here Markus cites the important text in Augustine's *City of God*:

where the bishop observed that in the household of the just man who lives on the basis of faith and who is still on pilgrimage... even those who give orders are the servants of those whom they appear to command. For they do not give orders because of a lust for domination but from a dutiful concern for the interests of others, not with pride in taking precedence over others, but with compassion in taking care of others. (*City* 19.14; Bettenson 874)

The influence of faith, of religion, on the compassionate governance of others in this passage is clearly positive.

THE ROLE OF SOCIAL ORDER

Augustine's dim "realistic" view of society, we concede, was largely colored by his own experience of human frailty and the fallen condition of mankind in an increasingly chaotic world. It would not be correct, however, to conclude from this admission, as Markus earlier concluded, that Augustine's vision of human social

relationships had no immediate relation to human perfection. As Renna noted, Augustine's view of the relationship of religion to society is "strikingly secular when compared to Jerome, Ambrose, and Cassian." He--more than any other of the Christian Fathers of the Church--joins his notion of peace to the idea of order. His notion of peace has "immediate social implications"(147). This is coming to the fore, more and more, recently.

Twenty years ago, Paul Ramsey cited the encyclical of Pope John XXIII, *Pacem in Terris*, as illustrating the influence of the Augustinian vision of peace in regard to Catholic teaching on human social rights and duties(xiii).¹³ Still more recently the National Conference of Catholic bishops of the United States cited Augustine's formulation of the just war theory as the "clearest answer" both historically and theologically as to how one justifies the use of lethal force against an unjust aggressor (26).¹⁴ This does not mean, however, that Augustine's influence has been confined to Christian theologians. Humanists from the time of Grotius have cited him in their development of notions of natural law and of human rights.¹⁵

To understand Augustine's viewpoint on peace and war, it is important to remember the disorders of northern Africa during the days when roving bands of Circumcellions were terrorizing the countryside, when the empire was in a state of "pulverized shock" (Eckenrode 1981, 251). If Augustine acknowledged the need for force, and was conservative regarding the police powers of the state, it was because, when the Empire was under attack by barbarians from all sides, the only alternative to chaos and death was some sort of police action.

Another viewpoint of Augustine, illustrating a different aspect of his conservatism in regard to social authority, is that Augustine viewed the Christian tradition in continuity rather than in discontinuity with the Hebrew tradition.¹⁶ For him, the Hebrew Scriptures were a primary, not a secondary source of wisdom.¹⁷ This is clearly illustrated in his letter to Marcellinus, the whole of which gives us the true context of his "just war" theory, which is, primarily, not Stoic philosophy, but the Hebrew tradition (Letter 138; Parsons 36).¹⁸ It was primarily for this reason that Augustine saw justice, as well as charity, as basic to any reasonable notion of peace. "What are kingdoms without justice, but bands of robbers?" asked

Augustine (*City* 4.4).¹⁹ Justice was, for him, "the morally significant differentiating factor in various forms of earthly peace" (Langan 30).

THE ROLE OF FORCE

The ordered harmony Augustine saw as synonymous with peace involved, first of all, doing no harm to anyone (*City* 19.14; Bettenson 873). It involved striving, as Paul enjoined, to overcome evil by good (Rom 12.21), seeking the good of those who offend, even if they refuse "to accept either correction or peace-making" (Letter 138; Parsons 44). It included the notion that no one is born by nature a slave (*City* 19.15; Bettenson 875). It included, however, also the notion that in the present order of things, peace and love do not exclude all use of force in a society "based on piety and justice," for the sake of sinners as well as the innocent. This was the tradition as Augustine understood it:

If Christian practice condemned war in general, then the soldiers in the Gospel who asked how they were to be saved should have been given the advice to throw down their arms and give up military service entirely. But what was told them was: 'Do violence to no man, neither calumniate any man and be content with your pay.' When he [John the Baptist] told them they ought to be content with their pay, he obviously did not forbid them to serve in the army. (Letter 138; Parsons 47-8)²⁰

Augustine also quoted Cicero's notion that a state cannot be maintained without justice, and that without true justice there can be no right; that justice implies assigning to every man his due (*City* 19.21; Bettenson 881-2). Augustine's notion of justice, however, was primarily the biblical notion of justice, which includes a person's relationship to God as well as to others.

Augustine is considered a realist, because he became aware through bitter personal experience that justice and peace can never be realized on this earth without the gracious assistance of God. He had, however, a vision of peace which he considered attainable, to a limited extent, even in the midst of the confusion and sufferings of

this life. This confidence was, for him, based upon his vision of God through faith, which he described in his treatise on The Trinity.

THE GODHEAD: THE PARADIGM

Augustine was, of course, a theologian first and foremost. In his theological treatise on the Trinity he gave us what might be considered a deeper insight into his positive attitude toward human relationships and institutions. Speaking of the Spirit of God as the source of human peace, Augustine noted how human beings are called to

preserve the unity of spirit through the bond of peace (Eph. 4.3), not by a participation but by their own essence, not by the gift of anyone superior to themselves but by their own gift. And we are commanded by grace to imitate this unity, both in our relations with God *as well as among ourselves*. (*Trinity* 6.5; McKenna 206)²¹

Augustine's vision of peace, of the way human relationships should be modeled, is based for him on the way in which God the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit share one divine Life.

In Augustine's view the love of others, of friends, and of country, stressed in his *City of God*, is modeled on the love of God, and is a positive derivative of it.

Consequently, when it is asked whether a wise man should be so concerned with social life that he wants the Supreme Good, which brings man happiness, for his friend as much as for himself, and is concerned to ensure it for his friend, or whether a wise man acts as he does solely for his own happiness, then the question is not about the Ultimate Good, but about taking or not taking a partner to share in this good, and that not for the philosopher's own sake but for the sake of that partner, so that the wise man may rejoice in his companion's good as in his own. (*City* 19.1; Bettenson 846-7)

Here, in human friendship, is the root of Augustine's positive view of human society. Even in the midst of a very imperfect human world, Augustine held "that the life of the wise man should be

social" (*City* 19.5; Bettenson 858). He noted that as language, which is of social origin, is for communication, its fulfillment is found only in human fellowship. Language itself was for him a "bond of peace and fellowship."²²

THE JUST WAR

Acknowledge though he did the need for using force, Augustine did not invent the notion of a "just war"; rather, he lamented the existence of war and entered into a dialogue with the traditional notion of it, in an effort to limit, at least, the evils of war.²³ Although he could not think of war without grief, he could think of a more pitiable condition, namely, that of any man who would rejoice in war (*City* 19.7; Bettenson 861-2).

For Augustine, the death of human beings must of necessity cause sorrow; but there was, for him, something worse than death or violence, and that was non-involvement or lack of love. His attitude toward defending the innocent went beyond the parable of the Good Samaritan in its literal form. What if the Good Samaritan had arrived on the scene during or just before the robbery? The greatest evil then would have been to have remained merely an onlooker, if he could have done something to stop the evil. Hence a Christian--it was Augustine's conviction--must love not only victims, but also attackers, but in ways appropriate to both.

Just war theorists and absolute pacifists part company when it comes to describing the ways one may choose to defend victims or to prevent attacking parties from harming others. Although Augustine held that, like Jesus, we must be ready to suffer unjust violence rather than inflict it on others, he also held it is not blameless to spare a robber or rapist. The robber/rapist must be chastised lest

you let him fall into a greater sin. Hence the duty of anyone who would be blameless includes not only doing no harm to anyone but also restraining a man from sin or punishing his sin, so that either the man who is chastised may be corrected by his experience, or others may be deterred by his example. (*City* 19.16; Bettenson 876)

It is too simple to say, then, as it is sometimes said, that in developing this notion of defending the innocent, even by the use of violence if necessary, Augustine took his cue from Stoic philosophers rather than from Jesus. He took from Jesus the notion that we must love enemies as well as friends; but he held that loving the innocent may at times include the use of the sword if necessary. Otherwise, why did Jesus (in Matthew 8 or Luke 7) not require the centurion to leave the Roman army? Or why did Peter not require the same of Cornelius before baptizing him and his household (Acts 10)? Why was there no Christian tradition requiring Roman soldiers to leave the Roman army? These are still relevant and thought-provoking questions even to contemporary Christian Scripture scholars. Among them, Furnish cites many other texts in the gospels that imply no incompatibility between military service and Christian faith (370-8).

In writing to the Governor of Africa, Augustine cited first of all the great commandment of the love of God and neighbor, but he also assured the Governor that he could please God even while serving his countrymen in the military, even as did King David. He urged the Governor, however:

Your will ought to hold fast to peace, with war as the result of necessity, that God may free you from the necessity and preserve you in peace. Peace is not sought for the purpose of stirring up war, but war is waged for the purpose of securing peace. Be, then, a peacemaker even while you make war, that by your victory you may lead those whom you defeat to know the desirability of peace. (Letter 189; Parsons 269)

The last essential characteristic of the Augustinian vision of peace is, of course, the eternal peace of the blessed in the vision of the Godhead. Temporal peace can necessarily bear only an imperfect resemblance to this ultimate peace. In this study I have stressed, albeit imperfectly, the similarities between the two forms of peace rather than their differences. As John Langan observes, however:

Augustine himself, one may safely say, puts more stress on the similarity between earthly peace and heavenly peace and sees earthly peace as making an important instrumental contribu-

tion to the well-being and progress of those called to heavenly peace. (29)

To sum up, then, Augustine's vision of peace is that of a relative pacifist. He noted that, while the teaching and example of Christ urged all to nonviolence, it did not compel soldiers to lay down their arms nor to refuse military service. He praised warriors who were both brave and faithful, who fought for peace and--amidst the chaotic conditions of north Africa in his days--a restoration of order. Then he added: "It is a greater glory to destroy war with a word than men with a sword, and to secure and maintain peace by means of peace rather than by war" (Letter 229; Parsons 152-3).

Disagree though many do with his interpretation of the peaceful teachings of Jesus, there can be no doubt that Augustine considered this interpretation the traditional Christian hermeneutic of peace in accord with the example of Jesus. Yet the ultimate goal of all use of military force always remained, in his view, peace: the peace of human society as a whole, temporal as well as eternal. For him, peace is synonymous with life; eternal peace with eternal life (*City* 19.11; Bettenson 865).

He compares the longing for peace to the way in which our individual bodies seek a place in which to rest. This longing for a place in which to rest was, for him, what gives life itself its weight (*City* 19.12; Bettenson 869).

All peace, for Augustine, was based upon intrinsic human needs:

the harmony and repose of human appetites; the agreement between human actions and human knowledge; the agreement between the human mind and the divine mind; the agreement among those who live together in any human household; even though perfect peace is found only in the harmonious fellowship of the saints in heaven, in the company and fellowship of God. (*City* 19.13; Bettenson 870)

He went so far, in fact, as to assert that there is no kind of existence for anything without some kind of peace as the condition for its being (*City* 19.13; Bettenson 871). This passage, as we have already seen, reflects the biblical view of the intrinsic good of creation, and

is--in embryo--an outline of the charter of human rights developed by the United Nations. Although he held that perfect peace could never be realized on this earth, Augustine still spelled out in detail not only a vision of the peace of heaven, but also the positive implications of peace for human society.

Augustine's vision of the origin and destiny of human beings inspired many, insofar as they were faithful to it, to preserve and promote whatever in human civilization was aimed at peace, including basic human duties and rights. Although some have disagreed with Augustine's interpretation of the example of Jesus, his vision of social peace was also inspired by the unity of God revealed by Jesus. He stated that "we are commanded by grace to imitate this unity, both in our relations with God as well as among ourselves" (*Trinity* 6.5; McKenna 206), because all creation is the work of one God, who is not only the Father of Jesus but also of us all. Here may well be the reason why Jews as well as Christians look to his vision of peace for inspiration.

Although he was a realist, doubtful that perfect peace could ever be realized on earth, Augustine held that the vision of peace promised in heaven to those with faith is achievable in a limited fashion even in this life. His vision of the origin and destiny of human beings moved many Christians, inspired by faith in one true God, to preserve and appropriate whatever in the multiplicity of nations and cultures was compatible with this faith.

Augustine believed that human duties and rights, to be truly alive, must be guided and sustained by the grace of God and grounded in living faith.²⁴ Augustine grounded his argument in the very heart of the Godhead. Until very recently, however, it appears that both Catholic and Protestant commentators on Augustine have missed this aspect of his social teaching. In fact, it is even claimed that from the time of the Protestant and Catholic Reformations, the Trinity as the basis of Augustinian social ethics has gone "largely untreated and unexplored," although it is the central belief of the Christian tradition (Himes 138). Hence the text we have underlined in this paper is crucial for an authentic interpretation of Augustine's social ethic, as well as for interpreting his vision of peace.

Augustine's writings are like the sea in their beauty, their vastness, their depth, and their power. Like the Mediterranean near him or the Atlantic Ocean beyond the shores of Africa, his writings have

touched and influenced all subsequent western lands and their ways of thinking, in moments of violent disturbance as well as in those of calm repose. Their depths remain, like many in the ocean, still to be explored. Still, his message in regard to the foundations of peace has touched all of us "en route with each other no matter how similar or disparate" we may be, whether Jew or Gentile, whether "integrated or crippled,"²⁵ attracting all with his vision of peace.

NOTES

¹ Compare this with the view of Hanigan that peacemaking should primarily aim at the reconciliation of one's opponent with oneself (18).

² De cat. rud. 27. 53; as cited by Robert Markus (1970, 32).

³ Mirgeler, *Mutations of Western Christianity*, as cited by Merton (41). Augustine is, nonetheless, one of the sources of the notion that civil coercion, whether against pagans or dissidents like the Donatists, is justifiable (Markus, 1970, 136).

⁴ Markus dates it (as beginning) from the late 390s (1970, 84), but he notes that even around the turn of the fourth century to the fifth, Augustine did not hesitate to endorse the Theodosian establishment, "with its forcible methods of repressing paganism and heresy and its recourse to legislation to enforce Christian orthodoxy" (136), although he did so reluctantly (137-8). Had he been able to foresee the horrendous conclusions later drawn from this fatal principle (noted also by Markus 1970, 142), he would no doubt have utterly renounced it, since it led (in medieval as well as in modern times) to terrible crimes against human dignity (which dignity, as we shall see, he upheld elsewhere, and which he carefully tried to safeguard).

⁵ Cf. E. Gilson, in foreword to *The City of God* (xlvi-xlvii). My colleague, Donald Brinley, has pointed out that this emphasis on the negative aspect of virtue has misled many Christians in subsequent ages, as Thomas Merton noted, to misunderstand the central Christian tradition on the positive nature of virtue; as though one could be happy in this life only by renouncing one's humanity. It seems to me that it was against this hermeneutic of the Christian,

Augustinian tradition that Nietzsche, Sartre, and others revolted. Cf. Merton (301).

⁶ Shakespeare, *Julius Caesar* iv, 3, 218. For contemporaries, cf. Bigongiari in *Political Writings of St. Augustine* (356).

⁷ This is a notion not so far-fetched as it might seem. Freudianism (in the so-called "free" world) and Marxism (among those under Marxian influence) both rest upon assumptions of forces (goals if you will) at work which have their effect whether or not people are conscious of their influence. But so does a lot of thinking about western democracy. Marcus Raskin observes that "myths of the common good in a democracy assert that people have capacities which are invariant and which are reflected in their observed and unconscious behavior"(82).

⁸ Cf. "The Essence of the Augustinian Doctrine of Freedom" in Clark(82-116).

⁹ As St. Augustine says, "The peace of the body. . . is a tempering of the component parts in duly ordered proportion; the peace of the irrational soul is a duly ordered repose of the appetites; the peace of the rational soul is the duly ordered agreement of cognition and action. The peace of body and soul is the duly ordered life and health of a living creature; peace between mortal man and God is an ordered obedience, in faith, in subjection to an everlasting law; peace between men is an ordered agreement of mind with mind; the peace of a home is the ordered agreement among those who live together about giving and obeying orders; the peace of the Heavenly City is a perfectly ordered and perfectly harmonious fellowship in the enjoyment of God, and a mutual fellowship in God; the peace of the whole universe is the tranquillity of order and order is the arrangement of things equal and unequal in pattern which assigns to each its proper position." (*City of God* 19.13; Bettenson 870)

¹⁰ Aristotle was the first to note, as Langan observes, the priority of peace to war in the order of final causes. *Nicomachean Ethics* 1177b9-12, as cited by Langan (28).

¹¹ *Tranquillitas*, as defined in the *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, still implies a peaceful condition of affairs transcending the individual person or city. In Later Latin, during Augustine's time, the word was used as a term of address almost exclusively in regard to the Roman Emperor. For this reason it is all the more

significant that Augustine uses it, not in regard to the emperor, but to that peace which in his mind is the goal of all empire, of all authority. Cf. Souter (31).

12 At the heart of the Augustinian view of government, Markus noted, along with its tendency to dominate people's lives, is its need to safeguard the common good. The latter is indeed its *raison d'être*, and while the temptation to exercise power over others simply to lord it over others is the sinful exercise of authority, using power to care for and to guide others is wholly legitimate and in accord with the nature of things (11). "Augustine's validation of government is precisely that it exists to control the conflict [between individuals greedy for their selfish good] and the insecurity inseparable from social existence on earth. Even though at any moment in time in any given society it will be hard to disentangle the extent to which power is being wielded for the common or for a sectional good, in principle it must be possible to distinguish a sectional from the common good and to ask which of them a government is dedicated to serving (Markus 1970 12)."

13 Ramsey also considered the "just war theory" developed by Augustine as originating primarily from the ethics of Christian love, or what John XXIII termed "social charity" (142).

14 Cf. Hoekema (360-1).

15 This is true not only in regard to these concepts in general, but even in regard to specific phrases and principles. Cf. Williams (51).

16 Cf. Cahill (383).

17 Cahill contends that both pacifists and subsequent just war theorists view the "Old Testament" as a "merely secondary source" (397).

18 This attitude toward the Hebrew Scriptures is evident also in Augustine's *Commentary on the Lord's Sermon on the Mount*, 1.19 (Kavanagh 56-59).

19 Cited by Pope John XXIII in *Pacem in Terris*, par. 92 (30).

20 The gospel reference is to Luke 3:14; the Christian kerygma in this text is implied as being in continuity with the advice of John the Baptist.

21 Italics mine, with thanks to Mary T. Clark.

22 This, despite Rome's imposition of its language on other nations at the cost in incalculable sufferings (*City* 19.7; Bettenson, 86l).

23 Cf. Johnson, "Historical Tradition and Moral Judgment: The Case of Just War Tradition" (301-14).

24 Implied here is a faith which works through love, or what some might call "caring" about others; cf. in this regard the observation of Raskin that the existence of God is found in human caring, "the most important element to sustain humanity," and a capacity found in all of us, whether Marxists or Christian liberation theologians(56.77). We might cite here in a similar vein many Christian theologians, such as Ignace Lepp or Karl Rahner.

25 Cf. Eckenrode (1984, 258).

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